Falklands Sting (H)

by Richard C. Thornton

Thornton (history and international affairs, George Washington University) contends that President Reagan's solution to two seemingly unrelated problems, Argentina's nuclear weapons program and the... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 1574881558
• ISBN13: 9781574881554
• Release Date: April 1998
• Publisher: Potomac Books
• Length: 305 Pages
• Weight: 1.45 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.9" x 6.3" x 9.3"

Customer Reviews

Internal disputes affecting foreign policies?

This book is GREAT!!!It shows how three National Governments define their foreign policies working from/amongst/within their internal disputes. The 3 nations involved are Argentina, Great Britain and the United States. The issue at stake is the Argentine claim, and 2nd April 1982 take-over, of the Malvinas (for Great Britain: Falkland) Islands. I guess it could be just anything else...So it goes:1) In the US: Haig vs Weinberger2) In the UK: Nott vs Thatcher3) In Argentina: Galtieri vs ViolaThe books even reveals how Argentina lost the islands because of the steps taken by General Viola (de facto president ousted by General Galtieri) to make sure that the take-over was anticipated, which in turn gave the UK the time-window they needed (badly) to perform the re-taking.

Fascinating Study

This is a fascinating work of detailed scholarship. Thornton has put together a compelling retelling of the War, and by giving us hitherto undisclosed details as to the political infighting within Argentina, the United Kingdom and the United States he has managed to give meaning to so many unanswered questions which other writers simply dismiss as being 'illogical' or 'unexplicable' behaviour. Piecing together a wide web of inter-related intrigue, Thornton has put the entire conflict into a whole new light. Highly recommended.

The Falklands Sting is worthy of praise.

Richard Thornton's book is an important study for understanding the diplomatic machinations of the Cold War era in general and the Reagan-Thatcher partnership within it in particular. Hitherto, the British-Argentine conflict has been treated either as a sideshow in the history of international relations or as a symbolic reassertion of British power in what seemed to be its imperial sunset. Thornton's approach is entirely new and original, setting the conflict sqaurely where it belongs in the chronology of Cold War history. With substantial support the author argues that the conflict was a sting designed to divest Argentina of its military government and nuclear weapons program (a little-known fact, the details of which are only recently being elaborating) while strenghthening America's strategic relationship with Thatcher's Britain. Thornton gives great care to relate the nature of the divisions existing within the various (American, British, Argentine) leaderships and how they influenced the outcome of the war. Particularly relevant to Cold War students is his treatment of the machinations behind Thatcher's ability to make a necessary war and Reagan's ability to support her. Thornton exposes the attempts of Alexander Haig and the "wet" foreign ministers Lord Carrington and Francis Pym to sideline the military solution, secure Thatcher's political defeat, and implement a renewed detente relationship with the Soviet Union. The Reagan-Thatcher defeat of the detente cabal is of crucial importance to understanding the origins of the war and the place of its outcome in Reagan's strategy of renewed containment. Barring a few factual errors of the minor sort, Thornton's analysis is a true example of what American scholarship of the Cold War should be. It is a proud refutation of the left-wing view that international relations are simplistic or irrelevant and that the broad social trend is what should concern historians most.