The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked

by Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts

Book Overview

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Few analysts of U.S. involvement in Vietnam would agree with the provocative conclusion of this book. The thesis of most postmortems is that the United States lost the war because of the failure of its foreign policy decisionmaking system. According to Gelb and Betts, however, the foreign policy failed, but the decisionmaking system worked. They attribute this paradox to the efficiency of the system in sustaining an increasingly heavy commitment...

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0815730713
• ISBN13: 9780815730712
• Release Date: March 1979
• Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
• Length: 400 Pages
• Weight: 1.20 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.1" x 6.0" x 9.1"

Customer Reviews

Superb Analysis On Vietnam And Why We Staggered & Stalemated!

One of a series of must read books on Vietnam for all who want to enter the field of International Relations and Foreign Policy. The author in a very methodical way details how America's National Security Apparatus of decision-making simply stalemated over Vietnam, not due to blunders but to positions that were well argued from both stand points. One group of advisors recommended no withdraw at any price. The other could not agree on how to win a victory and then exit. In the meantime, four presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon tried to win and escape at the same time as American boys blood reigned on the soaked soil of Vietnam. Although few blame Harry Truman's mistake by forcing a limited war to save South Korea, fewer know Truman started us in Vietnam as well when he first gave $10 million in Military Aid to the French in 1947. However, every president after him escalated the war to win it, only to see all attempts for peace evaporate when trying to stop it. What you find is the explanation in this book on why such outstanding advisors to five presidents could only agree to escalation to prevent withdrawal but develop no victory strategy at the same time. Leslie Gelb answers and details the blunders at the very center of National Security Council points of view. If you want to see how decisions were made back then, this is the book for you! In the end, you will question why so many failed leaving so many to die and few excuses to remember.

A Superb Book

This is an excellent, balanced, and well-written study of American foreign policy in Vietnam by two unusually able scholars. It refutes the modern mythology that LBJ and/or Nixon "dragged Congress kicking and screaming" into the conflict, and notes that a plurality of New Hampshire voters who supported McCarthy in Feb. 1968 went on to support George Wallace and Gen. Curtiss ("Bomb Hanoi back to the stone age") LeMay in the November election--that is, they were Hawks protesting a "no-win" policy rather than Doves who wanted to abandon South Vietnam to the Communists. Highly recommended.

One of the best books on American foreign policy wrt Vietnam

Very well-researched book regarding American policy towards Vietnam. The authors explore the constraints of each president, especially LBJ, when they had to deal with Vietnam. Especially incisive is the authors' view of "minimum necessary" vs "maximum feasible" constraints on US presidents w.r.t. Vietnam. This is not a conspiracy book or a first-person account. It is geared towards the academe who wants to learn about how US foreign policy was conceived and implemented wrt Vietnam.