The Case for Animal Rights

by Tom Regan

Book Overview

More than twenty years after its original publication, The Case for Animal Rights is an acknowledged classic of moral philosophy, and its author Tom Regan is recognized as the intellectual leader of... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0520054601
• ISBN13: 9780520054608
• Release Date: April 1985
• Publisher: University of California Press
• Length: 448 Pages
• Weight: 1.10 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.1" x 5.5" x 8.2"

Customer Reviews

A Book That Will Challenge The Way You Make Moral Decisions

Of all the books I read in college, this one has nagged me the most. It offers a completely logical case for giving animals their own "right to life." Most of the book is an education in ethics philosophy - necessary background if one is to reflect on one's own moral decision-making when it comes to other living beings. A Christian who believes that humans deserve higher moral consideration precisely because they are humans will not find the book particularly swaying. If one is to cite gospel for making moral decisions, Regan basically asks, "So ... WHICH gospel/scripture?" as there are many faiths that purport to receive the truth from a god or gods. Most Christians have a ready answer to that question - but one backed up by faith, not logic. Regan aims to show that our secular beliefs about human rights to life logically do not exclude - but rather, should include - other animals. One woman in our class rejected Regan's thesis and conclusion when she learned that accepting his arguments logically necessitated a pro-life, anti-abortion stance. For that reason, a pro-life Christian might give Regan's book a closer, more sympathetic look. Where Regan's case breaks down is in where to draw the line. Do we make it illegal to fish? To step on ants? To deal with this problem he creates a construct called "Subject of a Life" and establishes several criteria to decide which animals can be food and which ones can't. But it is hard not to see arbitrariness of whatever criteria we establish. In a sense, we are right back to where we started: refering to our personal biases as moral benchmarks. Why do YOU exclude animals from deserving a right to live, to be eaten, skinned, etc? Is it because they aren't as smart as humans or don't have sophisticated language? Is it because the scripture you believe to be true says it's okay to kill them for your purposes? Is it because you can ... and just don't feel that guilty? Is it a morality of expedience that we choose to follow when we kill an animal that feels pain and enjoys its life? Read this book and the questions will nag you, too.

Excellent work of moral philosophy

Other reviewers all seem to be Animal Rights advocates, interested in a sound justification for their preconceptions. I read this work for a different reason -- because I was interested in a non-theistic AND non-utilitarian justification for ethics. Tom Regan does an excellent job as a moral philosopher presenting an alternative way to look at ethics, and I stongly recommend this book for that reason. As for justifying animal welfare, I found it less convincing. Regan's reason for rejecting Singer's argument for utilitarianism is because utilitarianism could sometimes justify sacrificing an animal, and he wants a moral guideline that will not allow that. Well, this is certainly assuming your conclusion, and made me wonder how much of the work was honest reasoning, and how much was a political spin document. But the ultimate problem for me in accepting the arguments was in two areas. First, the absolutist nature of rights (either you have them, or you don't and they are non-negotiable) flies in the face of what is reasonable in the world. If a fish is not conscious, it has no rights, and if it is, its rights equal mine, even though its consiousness may be so marginal that we are extremely uncertain whether it even exists. Instead, for any consciousness-based rights system to be funcitonal, it must be based on DEGREE of consciousness, so a fish has less rights than a mouse, who has less rights than a mature human. (If mice have as many rights as humans, then almost all human activity is unacceptable -- plowing/tilling kills small rodents, as does driving, as does ANY construction work of any kind -- his mine rescue example neglects that all his options, including digging the mine in the first place, disturbs the soil fatally for some small rodents.) But Regan will not accept this, partially because any such scheme would be extremely difficult to work out, but primarily because it would allow the use/abuse of animals in some cases -- a consequence he will not accept (per his rejection of Singer) even if the reasoning for it is valid. The second objection is that this scheme takes no account of the welfare of future beings. Extinction to him is a concern of corporatist ethics, when all that matters according to him are the individuals CURRENTLY involved. But an ethics which cannot provide a rationale to prevent future ecosystem destruction, or to prevent mass extinctions say by a comet impact 100 years in the future of individuals who are not alive today and therefore do not compute for rights calculations is deeply flawed in providing moral guidance. These weaknesses are correctable, and this work could be improved to become a fairly compelling and general moral guideline. But to do so will result in drastically weakening the justification for animal welfare in his work, so I expect they will not be adressed, and this work will remain an interesting, but ulimately unconvincing excercise, serving solely to rally the faithful.

