Self-Harming Mergers

By Fabian Rosenkranz

In this book we study different solution concepts in three-player games and their effects on social welfare. Furthermore, the outcome under cooperative behavior is compared with the outcome under non-cooperative behavior. A merger'' is an agreement between two or more firms of coordinating strategical actions together and sharing the received profits. By analyzing three-player situations in price and quantity competition as well as in more general strategic games, we demonstrate the occurrence of mergers with negative effects. Moreover, a maximal subset of self-harming mergers in sequential and simultaneous versions of general three-player strategic games is constructed under the restrictions that the equilibria with and without merger are unique and the potential merging players have a dominant strategy.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 6202218711
• ISBN13: 9786202218719
• Release Date: April 2020
• Publisher: AV Akademikerverlag
• Length: 104 Pages
• Weight: 0.36 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.3" x 6.0" x 9.0"