The Price of Disobedience: The Battle of the River Plate Reconsidered

by Eric J. Grove

Renowned naval scholar Eric Grove reassesses the first British naval encounter of World War II--the Battle of the River Plate. In late 1939, a force from the Royal Navy engaged the German battleship... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 1557504296
• ISBN13: 9781557504296
• Release Date: January 2001
• Publisher: US Naval Institute Press
• Length: 182 Pages
• Weight: 4.27 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.4" x 6.9" x 9.5"

Customer Reviews

Battle of River Plate

Excellent reading and was very factual.This is one of the best book I have read on the Battle of River Plate.

Harwood & the First Deception of WW II

Eric Grove's superbly researched and written "The Price of Disobedience" recounts the first major naval battle of World War Two. This British victory hinged on the first major deception of the war. The German Panzerschiff (pocket battleships) Deutschland and Graf Spee were at sea when war broke out in September 1939. Deutschland sank two ships in the North Atlantic, then was ordered to return to German waters. Graf Spee headed to Cape Horn and began sinking British shipping in both the South Pacific and South Atlantic. By December 1939, Graf Spee had sunk nine British ships. Captain Harry Harwood, commanding the British cruisers Exeter, Ajax, and Achilles, used some remarkable deduction and found Graf Spee off Uruguay. His ships engaged on 13 December 1939. Exeter, severely damaged, was sent back to the Falklands, two of Ajax's four turrets were disabled, and the magazines of Harwood's squadron were down to a seventh of their ammunition. Graf Spee, hit over twenty times, was seriously damaged and her captain, Hans Langsdorff, ran her up the neutral River Plate to Montevideo, where Langsdorff hoped to make repairs. Harwood summoned the cruiser Cumberland to join the squadron at the mouth of the Platte, while the Admiralty ordered the battleship Renown, the carrier Ark Royal, and an escort of cruisers and destroyers to sortie from Cape Town to reinforce Harwood. Churchill, as First Lord, orchestrated the British and neutral press coverage of the engagement to deceive Lansdorff and the Kriegsmarine into believing Graf Spee was bottled up, by not just Harwood's hors de combat squadron, but the Renown battle group, soon to be joined by the French battleship, Dunkerque. The New York Times' front-page headlines claimed a "reinforced allied fleet" awaited the Graf Spee. Rumors were circulated and printed that Renown and Ark Royal had refueled in Rio de Janeiro (when the British ships were 2,500 miles away). In German-leaning Argentina, the two largest newspapers quoted "reliable sources" that "more than five cruisers were waiting" for Graf Spee. Uruguay ("England's butcher") heavily favored British interests and, refusing Langsdorff's pleas for repair and resupply, Uruguay ordered the Graf Spee to sail under the neutrality rules, i.e., in forty-eight hours. The British, however, wished Graf Spee to remain in Montevideo until the Renown battle group had reinforced Harwood. The British naval attaché ordered a British merchantman to depart Montevideo. Under international law, Graf Spee could not follow an adversary's departure for 24 hours. The British attaché stretched out British sailings over several days (until the Uruguayans caught onto his ruse) and used clever diplomacy to trap Langsdorff and the Graf Spee in Montevideo.Meanwhile, Harwood skillfully maneuvered in the approaches to the Platte and signaled to Cumberland as if she were the Renown battle group, while the BBC broadcast an ongoing account of the mythical fleet waiting the trapped Germa

