The Tragedy of the Middle East

by Barry Rubin

Book Overview

The Middle East has changed clearly, substantially, and dramatically during the last decade. Yet scholarly and public understanding lags far behind recent events. Barry Rubin's historical and... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0521603870
• ISBN13: 9780521603874
• Release Date: May 2012
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Length: 296 Pages
• Weight: 0.05 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.7" x 6.4" x 8.8"

Customer Reviews

Extremely Useful in Providing Context for ME Conflicts

Contrary to the previous reader review, I found the book extremely useful in providing a context for understanding the current ME conflicts. Clearly, when individuals harbor the feelings of the previous reviewer, we in America who believe in the continuation of our democracy need to be reading as much as we can that will enlighten us to what fuels the hatred of democracy and the United States.

An excellent book about the modern Middle East

Rubin makes some excellent points in this book. One topic he addresses is the failure of the Camp David peace talks between Israel, led by Barak, and Arafat. Some people think the talks failed because the Arabs refused to offer peace. Some think they failed because the Israelis failed to make any serious concessions to achieve peace. I happen to think that they failed for two reasons: the Israelis were never offered the only thing they wanted, namely peace, and the Arabs were offered land and a state, neither of which they actually wanted. Rubin disagrees with all these ideas. He states that the immediate problem was that a settlement was indeed close. And it was the threat of peace that scared the Arab side. Peace might destabilize Arab regimes. And given that Arab leaders had spent years crafting an extremist public opinion, they now chose to let that public opinion scuttle negotiations. I think this is an interesting possibility. The author also reminds us that "terrorism is not a weapon of the poor or oppressed but a carefully thought out revolutionary tactic." Rubin quotes a couple of Arabs who say that from a practical standpoint, Arabs would be better off making peace. After all, it is unlikely that the more extreme Arabs will achieve all their demands, some of which are quite unreasonable. And they are ignoring the balance of forces. But Rubin explains that in this situation, Arabs are indeed ignoring the balace of forces. I would go further than that. First, I would note that part of the Arab demands happen to be to deprive Jews and others of rights to life, liberty, and property. Such demands are arbitrary. Next, I would note that Arab demands happen to include the theft of Levantine land from the land-poor. Even if these demands are met now, in the long run, non-Arabs will almost surely buy even more Levantine land than they now have, and keep it. And finally, I do agree with the implication that anti-peace Arabs are regarding war as something desirable in and of itself, even if the balance of forces is very poor. The author quotes a poll taken by al-Jazeera in 2001 which asked which was worse, Zionism or Nazism. I found this interesting. You see, I regard Zionism, which is simply Jewish nationalism, as the application of human rights for everyone, including Jews. Given that I support human rights, I support Zionism. And I regard Nazism as opposition to human rights. But how would the majority of Arabs see it? Many of them supported the Nazis. And many are against human rights for themselves, against human rights for Women, against human rights for minorities, and against Jewish rights in particular. Obviously, quite a few Arabs oppose human rights, and might well like Nazism and dislike Zionism. Anyway, the poll came out with 84.6% preferring Nazism (saying Zionism was worse than Nazism), 2.7% preferring Zionism, and 11.1% regarding them equally "bad." I guess the rest had no opinion. Rubin conclud

Good Intro to the Mess that is the Modern Middle East

Rubin is a specialist in contemporary Middle Eastern politics and terrorism. After an overview that provides some historical background and general explanations for the region's problems backed up by examples (the first 70 pages), there are three chapters devoted to Iraq, Syria and Iran, respectively, and then four chapters dealing with state-sponsored terrorism, the struggle within Islam, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and U.S. foreign policy. Rubin's analysis contains a good number of insights that make this book more than worth reading. For example, Rubin argues that the ideology of Arab nationalism (or Arabism), historically a rallying cry of Arab unity and strength since the 1950s, has actually been a major source of violence and instability. This is because it has been repeatedly used to justify domestic repression and violent intervention in the affairs of other states. Rubin asks the reader to imagine how much worse Latin America's problems would be if Spanish-speaking countries were constantly plotting against one another, trying to form a region-wide power base. I would put it this way: imagine if Mexico, rather than focusing on its own economic development, were to persue a political union with Columbia, invade Ecuador, and sponsor a coup in Argentina. The region would like more like the Arab world. My major disagreement with Rubin is that he clearly believes in the popular theory that Arab anti-Americanism (and anti-Semitism/hatred of Israel) is essentially the result of goverment-controlled media fanning the flames of popular passion in order to divert attention away from the failures of Arab governments. There are indeed many examples of this, but it has two flaws. First, this theory does not explain similar responses prior to the rise of modern state media. For example, how to explain the violently anti-British response of Arab populations in the 1920s which had tolerated Ottoman rule for 400 years, when the Britains were no more repressive than the Ottomans and improved material conditions? Second, this theory doesn't explain why independent Muslim media sources tend to be as, if not more, anti-American and pro-terrorist than official media. Rubin analyzes Al-Jazeera, which is quasi-independent, but does not explain how so many independent sources, including educated Arabs living in the West, hold views like those expressed by official Arab media. The underlying source of the regions' passions must lie elsewhere, and I would point to two. The first is the political psychology of Islam, which makes any non-Muslim power in the Middle East unpopular, however beneficial it might be. The second is the general tendency of all peoples, Muslim or otherwise, to resent the rise of a dominant power from another culture. This is especially true for a people like the Arabs, who have a long and proud historical memory of powerful Arab and Islamic empires (i.e. the Abbasids). The theory that region's anti-Americanism results from bad gover