Torture Team: Rumsfeld's Memo and the Betrayal of American Values

by Philippe Sands and Carre Le John

Book Overview

On December 2, 2002 the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, signed his name at the bottom of a document that listed eighteen techniques of interrogation--techniques that defied international... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0230603904
• ISBN13: 9780230603905
• Release Date: May 2008
• Publisher: Palgrave MacMillan
• Length: 254 Pages
• Weight: 1.06 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.0" x 6.5" x 9.3"

Customer Reviews

the terror of torture

In November 2001, al-Qahtani Mohammed was captured in Afghanistan and sent to the American detention facility at Guantanamo, Cuba. About a year later, it was discovered that he had likely been an additional hijacker for the 9-11 terrorist attacks and a member of al-Qaeda, and so he was placed in isolation for 160 days. During that time he was subjected to aggressive interrogation techniques twenty hours a day for fifty-four straight days. His interrogation logs, in fact, were published by Time magazine on March 3, 2006, and Sands sprinkles excerpts of them throughout his book. al-Qahtani was not charged with any crimes for six years, not until February 11, 2008, and those charges were dropped by the Pentagon on May 12, 2008. Philippe Sands teaches at the University College London, and is a leading expert in international law. He participated in the torture cases of Pinochet and Charles Taylor. His book is meticulous in detail, exhaustive in its research, fairminded in letting all the protagonists explain their versions of the story, cautious in his language, suprisingly suspenseful given the arcane and complex nature of the subject matter, and, more than anything else, devastating in its conclusions. Sands believes that al-Qahtani's treatment amounted to torture, and that those who were responsible for his treatment are guilty of war crimes in light of the Geneva Conventions (Article 3) and the 1984 Torture Convention. Of course, in the world of realpolitik they will not be prosecuted here in America, but Sands is deadly serious in his sober advice to the Bush lawyers (William Haynes, Doug Feith, David Addington, Alberto Gonzales, John Yoo, and Jay Bybee) who provided legal rationalizations for the torture -- be very careful about traveling overseas. Sands draws other conclusions. The decision to torture al-Qahtani did not bubble up from the bottom at Guantanamo, as the Bush administration claimed, but was explicitly directed by Rumsfeld's office and his now infamous "torture memo" that included eighteen interrogation techniques. Abuses at Guantanamo clearly "migrated" to Abu Ghraib. Torture is always immoral in principle (cf. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). Experts suggest that it produces unreliable results, and that proved to be the case with al-Qahtani, as no meaningful intelligence was gathered from him. His treatment was a betrayal of American values and longstanding military practice. It put American soldiers at risk and undermined America's reputation abroad. But the Bush administration argued that the extraordinary times required extraordinary measures, that there were palpable fears of further attacks, and so they sought the legal fig leaf to cover what they intended to do no matter what. As with the run-up to the Iraq war, normal processes were subverted. In his acknowledgements Sands pays special tribute to the career military lawyers he encountered. A list of principal characters and a

Useful study of how the US state reintroduced torture

Philippe Sands QC, Professor of Law at University College London, wrote the acclaimed Lawless World. In this new book he investigates how the US state introduced aggressive interrogation techniques at Guantanamo and elsewhere. He interviewed key figures in the US Department of Defense, including Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Major General Michael Dunlavey, Commanding Officer of the Joint Task Force Guantanamo until 8 November 2002, General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General James Hill, Commander of US Southern Command. Sands shows that the highest US authorities authorised criminal acts. As Abraham Lincoln said in 1863, "military necessity does not admit of cruelty ... nor of torture to extract confessions." Aggressive interrogation techniques, as well as being immoral, are unnecessary because they are unreliable, and they are also counter-productive because they discredit the user, undermine the user side's war effort and increase the risks to the user side's POWs. A National Defense Intelligence College study of 2006 concluded that there was almost no scientific evidence to support their use. Yet in February 2002, President George W. Bush ruled that none of the Guantanamo detainees could rely on any of the protections granted by the Geneva Conventions. This ruling was intended to remove all constraints on interrogation, as Douglas Feith confirmed to Sands. On 2 December 2002 Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld signed an `Action Memo' one of whose four attachments authorised the use of eighteen interrogation techniques. These all contravened US Army Field Manual 34-52, the rule book for military interrogation, and broke Common Article 3 of the Conventions, which prohibits cruel or inhumane treatment and `outrages upon personal dignity', without exceptions for `necessity' or national security. Further, as former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger concluded in his report, "the augmented techniques for Guantanamo migrated to Afghanistan and Iraq where they were neither limited nor safeguarded." US pressure also led British forces in Iraq to adopt more aggressive interrogation techniques, as Brigadier Ewan Duncan, responsible for British HUMINT operations, acknowledged to Sands. In June 2006 the US Supreme Court ruled that Bush's decision was unlawful and that Common Article 3 applied to all Guantanamo detainees. As Justice Anthony Kennedy said, "violations of Common Article 3 are considered `war crimes'." All acts of torture and all acts of complicity or participation in torture are criminal offences.

