The Myth of Rescue: Why the Democracies Could Not Have Saved More Jews from the Nazis

by William D. Rubinstein

Book Overview

It has long been argued that the Allies did little or nothing to rescue Europe's Jews. Arguing that this has been consistently misinterpreted, The Myth of Rescue states that few Jews who perished could have been saved by any action of the Allies. In his new introduction to the paperback edition, Willliam Rubinstein responds to the controversy caused by his challenging views, and considers further the question of bombing Auschwitz, which remains...

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0415124557
• ISBN13: 9780415124553
• Release Date: June 1997
• Publisher: Routledge
• Length: 298 Pages
• Weight: 1.50 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.0" x 6.4" x 9.5"

Customer Reviews

A Welcome Surprise And A Must Read

To someone like myself, who has been reading in military history for years, the assertion by stupid left-wing intellectuals, that the WWII Allies could have done something (but did not want to) about the Nazi death camps, other than defeat the German Army in the field, is preposterous on its face, beneath contempt, and deserves no reply. And yet, the Left proves, time and again, that no idea is too stupid to be incorporated into the socialist canon. For that reason alone, this hateful, destructive, anti-historical libel must be confronted. Rubinstein does an excellent job confronting, and refuting, this scandalous defamation of the Allies' heroic sacrifices in WWII. Rubinstein treats very well the purely military obstacles to Rescue. He then goes further to examine the historical record on who wrote and spoke on Jewish Rescue. I.e., not only does he treat the question of "what did they know and when did they know it", but he looks at what people, including leading Jewish intellectuals and Jewish organizations, were actually calling for, at the time. Thus, this book is important in at least these two respects. First, it is an excellent investigation of one, small but important, neglected aspect of WWII historiography. Second, it sheds a harsh, revealing light on the internal contradictions of leftist intellectualism. To anyone who cares about ideas, history, WWII, and the holocaust, this book is a must read.

necessary thought imperfect

This book restores common sense to an issue poisoned with a blame everybody paranoiac attitude common to victimized groups.Adolf Hitler trapped Jews in Europe and his minions murdered them. The Allies were sacrificing their economies and the lives of their citizens by the thousands daily at full throttle in a life and death war to end his rule and his evil. And that was the only realistic rescue effort possible or at least conceivable to the Allies, including Jewish leaders of the time. While this book is not comprehensive -- it is the first of its type -- it does give a fresh persepctive. One interesting detail among many is that the leadership of the Jewish Agency for Palestine originally formally opposed bombing Auschwitz for fear of killing more Jews. The author hedges and fudges his case a little by saying that even if there was a failure of will or effort, there was nevertheless the failure of possibility as well. Not much to do except win the war as Jews were in the hands of an obsessed powerful psychopath. But the main fact remains -- saving Jews from Hitler was a goal of the Allied war effort (and pre-war humanitarian efforts) but it was subordinated to the effort of defeating Hitler because that was seen at the time as the best means and because there was, in most cases if not all, little else to be done. But blame the world is a common and appealing cry of victimized groups, to those who feel strangely comforted by finding racism and anti-Semitism everywhere and from everyone.

Thought-Provoking, But Could Be Expanded

One of the most convincing facts presented by this book is the information on the accuracy of bomb hits by Allied bombers. From this, the author Rubinstein makes it clear that a bombing raid on Auschwitz, even if "successful" would more likely wipe out the barracks and kill many Jews (and Poles, along with inmates of other nationalities) without putting the gas chambers and crematoria out of commission. And, although the author mentions Babi Yar as proof that the Germans did not need death camps to make the Holocaust work, this could have been further developed. For instance, Albert Speer pointed out that, had the death camps been destroyed, all the Germans needed to do would be to revert to the pre-1942 method of killing Jews (and millions of gentiles also): Local roundups of victims with mass shootings on the outskirts of towns where they lived, followed by burial in mass graves (or mass cremations on pyres). Many other facts in this book could be expanded. For instance, accusations that the Polish Underground deliberately (because of alleged anti-Semitism) did not sabotage the rail lines leading to the death camps can be refuted by identical arguments against their bombings, as told by Rubinstein: Destroyed tracks can often be replaced in hours or days, and there are several alternative railroad routes to the death camps. In addition, many of the routes to Auschwitz do not even occur in German-occupied Polish territory. Finally, if the Polish Underground proved incapable of rescuing millions of Polish-gentile inmates from the German-Nazi concentration camps, it can hardly be argued that they deliberately avoided preventing the Holocaust of Jews.

Fresh air

A welcome breath of fresh air on this subject, pointing out among many other things that by the time many Jews wanted to leave Germany and/or Europe, the problem was not that other countries would not let them in, but that HITLER WOULD NOT PERMIT THEM TO LEAVE. The book includes an excellent discussion of the possibility of bombing Auschwitz, pointing out among other things that for most of the war Allied aircraft were not within flying range of Auschwitz. The book is also very good in pointing out the error of confusing what we know about the camps now with what was known during World War II. An example of this is another (editorial) review of this same book which states flatly that Allied planes routinely spared deportation trains from being bombed. How were allied airmen supposed to know, from mid-air, that they WERE deportation trains? Rubinstein points out that the aerial photographs that have been used over the years to "prove" that the US knew exactly what Auschwitz was were enhanced to that level of detail IN THE 1970S with photographic technology that was not available during World War II! He also explains that many Jews did leave Germany but CHOSE to go to other European countries closer to home (Holland, France). They never expected that both would be conquered by the Germans in a matter of weeks in 1940, trapping them under German rule. Rubinstein also provides many useful reminders, among all the anger directed at Britain and the US for not doing more, that the primary responsibility for the HOlocaust belongs, NOT to the US or Britain, but to Germany and ADOLF HITLER -- remember him, folks?

Realistic view of the situation confronting the Allies

Rubenstein does yeoman work in deflating the wild claims of post-Holocaust "Blamers." Through meticulous use of raw numbers and the context of the time, William Rubenstein demonstrates that, despite claims to the contrary, there wasn't anything the Allied powers could do to end the Holocaust save win the war. Rubenstein uses immigration numbers from around the globe to show that the world was extremely receptive of German Jews leaving repression from 1933-39. (72% of German Jews escaped Hitler's reich.) Once the war began, not one Jew who escaped Axis territory was returned to his country of origin. Treatment of escapees was not golden, but, as Rubenstein points out, that is another issue. Once war broke out, Rubenstein again shows that all that could be done by the allied powers was done. Armchair generals who offhandedly toss out suggestions that Auschwitz could be bombed should pay special attention to Rubenstein's chapter on this impossibility. Rubenstein is not a revisionist. He does not deny the Holocaust or any of the horrors that were thoroughly documented by the Allies after the war. What he does do, though, is place the blame where it belongs. With Hitler and his subordinates.