The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War

By David G. Herrmann

Book Overview

David Herrmann's work is the most complete study to date of how land-based military power influenced international affairs during the series of diplomatic crises that led up to the First World War. Instead of emphasizing the naval arms race, which has been extensively studied before, Herrmann draws on documentary research in military and state archives in Germany, France, Austria, England, and Italy to show the previously unexplored effects of changes in the strength of the European armies during this period. Herrmann's work provides not only a contribution to debates about the causes of the war but also an account of how the European armies adopted the new weaponry of the twentieth century in the decade before 1914, including quick-firing artillery, machine guns, motor transport, and aircraft.

In a narrative account that runs from the beginning of a series of international crises in 1904 until the outbreak of the war, Herrmann points to changes in the balance of military power to explain why the war began in 1914, instead of at some other time. Russia was incapable of waging a European war in the aftermath of its defeat at the hands of Japan in 1904-5, but in 1912, when Russia appeared to be regaining its capacity to fight, an unprecedented land-armaments race began. Consequently, when the July crisis of 1914 developed, the atmosphere of military competition made war a far more likely outcome than it would have been a decade earlier.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0691015953
• ISBN13: 9780691015958
• Release Date: March 1997
• Publisher: Princeton University Press
• Length: 322 Pages
• Weight: 1.09 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.8" x 6.1" x 9.3"

Customer Reviews

Just brilliant!

David Herrmann has written an outstanding book: showing the ten years before the Great War as a period of miscalculations and misconceptions by diplomats, military and political leadership. All leading to a situation when diplomatic triumph was the preferred, diplomatic defeat the unacceptable outcome - and actual war the second choice. So, naturally ...But still it is mainly a book about the land armies of the European powers. Their strengths and weaknesses, the way they try to adapt to the new technologies and get the money for them. It is not an in-depth comparison of various weapon-system or tactics, but rather an n account of the way other armies judged their rivals. Were they perceived as threats or as negliable quantities and what was the outcome of such perceptions.From the first Morocco crisis to the Balkan Wars the crisis of this decade influenced the military and the political class of Europe. Since the book included archive material from all powers (Austria gets very often overlooked) it gives the whole picture. What it omits is the naval race.Admittedly the battleship race had - the money aside - no influence on the land armies and for the sake of shortness it is acceptable to barely mention it. Nevertheless it played an important role concerning the decline of relations between Germany and England, but there are lots of good books on that subject.What IMHO would have improved the book: a bit about the logistic aspects and feasibility of the various war plans. Martin Van Creveld's "Supplying War" showed the folly that was the Schliefen plan from this angle. That it omits this aspect of war - about which the contemporaries were well aware - is the only qualm I have with this book.For the land armies, as an overview of the situation during the countdown to the Great War this short book is just brilliant!

The Arming of Europe

In The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, author David G. Herrmann traces the roles and developments of land armies to demonstrate how World War One came to happen. His work is well written and maintains a pace that makes it an excellent read for either the serious historian or the casual military history buff. Herrmann tracks the many international crises from 1904 to 1914 to show how each contributed to national military awareness and, more importantly, perception of one's status among the greater European community. Herrmann does not believe there was a massive arms race (vis a vis the Anglo-German naval race) until relatively late in the period in question. Rather he contends each country made moderate changes in both military and diplomatic policies in attempts to gain better positions compared to their rivals. This usually meant distinct there were winners and losers, but war itself was never really considered until 1914. But this isn't to say war was never threaten. Indeed Germany came to use war bluffs often, beginning with the 1905 Moroccan crisis. After this event, both Germany and France began to give more serious thought to an impending war. Herrmann uses his analysis to consider the possibilities of what limited war in 1905 or 1909 (the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia) might or might not have accomplished, and this is what makes his work appear so complete. He not only covers the events, but he expands them into what might have occurred and what it might have meant. But Herrmann does not venture into the realm of "what if?" for the sake of developing alternate history. His purpose is to show why such speculations did not occur and what that in turn meant to the realities of the time. One important conclusion through this process shows that Germany had a much lesser chance of winning any general war after 1906.Herrmann covers both Moroccan crises well, but perhaps could have done more justice to both the Bosnian crisis and the Balkan wars (the Second Balkan War gets approximately ½ sentence worth of coverage). The lines drawn during the Moroccan crises were perhaps easier to discern than sorting the Balkan imbroglio, but Balkan coverage remains the one weak point in this otherwise excellent study. But Herrmann recovers well at the end to cover the outbreak of war thoroughly. Again he speculates on possible scenarios had war not occurred (i.e., possible Anglo-German rapprochement) but this serves his true purpose of explaining why events did occur rather than dwell on those that did not. The Arming of Europe is a very important contribution to World War One studies, and should remain so for years to come.

A Refreshing Approach to the Cause of World War I

In "The Arming of Europe and the Making of World War I" David Herrmann adopts the thesis that World War I occurred as a result of the creation of a "window of opportunity for war." He weaves together the development and preparedness of armies of the Great Powers against the background of repeated political crises. Herrman explains why the great war, which did not occur as a result of previous crises, became almost inevitable in July of 1914. His approach to the problem and conclusion was different from other historical treatment, and therefore makes his work a valuable study of the events leading to World War I. His work, while valuable, did include some shortcomings; for example a failure to appreciate the lag in communications technology to keep pace with weapons technology, which bound the western armies in a death grip (an excellent theory proposed by Keegan), and a somewhat superficial treatment of the land arms race. Herrmann purports to write about the land arms race that led to the war, but writes as much of the political and international developments that caused his "window of opportunity" to open. All things considered, he probably used the correct approach. I do recommend this work as an excellent addition to anyone's library of the 20th Century; I read this book "sandwiched" between reading Massie's Dreadnought and Keegan's First World War; all 3 works give an excellent sweep into the event that defined a century.

Outstanding and different view on how Europe got to WWI.

Very informative and thought provoking book. Imperical data such as France trying to motivate a draftee company with only 8 regulars vs Germany using 20 career soldiers for the same size unit. Good and logical treatment of how the powers did and did not adopt the Machine Gun, telephone, radio, and other developing technologies. This is a solid reading for anyone interested both in how Europe went from "No war for Morocco" in 1905, to "Germany will March," in 1914. Other books talk about the powder keg that was Europe, 1914. This guy introduces you to each keg as it goes into the pile. I've read 40 books in the last year on WWI, starting from Dreadnought and going to Keegan's latest. This book is one of the top five. You really want to read this book if you want to know the how and why of 1914.

An Excellent Companion to "Dreadnought"

I started reading this book about the same time I had reached chapter 20 of "Dreadnought" (by R. Massie). I found that switching between books, at appropriate sections, gives the reader a good overview of the events leading to the First World War. Mr. Herrmann has given "history junkies" like me a long awaited for work covering the arms race on land, prior to WW1. Thank you again Mr. Herrmann for completing the picture of political and military events which had occured during that critical time in our history.