Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism

By Lynne Rudder Baker

Book Overview

This stimulating book critically examines a wide range of physicalistic conceptions of mind in the works of Jerry A. Fodor, Stephen P. Stich, Paul M. Churchland, Daniel C. Dennett, and others. Part I argues that intentional concepts cannot be reduced to nonintentional (and nonsemantic) concepts; Part II argues that intentional concepts are nevertheless indispensable to our cognitive enterprises and thus need no foundation in physicalism. As a sustained challenge to the prevailing interpretation of cognitive science, this timely book fills a large gap in the philosophical literature. It is sure to spark controversy, yet its clarity makes it attractive as a text in upper-level undergraduate and graduate courses in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Saving Belief should be read by philosophers, psychologists, and others interested in the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science.

Originally published in 1988.

The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0691602247
• ISBN13: 9780691602240
• Release Date: March 2017
• Publisher: Princeton University Press
• Length: 192 Pages
• Weight: 0.61 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.4" x 6.1" x 9.2"

Customer Reviews

To-the-point Arguments

Rudder Baker's short critique of physicalism is a nicely argued, concise edition that lays the groundwork for her later work in non-reductive naturalism. As an earlier work of Rudder Baker's, the positive completion of her account must wait for her later books. Nevertheless, the first step in an enterprise of arguing for a non-reductive naturalist approach to the human mind is to critique the widely-held arguments of reductive physicalism. This is an excellent book to begin with for those who wish to preserve the intuitive notions of folk psychology and who we are as persons.