Beats the heck out of Peter Singer

As I suggested long ago in my review of Peter Singer's _Animal Liberation_, while I applaud Singer for pointing out numerous ways in which our treatment of animals could be improved, I don't find his "utilitarian" ethical arguments very persuasive. But Tom Regan's now-classic book -- this one -- is a different story. This is a tour-de-force of ethical argumentation that makes the titular case about as well as it's ever going to be made. Regan doesn't simplify any issues and he's very much alive to fine ethical nuances. And he sets out his case with both rigor and vigor. Probably most of us won't have any problem agreeing that at least some nonhuman animals are conscious, but there _have_ been people who have denied it (most famously, Rene Descartes). So for completeness, Regan begins with a careful discussion of the question. Avoiding simplistic answers and over-eager claims about research on e.g. animal language, he mounts a solid case that at least some nonhumans do possess consciousness. (Some of his arguments are a bit weaker than he thinks they are, although I still agree with his conclusions. For example, he argues that possession of language skills can't be an indicator of consciousness because human infants are presumably conscious before they acquire a language; how else, indeed, would they acquire it? But this shows only that _present_ possession of linguistic ability isn't a necessary condition of consciousness; it doesn't show that the ability to _learn_ a language isn't such a condition. As I said, though, I agree with his conclusion; I'm merely criticizing the way he gets to it.) The remainder of the book is a wide-ranging discussion, not just of animal rights, but of ethics generally. Even aside from Regan's nominal topic, the volume could serve as a fine introduction to ethical thought in general. (Among its many highlights: a short refutation of Jan Narveson's "rational egoism" that could double as a refutation of Ayn Rand's even sillier version.) In the end, what this gets us is a careful case for regarding mammalian animals which are at least a year old as possessors of "rights." (Regan also argues that for other reasons, we could and should want to extend "rights" to other animals; he has limited his discussion to mammals in order to keep to what he takes to be a fairly clear-cut case.) These "rights" do not, he holds, trump every other ethical consideration under the sun; in particular, in emergency situations in which either (say) a human being or a dog (or a million dogs) must be killed, we should kill the dog (or dogs) every time. These "rights" are _prima facie_ moral claims -- strong, but not indefeasible. What I think Regan has successfully shown is that living beings don't have to be moral _agents_ in order to count in our moral deliberations. And with most of what he says on this subject, I heartily agree; in particular I think he has made just the right distinction between moral agents and moral patients, and c

A Classic!!!

Warning: this book is not for people new to ethical philosophy or philosophy in general. Try Singer's book for an introduction to some of the themes discussed in this book. Essential reading for those tired of hearing the same old recycled arguments used to justify the torture and murder of sentient living creatures. As such, it appeals to two groups of people: 1) those who are already living or considering adopting an ethical lifestyle and 2) those interested in philosophy, especially ethical philosophy. Do your intellect a favor and READ THIS BOOK!

The best discussion of animal rights.

This book accomplishes two goals: First, it is the best available discussion of the many aspects of animal welfare. Second, it is an excellent example of a fine philosophical mind grappling with a difficult issue. I have often recommended the book to those who just wish to follow the workings of rigorous thought. But reader beware--do not look for simple answers or slogans here. This is difficult reading indeed, but Regan has, better than anyone else (and this is characteristic of all his writing)carefully worked through the many arguments, objections, counter-examples, etc., with thoroughness and clarity unapproached by similar books. If you recognize that the question "Do non-human animals have rights?" is extraordinarily complex and thereby can produce only complex answers, then this is THE book for you.