Sands Has Done the Work for Prosecution by International Court

After seeing Sands on Moyers, I ordered this book. The detail he brings to the possible prosecution of Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld/Yoo/Haynes/Feith for war crimes is remarkable. His interview with Dr. Abigail Seltzer in evaluating whether the treatment of Detainee 063 constituted torture is unsurpassed. His summation in Chapter 25 lays out the case with assistance from Lord Wright, who chaired the United Nations War Crimes Commission. Such a fine read!

On Law and Order

This is not a wild diatribe about the misguided Bush administration or an 'anti' anything. It's a well written and well documented account by an eminent British QC (Queens Council) of how Rumsfeld bent US and International law to allow interorgators to use torture in the prison camps in violation of the Geneva convention. It exposes part of the shame that Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld has brought on the great USA by invading Iraq. Should be read by all loyal US citizens to make them aware of how important it is to use the voting booth in an enlightned way to ensure that an honorable and wise government is empowered.

Connecting the Dots, Examining the Apple Tree

Phillipe Sands book brings together a lot that was already known with some new information provided by interviews. This book was valuable in that it places the information in a coherent narrative. Sands lets his Interviewees speak for themselves and succeeds in not judging them personally, nor questioning their motives, but only points out where the International and US law may be used to judge them and their possible guilt. He interviews Jim Haynes, General Hill, Doug Feith, Diane Beaver, General Myers and others, devoting a chapter to each interview. The overall effect of these interviews is at times startling. Sands focuses his main argument on the fact that lawyers were not guided by law in their memos and advice to the President, VP, Secretary of Defense, and others, but were subservient to the policy choices of our leaders. To use a phrase of Vice President Cheney, the Pentagon and Justice Department lawyers tried to write the law from the "dark side." We the readers are the jury who will decide if they stayed within the bounds of the rule of law. I think Sands does show, in disagreement with Alberto Gonzalez, General Myers, and Jim Haynes that the mistreatment of prisoners in Guantanamo was not in response to a request for guidance from below but was the premeditated, concerted effort of the lead Principals and Lawyers in the Bush Administration to bypass Army FM 34-52. The timeframe of the discussions, memos and interrogation policies of Guantanamo all support that conclusion. There can be no question of coincidental connections. Phillipe Sands convincingly connects the dots in my opinion. President Bush and his advisors made two momentous decisions. First, they set aside the Geneva Conventions and second, they augmented FM 34-52 with 18 interrogation techniques used separately and in concert. These interrogations left Al-Qahanti, the first target of this new policy, in the words of one Army interrogator, with "eyes, black as coals." In his interview with Dr Abigail Seltzer, psychiatrist, and medical expert who has had extensive experience with torture survivors, we learn that deciding whether techniques are torture, a lot can be gleaned from the reaction of the victim. The interview, based on the actual interrogation logs of Mohammed Al-Qahtani, Detainee 063, is chilling, to say the least. Critics may find that Sands spends too much time on Mohammed al-Qahtani Detainee 063 and exaggerates the importance of the treatment of one detainee, but I believe he shows how the part reveals the whole. Philippe Sands is very thorough in his analysis of detainee 063's case. He speaks with lawyers and medical experts to determine whether the treatment of 063 crossed the line into torture. His concentration, primarily on one case, did not detract from his book but strengthened it in my opinion. Sands also makes the point that illegal activity in regards to violations of Geneva Art. 3 can be imputed to a defendant based on only one case. In o