We've Been Here Before: The U.S. Army's Transition to Large Scale Ground Combat After Vietnam - Transformations in Doctrine and Organizations,

By U.S. Military, Scott Nusom, U.S. Department of Defense

Currently, the Army is undergoing a major transformation away from limited contingencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and relearning how to conduct Large Scale Ground Combat Operations (LSGCO). While this marks a fundamental divergence in the Army's concentration over the last 17 years, a modern historical example of this transition exists. From 1974-1991, the Army underwent a comprehensive restructuring that turned the attention from limited contingency operations in Vietnam to fighting a major land war in Europe. To understand this transformation, this study examines changes in doctrine and division-level organizations and how the Army validated those changes from the end of Vietnam through the Gulf War. This monograph uses a structured and focused approach to assess this transition. Eight focused research questions frame the inquiry around one detailed case study. Additionally, three tenets from the Army's Operating Concept provide the focus of the paper: lethality, innovation, and adaptability. The empirical evidence collected supports the study's thesis that transformations in doctrine and organizations, validated in training and operations, enabled the Army to become a lethal, adaptable, and innovative force during its transition to LSGCO after the Vietnam War.This compilation also includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.The purpose of this study is to examine how the U.S. Army transitioned to LSGCO following the Vietnam War. To understand this transformation, the following case study examines changes in doctrine and division-level organizations and how the Army validated those changes from the end of Vietnam through the Gulf War. Ultimately, this study posits that transformations in doctrine and organizations, validated in training and operations, enabled the Army to become a lethal, adaptable, and innovative force during its transition to LSGCO after Vietnam. This study is significant to both military practitioners and historians. The National Defense Strategy, the U.S. Army Operating Concept (AOC), and FM 3-0 (2017) reemphasizes the importance of preparing to fight and win against peer competitors. Military practitioners can apply the lessons from the post-Vietnam transformation to the Army's current shift towards LSGCO. Further, the military historian will gain a better understanding of how the Army restructured the force in the decades following Vietnam. While an abundance of primary and secondary sources exists on the post-Vietnam Army, this study specifically concentrates on the process used to refocus on large-scale combat. Finally, this study will inform historians who are interested in studying the actions of the U.S. military at the end of the Cold War.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 1703098579
• ISBN13: 9781703098570
• Release Date: January 1
• Publisher: Independently Published
• Length: 78 Pages
• Weight: 0.45 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.2" x 8.5" x 11.0"