Gleam of Bayonets

by James V. Murfin

Book Overview

One of the bloodiest days in American military history, the Battle of Antietam turned the tide of the Civil War in favor of the North and delivered the first major defeat to Robert E. Lee's army. In... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0517178052
• ISBN13: 9780517178058
• Release Date: January 1976
• Publisher: Outlet 1976-10
• Weight: 1.85 lbs.

Customer Reviews

Good Read About Bloodiest Day in US Military History

The Gleam of Bayonets by James V. Murfin is a worthwhile read concerning the bloodiest day that the American military has ever experienced. It is not the best book I have read concerning Antietam. For that I would recommend Landscape Turned Red : The Battle of Antietam by Stephen W. Sears. Murfin's basic premise is that Antietam was the turning point in not only the Civil War, but in American history. The Union "victory" allowed Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation and turn the war from one concerning economics and unionism to that of one to end slavery. By changing the nature of the conflict, intervention by the French and British was averted. Murfin's conclusion seems to based more on his assumptions than analysis.Where the book shines is in the comparison of the generalship of McClellan and Lee. Murfin goes a fine job discussing the strengths and weaknesses of both. For McClellan, who history has justifiedly ridiculed his handling of the entire Maryland Campaign, Murfin rightfully gives him credit for reorganizing the Army after the debacle of the Second Battle of Bull Run. Murfin is also correct is in his conclusion that Antietam was the best chance, prior to Appomattox, that the Union had to end the War and that McClellan needlessly lost that opportunity. On the day after the battle McClellan had up to 25,000 fresh troops, combined with at least the same number of other troops which could have been used to crush half as many battle fatigued Confederates. The cautious McClellan chose not to fight, and Murfin may be correct, that the Union was then condemned to two more years of bloody conflict.Murfin is deservedly more complimentary to Lee. Antietam may have been Lee's greatest tactical achievement. Outnumbered two to one, he was able to properly predict McClellan's moves and fight a battle that he should not have fought to a tactical stalemate. Any historical reviewer should have marveled at the ability of the Confederate Army to have survived the battle, without being routed, much less avert a Union victory. However, Murfin properly criticizes Lee's initial decision to invade Maryland and Lee's expectation that any tangible results could be achieved. The one point that Murfin misses is that the decision to stand and fight at Antietam needlessly sacrificed thousands of Confederate troops that Lee despritedly needed at future battles.All in all, this is a good read. The book is well written and Murfin does a fine job of interspersing quotes from the participants with his narrative. As a result, one gets a good feel of the soldiers thoughts and feelings on that bloody field.

Great overview of Antietam and the inept McClellan

What started as an assignment for a newspaper's 100th anniversary edition of the battle of Antietam, The Gleam of Bayonetd is the result of six years of intensive research and consultation with regarded historians. Murfin, an editorialist for the Hagerstown, Maryland "Herald Mail" newspaper and a member of the Hagerstown Civil War Roundtagle, explains in the book's preface his opinionated style of writing. For Murfin, what started as a mere examination of the battle, eventually became an analysis of the controversial Union General George B. McClellan. Throughout the book, Murfin examines and analyzes McClellan's excessive strategic caution, his failure to initiate an offensive, and how his indecisiveness shpaed Lee's decisions. Murfin portrays McClellan as a cautious general, reacting to Lee's movements as if Lee would, in some way, make a tactical error. This tactical error if committed would somehow afford McClellan the opportunity to launch a successful military offensive. On the other hand he describes Lee as the more cunning general, who knew McClellan's weaknesses and exploited them with his reactions. Comparing the generalships of McClellan and Lee to that of a game, Murfin writes, "It was a game of chess with McClellan moving only on piece at a time as if the same rules applied to war. Lee proved to be the master chessman, however." Convinced of the significance of McClellan's and Lincoln's relationship, Murfin dedicates and entire chapter to this relationship entitled "McClellan-Lincoln's Dilemma." In this chapter he examines McClellan's selection as General in Chief, his lack of initiative during the Peninsula Campaign, and his relationship with the political power in Washington. Intriguing as well are the two chapters examining both armies' physical contion to fight, and the Union Army's delay in pursuing the Confederate invaders. Murfin provides a detailed and descriptive analysis of Lee's Maryland Campaign strategy, and his seven reasons for taking the war to the North. Likewise, he looks at McClellan's blundered attempt to pursue the Confederate Army, while having in his possession "The Lost Order," and outline of Lee's entire campaign plans. In the chapter "The Flower of Lee's Army," Murfin writes of Confederate General Hood's arrest for insubordination, the conflict between Generals A P Hill and Stonewall Jackson, and of Hill's eventual relief from command. Murfin describes in detailed written accounts the Confederate's shoeless feet, their ill health, lack of uniforms, lameness, and diarrhea. Murfin writes, "Its seems almost symbolic that the "big three" of the Confederacy -Lee, Longstreet, and Jackson-rode into Maryland in a fashion that would soon be used by hundreds of Confederates when they left; by means of ambulance." The Gleam of Bayonets is a well written and scholarly account of the events leading up to Antietam and the battle itself. The equal treatment of both armies, and the almost blow by blow man