Ukraine and Russia: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, Volume II: Country Studies

by Anatol Lieven

Journalist Anatol Lieven here explores the complex ethnic and political relationship of Ukraine and Russia. Based on extensive interviews, Lieven provides a fascinating portrait of the diversity that... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 1878379879
• ISBN13: 9781878379870
• Release Date: January 1999
• Publisher: United States Institute of Peace Press
• Length: 208 Pages
• Weight: 0.25 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.5" x 6.1" x 9.0"

Customer Reviews

Generally good analysis

The author is known for his prior excellent work on the Baltic States and Chechnya. In this work, turning his keen analytical skills on post-Soviet Ukraine, Lieven has done another thorough study. His conclusions will doubtless go unappreciated by "Sinn Fein"-type Western Ukrainians, with their ever-present Russophobia; or by NATO expansionists who cling to the long-coveted dream of using Ukraine to contain Russia. But Lieven's prognosis, which envisions an Irish-British type of resolution for Russia and Ukraine, is doubtless the option best suited for two closely related - and in many ways inseparable - nations.

A Laissez-Faire Approach to Problem Solving

Well written and quite thoughtful on the issue regarding Ukraine's relationship to Russia. Although I disagree with the conclusion of the book, I found the perspective the author tried to present to be generally even-handed. In the conclusion, the author appears to express Russian sentiments regarding Ukraine and its cultural development for the future and also borders on "utopian" when he suggests that "there is no imminent threat of Russian aggression". Here are some obvious examples of Russian aggression. 1. The "Gas Crisis/War" in Ukraine is primarily the fault of Russia which is now interested in punishing Ukraine for electing a Western-minded, EU-seeking reformer in Yushchenko. Anyone who had closely followed this crisis could see for themselves that Russia is interested in keeping Ukraine in its orbit of influence. Rewards for those satisfying Russian interests and punishments for those who defy Russian interests. All one needs to do is compare the prices for gas between Ukraine and Belarus. One need not look too closely to witness Russian aggression and displeasure. 2. Russia's approach to Yulia Tymoshenko. First she's a wanted criminal, then the case is closed as she becomes friendlier to Moscow, and now it looks like they have decided to open the case once more after the Gas Crisis (which apparently has not yet come to an end). http://kommersant.com/page.asp?id=638907 3. The recent disputes regarding the lighthouses on the Crimean coast and the stay of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (Russia suggesting an indefinite stay, Ukraine suggesting the Fleet should leave ASAP, as it poses security concerns, conflict with the Ukrainian constitution, etc). 4. Russia's insistence that the Russian language be given the status of 2nd Official Language, only interested in exerting greater influence in Ukraine affairs. This is done in order to enhance the Russian presence in Ukraine and eventually attempting to claim Crimea again as a territory belonging to Russia or simply using it as leverage in future disputes. Also, to give Russian the status of 2nd Official Language makes the process of nation-building in Ukraine somewhat more difficult and serves to simply disconnect Russian-speaking Ukrainians from Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, further erode Ukrainian national identity as Russia has consistently always done in the past, and reconnect Ukraine (or at least portions of South-East Ukraine) to Russia through its Russian-speaking people - exerting greater influence in Ukraine's internal affairs. 5. And here is a very telling article on Ukraine in the mind of Russians. http://kommersant.com/page.asp?id=643367 Though one should certainly not fear Russia, one should also not underestimate her in the political sphere of influence. A laissez-faire approach may create greater cooperation and understanding between Ukrainians and Russians in time, but it will do so on Russia's terms and will gradually erode the freedom, sovereignty, language, and future

An excellent review

Anatol Lieven does a marvelous job explaining a rather complex issue of Ukrainian-Russian relations with great tact, detail and understanding that so commonly lacks in the works produced in the West. The book makes it obvious that a currently fashionable talk on postimperialist Russia versus an underdog postcolonialist Ukraine misfits the issue. The reality of modern nation building through separation and distancing from the larger "mother" nation makes reciprocal perceptions of Russians in Ukraine and Ukrainians in Russia as much a function of self-serving politics as of the common historical past, mutual admiration and truly fraternal ties between these two related nations. Lieven's cautioning againt the dangers of nationalism masquerading as "postcolonial" democracy is as relevant to Ukraine as it is to Kazakhstan or, say, Zimbabwe. The book makes a strong case against continuing attempts of some western geopoliticians, unreconstructed cold warriors and eternally anti-Russian hawks of the Ukrainian dispora in the west to drive a wedge between the two countries that even now are much closer to each other than, for example, Canada and the USA. The book essentially argues that, to facilitate both countries' liberal-democratic development, the West must help their strategic partnership, not obstruct it. This is a refreshing view, made all the more relevant by post-September 11 developments.

Excellent Short Survey

This book gives a great overview of Ukraine's history and Ukrainian-Russian relations. It's central argument is that relations are likely to remain peaceful between these two great Slavic states unless Ukraine's economy does much worse than Russia's or Ukrainian nationalism (concentrated among a decided minority of Ukrainians in Galicia in western Ukraine) grows markedly. Lieven argues that the West should not encourage the nationalists as stronger old-style Ukrainian nationalism would be one of the few things to harm the otherwise extremely close and good relations between Ukrainians and Russians throughout much of the rest of Ukraine. Well-written and a lot packed into this thoughtful good work that remains relavant in 2001.