1 Introduction
1.1 The Puzzle
1.2 The Argument in a Nutshell
1.3 Plan of the Book
References
2 Toward a Theory of Political Repression
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Why is Political Repression Important to Authoritarian Rule?
2.3 What the Punishment Puzzle Says About Political Repression
2.4 Reconceptualizing Repression: Restrictions and Violence
2.5 How Do Restrictions and Violence Connect?2.6 Conclusion
References
3 How to Measure Dictatorship, Dissent, and Political Repression
3.1 Introduction
3.2 What Counts as Authoritarian Rule?
3.3 Recognizing Dissent Under Authoritarian Rule
3.4 How to Measure Political Repression
3.4.1 Problems in Measuring Political Repression
3.4.2 Operationalization of Violence and Restrictions
3.4.3 Debating Important Reservations3.5 Conclusion
3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Authoritarian Spells, Campaigns, and Repression
3.6.2 Summary of More Flexible Lag Structures
3.6.3 Uncertainty About Violence by Level of Restrictions
References
4. Does Repression Prevent Successful Campaigns?
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Taking Stock of Campaigns
4.3 How Repression Impedes Campaigns
4.4 Design and Data
4.4.1 Hints to Sample Selection Bias
4.4.2 How to Correct for Sample Selection Bias
4.4.3 Data
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Exploratory Findings
4.5.2 Statistical Analysis
4.5.3 Robustness Tests
4.6 Discussion
4.7 Conclusion
4.8 Appendix
4.8.1 Summary Statistics
4.8.2 Difference-In-Means by Campaign Status
4.8.3 Marginal Effects Accounting for Sample Selection Bias
4.8.4 Results for a Graded Measurement of Campaign Success
4.8.5 Results for Unique Observations
4.8.6 Bootstrap Results
References
5 Does Repression of Campaigns Trigger Coups d'?tat?
5.1 Introduction
5.2 What's in a Coup d'?tat?
5.3 How Repression Discourages Coups in the Shadow of Campaigns
5.4 Design and Data
5.4.1 A Bayesian Multilevel Framework for Analysis
5.4.2 Data
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Statistical Analysis
5.5.2 Robustness
5.6 Discussion
5.7 Conclusion
5.8 Appendix
5.8.1 Summary Statistics
5.8.2 Summary of Within- and Between-Differences
5.8.3 Results for a Fully Specified Interaction Term
5.8.4 Results for an Alternative Coding of the Coup d'?tat
5.8.5 Fixed Effects Estimation Results
5.8.6 Cross-Classified Bayesian Multilevel Analysis
References
6 Conclusion
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Summary of the Book
6.3 Main Findings
6.4 Added Value and Limits of the Analytical Framework
6.5 Avenues for Future Research
6.6 Conclusion
References