The Strategy of Conflict: With a New Preface by the Author

by Thomas C. Schelling

Book Overview

'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes,... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0674840313
• Release Date: May 1981
• Publisher: Harvard University Press
• Length: 328 Pages
• Weight: 0.84 lbs.
• Dimensions: 8.3" x 0.6" x 5.5"

Customer Reviews

Everyone should read this book

"The Strategy of Conflict" changed the development of game theory in several ways, but none was more important than Schelling's focus on real life examples, situations or games that are relevant to what we encounter in our daily lives. Before Schelling, game theory analysis was abstract and mathematical; it focused on zero-sum games, where interests were purely conflicting and there were no incentives to cooperate. Game theorists built convincing abstract models for these types of games, but its application was limited, since most interactions were a mixture of conflict and mutual dependence. In other words, analysis focused on pure conflict, a limiting cases of real world interactions, while in "The Strategy of Conflict" Schelling attempts to generalize game theory analysis to richer games that are `played' in the real world. His generalization introduced the concepts, commitments, threats, promises, communication systems, focal points, and randomization of strategies into game theory (chapters 1~8), which was then used to analyze the its applications in national security (chapters 9 and 10). If you are studying game theory, this book is a must read. If you are just interested in game theory, I'd recommend reading this book too.

NOBLE PRIZE WINNER ON CONFLICT

The 2005 Nobel Prize for Economics was awarded to Robert Aumann and Thomas C. Schelling. Schelling is professor of Economics at the University of Maryland and applied game theory to conflict. His focus was on the weapons issues but his ideas have been applied to a host of business issues. In this review, we will apply some of Shelling's concepts to how companies fire employees. Schelling says "uncertain retaliation is more efficient than certain retaliation" when bargaining and "the capability to retaliate is more useful than the ability to defend." Now let's get practical. GOODBYE SCENARIO As a verb, "goodbye" is the act of parting. It is also an acknowledgement of parting. A goodbye scenario assumes that once employees physically leave the building, they will never be a factor for the company's future. The relationship was transactional and the transaction is now over. If the firm defines the termination as a goodbye scenario, the firm should be guided by a business model that says, "What's the least expensive way of terminating this relationship?" And Board members should ask tough questions about paying too much. AUWIEDERSEHEN SCENARIO "Auwiedersehen" is German for "Until we meet again." It has a more open-ended quality than the English "goodbye." In an auwiedersehen scenario, the assumption is that once employees physically leave the building, they may continue to be a factor in the firm's future. But it is unclear what that factor may be. After their non-compete contracts are over, they may join a smaller competitor and become potential allies or opponents in your firm's efforts to develop strategic alliances or acquire the firm. They may join firms that touch your industry and become potential referral sources of new business for you or a potential source of caution to others about using your company. They may attend alumni programs at their schools and encourage/discourage graduates from joining your firm. Each of these scenarios assumes capability of retaliation plus uncertainty of retaliation. The best practical defense in terminating employees under these conditions is "Treat people with dignity on the way out because the assured costs of such positive treatment are less than the potential downside retaliatory risks. AUWIEDERSEHEN VS IT'S NICE TO BE NICE We work with companies that treat departing leaders with dignity on the grounds that "it is good public relations and good for morale if we help former employees achieve a `soft landing.'" This positive rationale works only in cultures supportive of such a rationale. The Schelling rationale does not depend on an organizion having a specific culture for treating people with dignity. It develops a contingency approach to management based on a risk assessment. There may be times when a "goodbye" scenario does indeed make good sense. There are other times when "auwiedersehen" makes better economic sense. In applying Professor Sc

Major contribution and still relevant after decades

Since its first publication in 1960, the strategy of Conflict is still relevant today. His concepts of strategic moves and random strategy can still be applied to the increasing complicated international affairs. It's definitely a timeless classic for game theoretical study of international relations.

fascinating

I disagree with the review that describes Schelling's primary contribution here as the idea of focal points. This is one of the key insights in the book, but only one. He also has a fascinating discussion of threats, promises, and credibility and the relation of these issues to national security issues. The connection is explored further in Schelling's Arms and Influence, while this book is more theoretical in its orientation. I highly recommend this book to anyone who knows a little game theory but is frustrated by the level of abstraction which pervades the theory.

Schelling?s major contribution to game theory

Schelling's major contribution to game theory (and the study of culture) was the concept of focal points. He observed that in real life bargaining each player would rather make a concession than fail to reach any agreement at all. And there are a wide range of outcomes that would be preferable to both of them than no agreement at all. Now without some procedure to select among those acceptable alternatives, people might never come to a satisfactory agreement. This is where the key concept of "focal points" comes into play. Schelling defines focal points as "intuitively perceived mutual expectations, shared appreciations, preoccupations, obsessions, and sensitivities to suggestion." He criticized traditional game theorists for failing to recognize that "players" actually achieve much better coordination and cooperation when they are able to rely upon focal points. Although he does not make this analogy, it seems that focal points represent some sort of a "templat! e" or "blueprint" that helps to unify understanding and coordinate action. However, for Schelling, "focal points" are quite arbitrary-whether and to what degree they serve to coordinate action and expectations is the key question.