Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy

by Amitai Etzioni

Book Overview

The need for drastic change in American foreign policy is clear, argues Etzioni, and he proposes an approach that is both pragmatic and morally sound

"Rarely have more profound changes in American foreign policy been called for than today," begins Amitai Etzioni in the preface to this book. Yet Etzioni's concern is not to lay blame for past mistakes but to address the future: What can now be done to improve U.S. relations with the rest...

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0300108575
• ISBN13: 9780300108576
• Release Date: July 2007
• Publisher: Yale University Press
• Length: 308 Pages
• Weight: 1.33 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.9" x 6.6" x 9.5"

Customer Reviews

A convincing book

That great Communitarian, Amitai Etzioni, compellingly argues that the first priority in foreign policy is to provide basic security, not to democratize (Security First, 2007, Yale University Press). He argues for a "muscular, moral foreign policy" for the United States. Security cannot, however, be mainly based on military forces, police and other methods of law enforcement. Security is based largely on values, on most people most of the time doing what must be done because they believe they ought to do it. When and where the right to security is violated, all other rights are violated as well. The prevention of genocide is a much more legitimate reason for intervening in the affairs of another country than, say, democratization. Iraq has taught us that the provision of basic security is essential to the development of liberal-democratic institutions, not the other way round. Post-war Germany, Italy and Japan all followed this sequence. The US saw, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, each democratic step - election, approval of constitution, meeting of parliament, approval of government - as a"turning point" or "critical juncture" upon the assumption that once the various conflicting interests enjoyed a political forum in which to work through their differences, the violence would subside. Three reasons stand out why this was wrong. Security did not precede democratization but was meant to be driven by it; the US-promoted institutions were not well designed for the Afghans and the Iraqis; and these institutions were far too unitary, rather than federal or decentralised, in character. Under a Security First scenario, occupying forces must make the `second worst' decision to leave many of the elements of the old regime in place, and then slowly work to convert them, while allowing considerable time for new and more liberal forces to grow. Illiberal ideological or religious regimes must initially be tolerated, as long as the leadership in place helps maintain basic security. This is the course the US and its allies adopted in Nazi Germany after WWII. Turning now to Islam, Etzioni rejects the Huntington Clash of Civilizations treatment of Islam as if it were one coherent, violent civilization, intent on permanent warfare with the West. There are many Americans and Europeans who do not believe that Islam and the West can coexist and that there will be an inevitable clash. Many believe that a moderate Muslim - and therefore an acceptable US ally - is only one who supports liberal democracy and human rights. The author convincingly illustrates that, in the all important distinction between coercive and persuasive beliefs, Islam is not different from other belief systems. The Bible as well as the Koran contains paragraphs which can have both violent and peaceful interpretations. Opinion polls across the Muslim world suggest that there is a strong rejection of violence but strong support for a greater role for Islam in national politics, and little acti

Review of Security First

Democracy is a beautiful flower, but it does not grow wherever its seed is cast. Both neoconservatives and liberal internationalists have been seduced by the idea that if we promote democracy, peace and security will follow. They have it backwards, according to Amitai Etzioni. He believes that establishing order and protecting people from violence, rather than exporting democracy, should be the first priority of US foreign policy. The house of democracy cannot be built from the attic down. In the wake of the Iraq war, it is not too difficult to convince people that promoting democracy through war is a fool's errand. Political sociologists have understood for decades a lot about the social requisites of democracy - and it is not surprising that a distinguished sociologist like Etzioni would note the elemental unreality of the Bush policy of democracy-via-blitzkrieg. But Etzioni goes even further than this. He argues that protecting America in today's world requires that we step away from democracy promotion so that we can focus on the urgent need to protect human life, both that of others and our own, in a very violent world. Etzioni is a realist who understands the importance of power in keeping a nation secure. But to those who argue that realism and morality cannot go together, Etzioni shows that they must. He understands the importance of moral cohesion in constructing effective human societies and building efficacious political coalitions. He sees that the United States can protect its vital interests only if our foreign policy is grounded upon moral principles which will rally others to our side. Uniting the world, especially the Islamic world, around a common moral agenda demands that we understand that that agenda cannot be the mere export of our own brand of politics. The world is filled with "illiberal moderates," who Etzioni says constitute a "global swing vote." These people will not follow us if we are waving the banner of western secular democracy, but they will side with us against Jihadism if our cause is peace and security. Etzioni's moral vision is clear: people cannot enjoy democratic freedoms, or much else, if they are dead or living in fear. What nobler purpose than to protect people from violence? Etzioni believes that it would be a moral triumph for the US to lead the world against such horrors as genocide and nuclear terrorism -- even at the price of weakening traditional conceptions of national sovereignty. Jonathan Rauch, in a recent review in Reason, summed up Security First as "realism with a caring face, idealism in sensible shoes." Indeed, for decades, Etzioni's work has escaped the usual ideological/theoretical categorizations, and this book is no exception. With Security First, Etzioni has presented the outlines of a realistic, morally-coherent foreign policy which both thoughtful liberals and thoughtful conservatives could support. For those of us who believe that politics should end at the wa

First Things First

"This book is well written, well organized, and a must read for decision makers and students of American foreign policy, although perhaps it should more properly be titled 'First Things First.' In laying out a case for a fact-based foreign policy, Etzioni delivers an indirect but devastating attack on the policies of the Bush administration... Beyond making a case for the establishment of security within troubled states, Etzioni also outlines a realistic, constitutionally practical, and affordable program to prevent terrorism, relying again on the principles of 'first things first.'

