The Presidency in a Separated System

By Charles O. Jones and Emeritus Professor of Political Science Charles O Jones

Book Overview

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Popular interpretations of American government tend to center on the presidency. Successes and failures of government are often attributed to presidents themselves. But, though the White House stands as a powerful symbol of government, the United States has a separated system intentionally designed to distribute power, not to concentrate it. Charles O. Jones explains that focusing exclusively on the presidency can lead to a seriously distorted picture of how the national government works. The role of the president varies widely, depending on his resources, advantages, and strategic position. Public expectations often far exceed the president's personal, political, institutional, or constitutional capacities for achievement. Jones explores how presidents find their place in the permanent government and how they are ""fitted in"" by others, most notably those on Capitol Hill. This book shows how a separated system of government works under the circumstances created by the Constitution and encouraged by a two-party system. Jones examines the organizational challenges facing presidents, their public standing and what it means, presidential agendas and mandates, and lawmaking--how it works, where the president fits in, and how it varies from issue to issue. He compares the post-World War II presidents and identifies the strengths and weaknesses of each in working within the separated system. Jones proposes a view of government as a legitimate, even productive, form of decisionmaking and emphasizes the varying strategies available to presidents for governing. He concludes with a number of important lessons for presidents and advice on how to make the separated system work better.

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• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0815747098
• ISBN13: 9780815747093
• Release Date: May 1994
• Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
• Length: 360 Pages
• Weight: 1.25 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.0" x 6.1" x 9.1"

Customer Reviews

Conflicting Powers v. Shared Powers

Jones (1994) moves away from the responsible parties model of government which sees a strong president, coupled with a strong party working together to develop and implement programs while an opposition develops alternatives for the next election. Jones (1994) contends that such a system is unlike in the US due to the many competing interests - competition between the branches of government, etc. Jones (1994) calls this system of competing interests one of "diffused responsibility," one in which "responsibility is not focused, it is diffused. Representation is not pure and unidirectional; it is mixed, diluted, and multidirectional...credit will be take and blame will be avoided by both institutions and parties" (17). In such a system, presidential power can vary over time, under changing political circumstances, policy environments, and various institutional settings. The president is subject to a number of variables that may affect his influence; "the election itself and how it was interpreted, the number of House and Senate seats held by the president's party, public and media support, and the nature of the agenda" (15). When the president has more of these resources, he will likely be more powerful. When he lacks these resources, it is likely power will lie with Congress. Depending on such variations in power, we are likely to see government dominated by the president, dominated by Congress, or more balanced. Jones (1994) contends that the way a president comes to power - nominated and elected, elected as heir apparent, elected vice president, etc. - coupled with the president's background - political, professional, and party experience - affect the variation in advantages and disadvantages of a president, and the particular governing strategies a president may adopt. The president may maintain a significant amount of advantages to pursue aggressive, assertive strategies, or if lacking advantages, they may need to adopt a more compensatory strategies, i.e. "with significant disadvantages and particularly lacking and electoral edge, the president devises ways supplementary means for authenticating his leadership" (49). Ultimately, what Jones (1994) is arguing is that "the political and policy strategies of presidents in dealing with Congress depend on the advantages they have available to them at any given time" (19). Jones (1994) contends that presidential advantages and disadvantages are also shaped by the organization of the executive branch, the public standing of the president, and agenda setting. The executive branch - executive office of the President - serves as the contacts with Congress, the bureaucracy, parties, the public etc. Because of the potential power in this institution, it is imperative that the president maintain control. The organizational model of this institution can vary. It can fluctuate from a continuous and stable organization to one requiring major restructuring and many new appointments. Such chang

Questioning the Dominance of the rational party theory

Jones does a marvelous job in brining into to the harsh light the problems in using the rational party, strong president analysis to examine the relationship between Congress and the President. A must read for those with an interest in either the process of lawmaking or the interaction between the President and Congress.