Under Siege: PLO Decisionmaking During the 1982 War

by Rashid Khalidi

Book Overview

A fascinating and often terrifying firsthand account of the 1982 war in Lebanon, Under Siege vividly reveals the complex negotiations and military maneuvers which ended with the evacuation of the... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0231061862
• ISBN13: 9780231061865
• Release Date: December 1985
• Publisher: Columbia University Press
• Length: 241 Pages
• Weight: 1.75 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.8" x 6.3" x 9.2"

Customer Reviews

An Insider's Account

When examining the 1982 war in Lebanon, there are many different aspects that one can study. Books have been written explaining Israeli motives for the invasion, analyzing the international reaction, studying American intervention, and debating the war's impact on Lebanese society. In writing Under Siege, Rashid Khalidi attempts to fill a gap in the scholarship by focusing on the P.L.O. Khalidi's personal experience and sympathies are a part of his narrative - he lived in Beirut during the summer of 1982 as a witness to the siege. In describing the situation of the P.L.O., Khalidi utilizes and contributes to a narrative that juxtaposes victim and aggressor, and his sympathies clearly lie first with the Palestinian people and second with their sometimes misled liberation organization. In his preface, he dedicates his book to those who gave their lives in "defense of the cause of Palestine and the independence of Lebanon." The Israeli invasion and the siege of Beirut were a high-water mark of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and was a military, political, and diplomatic showdown between Israel and the P.L.O. In the introduction to his work, published in 1986, Rashid Khalidi states that "few Lebanese or Palestinians have had the chance to record their view of events in 1982." These views, and Khalidi's, reject the narrative that Israel invaded, surrounded, and forced the P.L.O. to flee Lebanon in something approximating a Palestinian surrender. "It is wrong to assume that... Israel's defeat of their forces... [meant] that the P.L.O. was summarily forced to leave, with the only question ever at issue being when and how." A large part of his work is devoted to showing the P.L.O. as an actor in the events, rather than a group that was acted upon. Khalidi begins his work with an overview of the P.L.O.'s experience in Lebanon in an attempt to show the change in Lebanese opinion towards the guerrillas and their leadership. Initially, the P.L.O. participated in the Lebanese civil war, fighting alongside the Lebanese National Front (L.N.F.). The L.N.F. consisted of various leftist militias composed of Sunni Muslim lower classes, factions of the Shia Amal militia and led by the charismatic Druse chief Walid Jumblatt. The P.L.O. and the L.N.F. created a command called the Joint Forces (J.F.) against the rightist Lebanese Forces (L.F.) Khalidi suggests that the P.L.O.'s growing strength and its sense of entitlement ultimately led to the isolation of the Palestinian leadership in Lebanon. The guerrillas, who had previously fought alongside the L.N.F. against the rightist militias and the Syrian army, found themselves without allies on the eve of the invasion. This isolation at the beginning of the war was only exacerbated by the punishment the Lebanese suffered under the Israeli assault. Lebanese opposition under siege meant that the P.L.O. could draw on no domestic support against the Israeli position. In describing the terrific difficulties of confront