Security First review

Amitai Etzioni argues that our international problems are largely self-inflicted. And he sees good news in this finding, to the extent that many of our problems admit of a solution. We are suffering, he argues, from a severe form of realism deficiency disorder. Etzioni uses the term "realism" not in a Freudian sense, nor in a Realpolitik sense. Given that it is much easier (albeit far from easy) to learn to face reality than to change reality--Etzioni shows that there is cause for optimism for the post-Bush world. First of all, despite multiple terrorist attacks, we are not involved in a clash of civilizations. Etzioni presents considerable evidence to show that most Muslims are moderate people who oppose violence. For those who are quick to argue that this may be true but only of non-Arabs, he presents data to show that most Palestinians, for example, also seek a peaceful solution with Israel. Many may have voted for Hamas, but they did so because of its attention to social services and its integrity, as opposed to the corrupt Fatah party. (He points to similar data for several other Arab nations.) That is, most Muslims are on our side of what Etzioni calls the "true fault line"--the divide between those who rely on violence and those who favor peaceful coexistence--in contrast to the way in which Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington divide the "West" and "the rest," a worldview that gained much following after 9/11. One major reason many believe the Muslim world is so problematic is that we have bought lock, stock, and barrel into another unrealistic theory, namely, that we ought to make the world safe by promoting democracy. Such a theory argues that the world is trending towards democracy and that we should give history a helping hand; after all, this theory holds, many of our most reliable allies are liberal democracies. Etzioni shows that genuine liberals are in reality few and far between in most of the world. Hence if we approach the world seeking only liberals as allies, we shall find few. On the other hand, if we set out in search of moderates, we shall find many more partners. He uses the spat over the Danish cartoons to illustrate his point. Most Muslims were offended by the cartoons and--given half a chance--would ban them, and generally limit free speech, a key liberal tenet. However, at the same time, most Muslims opposed violent reactions to the publication. Similarly, the U.S.'s efforts to get Afghanistan and Iraq to introduce the separation of mosque and state and to grant full-blown women's rights in their constitutions are unrealistic, and delayed what must be done: providing security first. Etzioni draws from this analysis one of his major policy recommendations: in places like Iraq and Afghanistan we should help provide law and order, but otherwise leave it to the people of these nations to hammer out the details of their political systems. Etzioni applies the same "Security First" thesis to internationa

An interesting book

One line Professor Etzioni used, during a lecture about his new book, Security First, stayed with me. He compared the Bush Administration approach to rogue states, demanding regime change, to someone who approaches the White House and tells the President to "turn over the keys to the White House to Gore, go and campaign for gay marriage and abortion rights, and then we can talk about the rest." He added wryly "that such statements do not make much of a conversation starter." His made this observations to highlight the difference between his view and that of the Neo Cons who argue that only democratic regimes can be reliable partners in promoting global security. Hence starting with regime change is essential. Etzioni faces the problems that result from writing about foreign policy in a rapidly changing world. Although his new book has just been published, his thesis is already facing a very concrete and telling test. Etzioni holds that the U.S. and its allies should follow the opposite course the Bush Administration has: instead of asking rogue states to agree to change their regimes--promise them that the U.S. will not use its force to topple their government if they give up their nuclear-military ambitions. He claims that this is not a bad bargain as the U.S. cannot realistically invade Iran and North Korea anyhow, or otherwise force regime change on them. Moreover, these regimes are being challenged (especially in Iran) by their own people. Above all that these nations may be willing to trade their nuclear plans for a non aggression treaty with the U.S., as they have indicated in the past. Well, we shall see soon enough whether this thesis will hold, because as of late, this is the deal the U.S. and its partners in the six nation talks have offered to North Korea. The negotiations with Iran may soon provide a similar test for Etzioni's Security First foreign policy. If these tests fail, Etzioni may well wish that he written his book on ice. Still even if these rogue nations in the end do not trust the Bush Administration sufficiently to make a deal, one wishes that some of the other ideas of the book (some less original than others, but a truly long list) would be put to the test. I would start with Gelb-Biden idea, which Etzioni develops some, to turn Iraqi security over to the local militias. That is, to allow the Shias to control the south of Iraq and parts of Baghdad; the Kurds already control segments of the north; and the rest will be up to the Sunnis to maintain law and order. The most interesting test--I can hardly wait--would be checking out Etzioni's claim that most Muslims are moderates (which he defines as opposed to suicide bombers, car bombs, and more generally to terrorism) but do not necessarily favor a Western style democracy or several key human rights. That if the U.S. insists that it can ally itself only with those who seek its kind of regime, we will find few soulmates in the Muslim world. However, if the U.S. would agree