SHOOT OUT AT THE RIVER PLATE

On 13 December 1939 the Graf Spee, a German pocket battleship commanded by Captain Hans Langsdorff engaged three British cruisers in the South Atlantic. Questions remained as to (1) why did Langsdorff disobey orders and engage a British force; (2) why did the damaged Grap Spee make for British-friendly Uruguay instead of German-friendly Argentina; and (3) why did Langsdorff scuttle his ship instead of making a nightime escape across shallow water to Argentina? The author, Eric Grove, addresses these questions in a well researched account much of which is from previously unpublished private sources. Contrary to popular belief, under the limitations of the Versailles Treaty the German pocket battleships were not designed as commerce raiders but were built to counter a naval threat in the Baltic Sea. However, with the outbreak of W.W.II, these ships were employed as commerce raiders, and the text narrates the Graf Spee's 1939 commerce raiding in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.In direct disobedience of standing orders not to engage enemy naval forces even if they were inferior, when returning to Geermany for a shipyard overhual Captain Langsdorff decided to attack escorted convoys. On 13 December Langsdorff closed range to attack a convoy encountering not a convoy but the British cruisers HMS Ajax, HMS Achilles and HMS Exeter under the command of Commodore Henry Harwood. The author notes that Langsdorff could not run because the British cruisers would shadow the Graf Spee until reinforcements arrived so that "Langsdorff knew he had to sink or disable all three enemy ships."The text contains a good account of the battle. The Graf Spee was hit at least 23 times and sufferred 37 killed and 57 wounded including the captain who remained in command as Graf Spee was chased towards neutral water. Unaware of the pro-British feelings, Langsdorff put in to Montevideo where he hoped Grap Spee could repaired for a return to Germany. Commodore Harwood remained off shore in neutral waters with HMS Achilles and HMS Ajax; the damaged HMS Exeter was sent to the Falklands for repairs. Grap Spee was trapped in Montevideo. The text gives an excellent account of the gamesmanship played by British and Germans diplomats in Montevideo; the Germans wanting their ship repaired and the British working to delay its departure until naval reinforcements arrived. Uruguay decreed that Graf Spee carry out essential repairs and leave by 2000 hours on 17 December.Germany did not want the Graf Spee interned in Uruguay but the ship was not seaworthy on 17 December so that Langsdorff had three options (1) fight the British; or (2) run for Argentina; or (3) scuttle the ship. Erroneously believing British naval reinforcements had arrived, the options of fighting or running weren't considered feasible so the Graf Spee left Montevideo on 17 December and was scuttled. The German crew was picked up by Argentine ships and were interned in Argentina. Criticized by the press for not going do

An Old Song Newly and Nicely Sung

Eric Grove again proves why he's among the best of today's military historians with a fresh and insightful look at the classic December 1939 confrontation between the Graf Spee and Harwood's cruiser squadron in the South Atlantic. Purists consider this the last of the "old fashioned" naval battles -- pre-ULTRA, and so on. Grove makes a compelling case for the fact that regardless of the state of technology, the human factor remains key to the outcome of battles. The author's portrait of Langsdorff -- "warts and all" -- is free of the propaganda-induced biases that have plagued some other writers. The book shows the man to be undone in large part by his desire to make a definitive statement about the effectiveness of German sea power in the earliest days of the war, and his willingness to do so in spite of strict orders from his superiors to avoid engagements with enemy warships. The author's portrait of Harwood, Bell, and the others on the Allied side is cogent and insightful as well. Grove's analysis of the (relative in-)effectiveness of the gunnery on both sides is well presented, and he does a good job of interpreting the Graf Spee's battle damage in terms of its effects on the vessel's fighting and seakeeping capabilities, should a breakout from Montevideo have been attempted. He does the same with the intricate post-battle political sparring that helped seal Graf Spee's destiny, and offers a comprehensive look at the fates of the people involved on both sids of the fighting. Grove also provides some brief but interesting commentary on the 1956 movie done on the Battle. Throughout the book he makes minimal use of "hindsight" and succeeds in presenting a familiar story in a fresh and compelling manner. The only flaws I found in the book could have been rectified by some careful proofreading; in one instance the date of the battle moves from December to January and in another the word "judgment" is spelled two different ways on the same page. But the book overall is an excellent addition to the WWII naval history cannon and delivers keen insights into one of the war's most publicized engagements. Highly recommended!!