The Bombing of Auschwitz: Should the Allies Have Attempted It?

Bys: Michael J. Neufeld and Michael Berenbaum

Book Overview

Did we "know" the gas chambers were there? Could we have destroyed them? Why didn't we bomb? For decades, debate has raged over whether the Allies should have bombed the gas chambers at Auschwitz and... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0312198388
• ISBN13: 9780312198381
• Release Date: August 2000
• Publisher: St. Martin's Press
• Length: 350 Pages
• Weight: 1.15 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.2" x 6.5" x 9.6"

Customer Reviews

An interesting read

I am rating this book highly because I think that people should have a responsibility to learn the facts, before they form opinions that judge others. There are some great essays that help the reader understand some of the technical aspects, a great essay by Deborah Lipstadt about people seeing it as symbolic of apathy, a great "against" essay by Richard Levy plus a great "for" essay by Sir Martin Gilbert. However, some of the articles in the debate are actually conterfactual, sensationlist and have only served to misinform some people as evidenced by some of the reviews on very site. For example(quoted from one of the reviews): "Especially compelling are the aerial reconnaisance photographs and contemporary documents included in the book. One photograph alone--showing Auschwitz from high above, with the crematoria bracketed by bombs dropped to destroy the adjacent IG Farben slave labor factory--is especially haunting, since it shows very vividly that not only could the Allies have bombed the killing facilities at Auschwitz/Birkenau, they did bomb a facility literally only a few miles away. (Former Israeli Premier Benjamin Netanyahu is quoted to the effect that the Allies knew enough and had the capacity to bomb Auschwitz; the problem, he asserts, was that the Jews did not have enough political clout at the time to command attention and military resources.)" The problem is that no one ever actually developed the negatives into print until 1979. As Yeduha Bauer is fond of saying "There is a difference between knoledge and information". We had the information, ie the film but the proof is that we did not have the knowledge. Another quote from the same review: "Among the documents included in the volume is a detailed report from two Slovakian Jews who escaped from Auschwitz, documenting very clearly that early in 1944 detailed information was available to Allied leaders about the massive murders being carried out there. It also included a remarkably accurate map of the area, drawn from memory by the escapees." This is a reference to the Rudolph Vbra report also know as "The protocols of Auschwitz" which was recieved in summary (Not DETAIL) in July of 1944 not "early 1944". In detail it was recieved in November of 1944, after the camp had stopped the killings. There is a great deal of controvesy of the timing of the report and how is was diseminated. It also exagerrated the death toll by a factor of four. Should it have been bombed, in my humble opinion it is hard to say. Would it have saved lives ? In the book Lipstadt remaarks that she is always amazed that when she gives a talk, how many people believe it would have saved "millions" Yet while she does not actually answer the question the point she is making is that "millions" is clearly incorrect. In his excellent book on Auschwitz, Laurence Reese suggest no. He points out the timing and the fact that had it been bombed, when it could have been bombed, that the Hungarian Jews had already be

The Great Debate

I love a good debate and this book is probably the closest one could come to a well thought out debate and not actually participate in it. The authors / editors do a great job of selecting the historians to write the chapters, I do not think you could ask for a more well spoken, knowledgeable and balanced group. I thought the book would have a lot of emotion shading the arguments almost to the point of making the debate fall into a day time talk show format of pushing and shouting, but that never happened. The chapters provided very convincing and detail laden essays on each particular facet of the issue with a for and against article to balance the debate. To be honest I did not have an opion one way or the other on this topic before picking up the book. What then happened was that I kept bouncing from one side to the next with each article until I sat back and viewed the book in its totality. My opinion really only maters to me so I will spare you, but this book will definitely help you in forming one. The editors also did a good job of making sure that the book had a nice flow, sometimes I find that with books of different articles by different people you can get a choppy book. It also provides a ton of interesting details about the air war in Europe something I was not expecting but came as a pleasant surprise. Overall this is a very well thought out, well written book that will provide you with a great deal of information.

Very good

The point is made which I agree with is that the responsibility for the murders should be with the murders. I found it this the best and quite a readable account of this issue. Its a series of articles which allow the reader to reach a conclusion. It discusses the US and Britain. It makes it quite clear Stalin did not care and did nothing. There are basically two issue involved. The first is could it be done. After reading the discussion in the book but its left to you the reader to decide. I think it could have been. There seems to be no reason, why not? The technical, military and intelligence problems seem quite solvable. The second is if it could have been done, could it have made any difference. This question is more difficult to answer. If the operation had been done its quite possible that the people would have been killed by other methods eg forced marches or bullets. However this was harder and slower then the gas chambers. It goes on to discuss an air raid on Hungary scared the government there into stopping the transportation of Jews. This was purely an accidental effect of timing. The air raid occurred just when the transportation of Jews started. The Hungarian government thought it was because of the transportation and stopped them. It then discusses the effect of this air raid. Leaving the reader with the impression that maybe political action may have helped to stop some of these murders. The question that I would like to ask the writers "Is if they had been Americans or English being sent to those gas chambers - would they have been bombed?". I think they would have.

An informative, provocative historiographic tour de force

This collection of essays about the feasibility of bombing the crematoria and gas chambers at the Nazi death camp Auschwitz and the railways leading to it in 1944 presents virtually every aspect of the issue--from the available intelligence about the camp to military logistical and operational considerations to the British and American politics behind the decision not to intervene to the likely casualties caused and lives saved by such an intervention if it had taken place. Don't come to this book expecting facile, clear, categorical answers to the issues. While most authors have their own viewpoints to argue, collectively, the essays present a reasonably balanced set of perspectives on the pros and cons of bombing Auschwitz and its environs. The editors largely leave it to the reader to decide what could and should have been done. They are to be commended for their overall objectivity.Especially compelling are the aerial reconnaisance photographs and contemporary documents included in the book. One photograph alone--showing Auschwitz from high above, with the crematoria bracketed by bombs dropped to destroy the adjacent IG Farben slave labor factory--is especially haunting, since it shows very vividly that not only could the Allies have bombed the killing facilities at Auschwitz/Birkenau, they did bomb a facility literally only a few miles away. (Former Israeli Premier Benjamin Netanyahu is quoted to the effect that the Allies knew enough and had the capacity to bomb Auschwitz; the problem, he asserts, was that the Jews did not have enough political clout at the time to command attention and military resources.) Among the documents included in the volume is a detailed report from two Slovakian Jews who escaped from Auschwitz, documenting very clearly that early in 1944 detailed information was available to Allied leaders about the massive murders being carried out there. It also included a remarkably accurate map of the area, drawn from memory by the escapees.Many of the essays caution the reader against the fallacy of "presentism"--reading the history of over half a century ago through the prism of the present along with its political and ethical standards. For example, at the time that it first became militarily feasible to bomb Auschwitz--late spring and early summer of 1944, when American bombers were operating out of southern Italy--the Allies were understandbly preoccupied with launching the D-Day invasion of Normandy, and most available British-American resources in the European theater were being devoted to that goal. Nor was victory over the Nazis a certainty at this time. Thus, the repeated response of U.S. War Department officials that military resources could not be diverted to bomb Auschwitz is a bit more understandable, albeit still morally obtuse in light of the boming of the nearby I.G. Farben works. (None of the essays seems to recognize that the allocation of military resource