You Can't Fight Tanks with Bayonets: Psychological Warfare against the Japanese Army in the Southwest Pacific

By Allison B. Gilmore

Book Overview

A startling omission from the extensive literature on the Pacific events of World War II is an analysis of Allied psychological operations. Allison B. Gilmore makes a strong case for the importance of psychological warfare in this theater, countering the usual view of fanatical resistance by Japanese units. Gilmore marshals evidence that Japanese military indoctrination did not produce soldiers who were invulnerable to demoralization and the survival instinct.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0803270895
• ISBN13: 9780803270893
• Release Date: March 2000
• Publisher: Bison Books
• Length: 234 Pages
• Weight: 0.76 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.6" x 5.5" x 8.5"

Customer Reviews

Good Book

Overall a great book, very short and to the point. The only complaint I had was that the countless abreviations used by the author make the book nearly impossible to follow. Other than that the book offers great insight into the psychological war fought against Japan.

Breaking the Samurai

There is a widespread perception in Japan and the west that the Imperial Japanese Army fought to the last man, often making suicidal banzai charges when all was clearly lost. John Dower argued that this was a manifestation of the race war fought between Japan and the West. Allison B. Gilmore shows in this short study that such was hardly the case. After a series of failures that often foundered on a lack of knowledge about Japanese culture and language, psychological warfare units under the command of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur developed an approach that emphasized despair. The most effective leaflets and radio broadcasts stressed issues that individual Japanese soldiers could confirm as being true and that did not offend cultural sensitivities. Drawing upon captured Japanese documents, Gilmore argues that U.S. psychological warfare operations were becoming an issue of concern to Imperial Army officers. There was a cumulative effective to the distribution of leaflets in the Philippines campaign. Between October-December 1944, the ratio of POWs to Japanese dead was 1:100 by July of 1945 the ratio was 1:7. MacArthur's command ended up taking 10,000 POWs. At the same time on Iwo Jima and Okinawa where Nimitz's command made only tepid efforts at psychological warfare, the Japanese did fight to the very end. There were few POWs taken on these islands. Despite its dense topic, Gilmore writes well and easily--far better than your average academic. The book is less than 200 pages of text, so it is a quick read.

A great book on psychological warfare.

The book follows the development of psychological warfare, at first with a little history and then getting into details about its use against the Japanese. The author points out that the use of propaganda was not very effective till the Japanese started to lose and till the Allies learned what did and did not work. Getting to know the enemy and finding his weak points is as important as selecting the right words to use and finding out if it's working. Truth is VERY important as you want the reader to trust you as a source of REAL information, information he/she can see as observable facts or can be checked on later.The author breaks down the basics of GOOD psywar operations with a number of general conclusions near the end. A must for anybody interested in military history or the Pacific Theater during World War Two.

Invaluable Guide into Psychological Operations

As a former US Psychological Operations (PSYOP) specialist, I found Allison Gilmore's study of the US PSYWAR efforts against the Imperial Japanese Army during the Pacific War not only historically interesting but also invaluable. Psychological Operations is often misunderstood as "mind-control" and evoke a dark image of disseminating lies through Tokyo Rose and Bagdad Betty. Although such kinds of "grey" or "black" PSYOP is practiced, it represents a small aspect of PSYOP. Especially in the US PSYOP, truth is held to be the most important weapon in persuading and convincing enemies to give-up resistence. A prime example is the Gulf War, in which the US PSYOP campaign was credited with contributing to the massive surrender of the Iraqi troops: US PSYOPers provided essential news and battle situations information to convince the Iraqi's of their inevitable defeat. Gilmore describes the evolution of Allied PSYOP efforts from the beginning to the end. Contrary to the widely-held view during the war in the US that the Japanese soldiers were impervious to any kind of persuation to give-up their fight because of their dedication to their Emporer, superiors, and their nation, Gilmore delineates, step-by-step, how the Allied PSYOPers analysed impact of battle conditions on the average Japanese soldiers, sorted-out psychological "weaknesses," and formulated proper messages to exploit those weaknesses and evetually defeat the Japanese "psychologically." In a sense, this book provides "how-to" knowledge and dispels myths surrounding PSYOP. As the saying goes, "honesty is the best policy," in PSYOP, verifiable truths, rather than lies, will win-over your enemies. Anyone interested in learning more about PSYOP or Pacific War, "You Can't Fight Tanks with Bayonets" should be an essential part of their reading.