The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II

By Carl Boyd, Akihiko Yoshida Yoshida, Akihiko Yoshida, et al.

Book Overview

When first published in 1995, this book was hailed as an absolutely indispensable contribution to the history of the Pacific War. Drawing heavily from Japanese sources and American wartime intercepts of secret Japanese radio messages, a noted American naval historian and a Japanese mariner painstakingly recorded and evaluated a diverse array of material about Japan's submarines in World War II. The study begins with the development of the first Japanese 103-ton Holland-type submergible craft in 1905 and continues through the 1945 surrender of the largest submarine in the world at the time, the 5300-ton I-400 class that carried three airplanes. Submarine weapons, equipment, personnel, and shore support systems are discussed first in the context of Japanese naval preparations for war and later during the war. Both successes and missed opportunities are analyzed in operations ranging from the California coast through the Pacific and Indian Oceans to the coast of German-occupied France. Appendixes include lists of Japanese submarine losses and the biographies of key Japanese submarine officers. Rare illustrations and specifically commissioned operational maps enhance the text.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 1557500150
• ISBN13: 9781557500151
• Release Date: January 2013
• Publisher: Naval Institute Press
• Length: 296 Pages
• Weight: 0.95 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.7" x 6.0" x 9.0"

Customer Reviews

Japanese Naval Strategy in WWII

This book does a good job explaining how how ineffective their submarine forces were despite having superior numbers and large subs. They do a good job on describing the technical aspects of the subs and the men who served on them.

The Story of the Imperial Japanese Submarine Force Until 1945

This book was basically the first I bought on a subject that has fascinated me for as long as I can remember; Axis submarines. Written by both an US & a Japanese Naval Historian, the book is quite interesting. The book begins its story at the inauguration of the Japanese submarine force during the early 1900's, and continues throughout increasingly dangerous times until the disaster in 1945 when the forces of the money schemers and the Bolsheviks crushed both Imperial Japan and their Axis allies. Most people aren't really aware that the naval forces of the Emperor had quite the impressive submarine arm as well, but there it is. The Japanese took much early inspiration from their German allies in regards construction, but unlike everyone else their offensive naval strategy was more centred on the traditional Japanese doctrine of the navy; the decisive battle. The goal was here to lure a big chunk of the hostile navy into one huge battle and after this battle was won, the seas could be ruled with ease. As it turned out, the submarines weren't that well suited for this type of strategy, especially since the chance for this decisive battle was minimal and the attempts usually ended in a much further decimated Japanese navy. Although the number of successful sinking of enemy ships at the hands of submarine captains was high and often very important ships were sunk, there was usually often a ratio of 2:1 for every sunken ship, and considering the long-term industrial might of the combined Allied navies, this was highly unacceptable if the empire of the sun aimed to win the war on behalf of their divine emperor. Of course, the Americans (which were the theoretical main enemy for 20-30 years prior to the war) had very little to fight for except empty phrases and propaganda, the Japanese were fighting a battle for their very way of life and had the chance of transcendence if they gave their life in battle for emperor Hirohito. Hence, the dedication by the overwhelming majority of the Japanese forces, the submariners included, had a lot of effect on the war. The desperate climate of war made the Japanese come up with various forms of suicide attacks from the sea, including human torpedoes. Such dedication hardened the climate of the war, and contributed to the high losses suffered by the Japanese. Instead of focusing on the ships transporting goods and forces, the Japanese sought out the mentioned "decisive battle" and slowly got cut to pieces. If you want to read the story of the heroic battle in the meantime before the more or less complete destruction of the Imperial Japanese submarine force, look no further. The book could easily be twice as thick, though, but as people have pointed out, very few survived to tell the tale, so this is mostly just brief reports on encounters and various data. If you are even looking at this book with an interest in the subject, you'll never regret buying this book; highly recommended. 4,5 stars. (I read the 1995 hard

Interesting book on a neglected subject

The authors do a good job covering the subject of Imperial Japanese Submarine operations in World War 2. Despite limited personal accounts from Japanese submarine crews, the authors make good use of available sources of information. Presented in a mainly generalized format, the main stratagies employed by the Japanese for their submarine fleet are well covered. I was a bit disappointed as major and minor campaigns rarely received more than a page or two, and sometimes just a few paragraphs. Perhaps source materials did not allow a more in depth presentation of these battles, but I felt as if many operations received a cursory discussion at best. The authors refer to the Japanese strategic operations plan for submarines developed in the decades prior to the war (the last being 1934) many times throughour the book. However, the actual plan is contained in appendix 1. A recommendation to the reader - read appendix 1 before reading he book. This will allow you to see submarine operations and strategies through the eyes of the Japanese commanders who were raised on this doctrine. It will make the seemingly random movements of assets by Japanese commanders more clear and put you squarely in tune with their line of thinking. Despite these shortcomings, the book does a fine job shedding info and insight into a difficult and elusive subject.

Wasted assets

In the early days after Pearl Harbor, 25 Japanese fleet submarines surrounded the Hawaiian Islands. Off the East Coast at the same time, a mere five German U-boats crated havoc with merchant shipping. In the North Pacific, however, after a few vessels plying between the West Coast and the Hawaiian Islands were surprised early in December, the Japanese submarine threat was negligible. Authors Carl Boyd, an American professor, and Akihiko Yoshida, who is on the staff of the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo, attempt to explain why the large and capable Japanese submarine force did not do more damage to its enemies. It was purely a matter of doctrine. Though eventually outnumbered, the Imperial Japanese Navy's undersea fleet was comparatively ineffective even in the early days when it could have had the upper hand. This was because the Japanese remained committed longer than any other navy to using the sub as an arm of the battle fleet. The true role of the slow diesel submarine was as a commerce raider, and in the Pacific war the American subs massacred the Japanese merchant navy. Had the Japanese navy followed a similar logic, Maui might have been a much hungrier place in 1941-45, as Malta was. As it was, although the Japanese made a strategic mistake with their submarines, their tactical successes in 1942 were impressive. 'The Japanese submarine force has frequently been misrepresented in Western literature' as a complete failure, write Boyd and Yoshida. The U.S. Navy had only six fleet carriers in the Pacific in 1942, and Japanese submarines torpedoed three of them (the Saratoga twice) and the threat of Japanese subs had a lot to do with the loss of a fourth carrier, the Lexington. You could hardly ask for more from a light force against an opponent's capital ships. But slow subs were not a long-run challenge to fast surface warships, and the Japanese submariners turned increasingly to dead-end types, such as midgets, long-range airplane carriers and supply subs. (It is now suspected, however, that one of the five midget subs sent against Pearl Harbor did manage to get a torpedo into the battleship Oklahoma.) Surface fleets ruled supreme in 1941-45, so much so that almost the only communication possible between allies Germany and Japan was by passage of a few submarines carrying antimony, plans and other war material. The amounts were trivial and eventually even this route was choked off. 'The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II' concentrates heavily on statistical data, operational orders and staff memos. There must have been many adventures in the Japanese submarine fleet, but very few of the crewmen survived to relate their stories.