The Crossing of the Suez

By Saad El Shazly

Book Overview

Third printing,of the original work by General Saad Shazly Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed forces during the Arab Israeli war of 1973, including three new chapters. The Crossing Of The Suez is an... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0960456228
• ISBN13: 9780960456222
• Release Date: September 2003
• Publisher: American Mideast Research
• Length: 380 Pages
• Weight: 1.00 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.9" x 6.0" x 8.1"

Customer Reviews

A must have book on The October War 1973

This is a fantastic book about The October War 1973 from the Arab's point of view. So many book have been written thus far, mostly from the Israeli perspective but reading this book will really give a new dimension towards the war. This book is totally superb.

The Crossing of The Suez, revised edition

General Shazly,the Egyptin cheif of staff of the combiend army,navy and air force,records his historical testemony about the era before and during Yom Kipor war 1973. His book adds a reliable personal angle to the political and millitary factors during that era.His testmony comes from a self build, well educated,highly decorated patriotic egyptin military leader. He had such a reputation that you want him to be on your side to assure winning. Reliabeilty of the factual accounts of the book are readly tested by raeding other accounts about the yom kipour war.Furthermore his (account) is the only reliable one comming from the Egyptian side.The book is very interesting, easy readable and provides maps and photo rarely or never been seen before. I only wished that the book to contain more photo about the war activities eg. aireal photos and more the role of the Egyptin paratroopers in the 1973 war. I,Realy, had enjoyed reading the book. It gets 5 stars for a 5 star general.

Pretty good despite the politics

This book does a great job covering the planning, preparation, and execution of the Egyptian crossing of the Suez and taking the Bar-Lev line. While it is probably necessary to include all of the political discussions, it seems to devolve into covering ones own backside and pointing the finger at others. Who knows if we will ever know the truth about the attack to the Sinai passes. Aside from those political sections though, the book is a good read. I highly recommend it to anyone interested in the operations itself, or interested in the planning of an operation based on your capabilities.

Excellent Book

Out of many books I read about the Yom Kippur War, this was one of the best. It is the only book in English that I know of that was written by an Egyptian top commander, giving details about the Egyptian side of the story (having in mind that most of the other books about this war was written from the Israeli point of view). Shazly is a war hero, who fought in five wars, finally reaching Egyptian Chief of Staff during the Yom Kippur War. The author's military career and charisma can be felt through his style of writing, which greatly simplifies complex situations. He is clear and organized. He carefully lists military hardships faced before the war and the necessary equipments and training the Egyptian army lacked. Then, he goes on explaining the political implications. He continues then listing the war details, day by day. The most amazing thing is the book is still banned in Egypt and the man was exiled from Egypt and sentenced to jail, which he actually partly served after returning. So sad to see such a war hero be humiliated instead of received with honor.

The amateur studies tactics--the professional logistics

Regardless of one's sympathies, it is easy to appreciate the brilliance of the 1973 assault on Israel's Bar Lev line--this book is as succinct as a combat unit diary in its description of the planning, preparation and execution of an operation that will be studied by military staff officers for many years to come. Amazingly, the Egyptians under General Saad El Shazly were able to pull off the feat of surprising the Israelis when the Israelis knew they were coming.The main appeal is the precise operations briefing feel of the bulk of the book. The author falters only when he addresses the period following Egyptian deep penetration into the Sinai. It was at this point that political factors and personal agendas began to conflict with tactical objectives. When it occurred that the Egyptians might be able to achieve even greater success than their plan envisioned both the plan and Egyptian senior leadership reached their limits.The narrative not-too subtly shifts to an extended argument explaining why it was everyone else's fault that tactical and ultimately strategic gains realized by brilliant and faithful execution of an almost faultless plan were lost. Even this portion is valuable though, providing as it does, insight into the non-military challenges facing any military planner. The General's sometimes plaintive comments about the political in-fighting that interfered with and ultimately, in his view, cost Egypt the victory ring true.In summary, this is a book that is valuable for the professional and amateur military strategist alike. It will be treasured for its detailed description of one of history's most successful large scale special operations as well as its insight into the manifest difficulty inherent in managing the tension between military and political objectives.