Self-Deception and Wilful Ignorance

By Margaret Leila Penhall-Jones

Self-deception and wilful ignorance each involve professed attitudes involving ignorance

which, in the circumstances, are difficult for others to believe. Some recent philosophical

discourse considers whether they are the same or similar phenomena, with conflicting results.

A clarification of issues, including identifying some conditions conducive to comparison of

these phenomena, such as I present here, is aimed at contributing to this debate.

Comparison of two phenomena requires a clear concept of each. A review of the literature

showed that this is not available for self-deception. Various incompatible theories have been

proposed to explain self-deception. In these theories, argument often seeks to derive sufficient

conditions from paradigm examples. Theory has reached an impasse between the two leading

theories in Analytical Philosophy: Intentionalism and Motivationalism. The first task, then, is

to identify the theory of self-deception to be used for comparison.

Paradigm examples can also be useful as tools of analysis. This is what I have done here, with

the aim of discovering the currently established theory of self-deception with the most

explanatory power. Analysing some standard paradigm examples for distinctive features of

self-deception, I have derived several 'desiderata' that a theory must address. I have added two

questions, regarding the reasons for and purpose of self-deception.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 1835205585
• ISBN13: 9781835205587
• Release Date: August 2023
• Publisher: Awasthihb
• Length: 98 Pages
• Weight: 0.31 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.2" x 6.0" x 9.0"