The Korean War: The West Confronts Communism

by Michael Hickey

Book Overview

Set in the midst of international power politics alongside fears of a worldwide conflagration, the Korean War at its height involved rapid, large-scale troop movements over long distances as each side... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 1585671797
• ISBN13: 9781585671793
• Release Date: September 2001
• Publisher: Harry N. Abrams
• Length: 397 Pages
• Weight: 1.45 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.0" x 5.0" x 8.0"

Customer Reviews

Korean War study from perspective of Brit soldier

Colonel Hickey wrote a detailed and interesting coverage of the Korean War from his perspective as a young officer serving with the Commonwealth Brigade during the Imjin River fighting. His commentary on the better and worst features of some of the combat units of his own army and those of the allies is interesting and different from other publications on the war I have read. Virtually no mention of Hickey's own role or action is included in the book and his name is not even indexed at the last section. Yet the very British observations and insights of Hickey's book come through. Having met the author recently and learned about his long and distinguished service in the British Army, I came to appreciate Colonel Michael Hickey as a special warrior and representative of the best of English society.

A view of the Korean War from the Boardroom and the Battlefield

This is a comprehensive and competent account of the Korean War, written by someone who personally experienced it. It tells the story of the first major military confrontation between the Communist bloc and the Western alliance. The series of explosive encounters between the North and the South Koreans, the Americans and the Chinese, and the myriad other groups involved is rendered in commendable detail. Military history buffs would be treated to descriptions of the minutiae of almost every battle - details that Hickey has meticulously extracted from a combination of declassified official records, regimental archives and diaries and interviews. One of the great strengths of the book is its ability to switch convincingly between power politics and frontline action; between the view from the corridors of power and that of the man on the ground. I found myself alternately enthralled by the vivid portraits of military supremos like General McArthur and sickened by just as vivid depictions of death and brutality in the trenches. Hickey also brings new depth to traditional accounts of the war by setting in context the contributions of other nations, besides the US, that answered the UN call to military involvement and coalition against the Communists. More specifically, he focuses on the contributions of the `old' Commonwealth: Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and India. In other accounts, their contributions are usually obscured by the role of the Americans. Here, their heroics and their idiosyncrasies are on full display. All this being said, Hickey's `Korean War' lacks that extra spark that makes a book a truly great read. It lets itself down in terms of style. Even after having read the book from cover to cover, I would never have guessed that the author himself was in the thick of the action had I not been told. His account, comprehensive as it is, lacks the rawness and immediacy of personal experience. The book could also be better structured; the narrative tends to get laboured and the plot directionless when consecutive battles are being methodically described. Not a book to be finished in one serving.

Good, but too much British for a general history

Hickey has written a nice book about the Korean War (where he too part himself) and his description of battles, heroic actions and important decision making are very good indeed. The problem is that he gives heavy emphasis on the British (and Comonwealth) side of the war, spending too many pages to analyze the battles of these troops and he has little knowledge for the ¨other side of the hill¨. The maps are very few and general in nature and in many cases the reader will have a problem to follow the action. Some chapters are especially interesting, like that about the living conditions in the front lines, the commando and partisan operations, the air war and the highly informative appendices. I wish Mr Hickey had adopted a more balanced account of the war, presenting also the strategy, logistics and tactics of the communist side.

A very balanced view

What a great read. Its a shame some American reviewers can't accept that sometimes the mighty US military machine is out-performed by its allies (never mind its enemies); this was certainly the case during the initial North Korean successes, and again later when the Chinese joined the fighting. Far from looking through 'rose-colored glasses', the author is plainly stating facts gathered from a wide range of sources, including, presumably, personal experience. The author obviously calls it not only as he sees it, but as others do as well; he is also fulsome in his praise for the US Marines, for example. The perception that generally the British, and certainly the Australians, were of a far better standard than the US Army units it fought alongside isn't the book's 'most glaring weakness', but one of its strongest themes. People in this country should read it, accept it and move on. A highly recommended book. By the way, the Australians out-performed the Americans in Vietnam, as well.

When courage and resolve won the day

Given the tremendous social upheaval that took place as a consequence of the American involvement in Vietnam, the domino theory has fallen into disfavor. While most likely not true in the sixties, at the time of the Korean war it was probably true. Eastern Europe had fallen under the Soviet grip and a civil war was fought in Greece that could have ended in a communist victory. The Marshall plan gave Western Europe new hope , but elsewhere communism appeared to be an attractive alternative to capitalism. The forces of Mao Zedong had just emerged victorious in China and colonialism was on its deathbed. When it appeared that the United States had no security interests in Korea and a quick armed victory by the forces of North Korea seemed certain, the attack came. Faced with the strength of the attack and the weakness of the South Korean forces, the choices were to accept a fait accompli on the Korean peninsula or commit huge amounts of American men and material. Fortunately for the world, the US and other western leaders chose to fight. However, the ultimate stalemate, which was in fact a victory, could easily have gone the other way. As is explained very well in this book, there were two points of crisis, the months right after the initial attack and the months after the massive Chinese entry into the war. A US response limited to diplomatic outrage would have emboldened many other moves by the communist forces around the world and other countries would have no doubt fallen into the communist orbit. However, while they were fighting it, the soldiers in Korea generally had no such grandiose thoughts. Their cause was to stay alive and to fight for their units and their pride. While the author does spend some time on the greater geopolitical considerations, most of the book describes the life and struggle of the ground forces. The chronicle of the incredible endurance and tenacity of the men who fought it out is an excellent account of what determined men can do. The author is a British veteran of the Korean campaign and that is no doubt the reason for the most glaring weakness of the book. While it is true that the British, Australian and other Commonwealth troops fought very well, they are portrayed as being the near saviors of many battles, never wavering in the face of enormous numbers of the enemy. Given that US losses were over 33,000 killed and over 100,000 wounded while the UK suffered slightly over 1,000 killed and nearly 3,000 wounded, it is clear who did the bulk of the fighting and dying. Some commentators have been presumptuous enough to argue that Ronald Reagan won the cold war as a consequence of his building up the US military. Such statements are absurd and neglect the courage and resolve of the architects of the Marshall Plan and the military forces commited to Korea. For subsequent events have clearly indicated that communism is an ideology that is all or none. It will either dominate