Prelude to Tragedy: Vietnam, 1960-1965

By: Richard Holbrooke

Foreword by Richard Holbrooke

Five American and three Vietnamese participants in the early days of U.S. involvement in southeast Asia compellingly argue that the failure of American policy in Vietnam was not inevitable. The common theme of their individual essays suggests that the war in Vietnam might have had a much different--and far less tragic--outcome if U.S. policy makers had listened to experts with experience in Asia and combating communist revolutionary warfare and pursued a coherent and consistent counterinsurgency strategy instead of militarizing and Americanizing the struggle. The authors point out that against the advice of experts and the proven success of counterinsurgency programs in Malaya and the Philippines, senior policy makers made the fateful decision to develop the South Vietnamese Army as a mirror image of the U.S. Army rather than as a counter-guerilla force.

The authors, who were involved in all levels of the counterinsurgency campaign, also cite as key factors in American policy failure: support for the coup that overthrew President Diem in 1963, bureaucratic in-fighting, and the lack of appreciation for the complexities of revolutionary warfare and the practicalities of grass-roots programs to combat it. A vivid account of that coup is included in the book with fresh insight into the pivotal event. Two essays written by former South Vietnamese senior officers who once fought with Communist Viet Minh forces provide a unique perspective of how both sides thought and functioned. While this devastating portrait can do nothing to change what has already transpired, it does offer significant lessons for the future and should not be ignored.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 1557504911
• ISBN13: 9781557504913
• Release Date: December 2000
• Publisher: Naval Institute Press
• Length: 308 Pages
• Weight: 1.40 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.1" x 6.3" x 9.3"

Customer Reviews

The Unknow War to Save South Vietnam

To most Americans, the war in Vietnam began in March 1965 with the arrival of the U.S. Marines across the beach at Danang...But a handful of young American civilians had entered the war five years' earlier...Thousands more followed as the entire American Governent was mobilized to "win in Vietnam"..until it became obvious only the South Vietnamese themselves could obtain a victory.. This book offers an insight into the efforts, the successes and the failures of these first Americans; and how we often were our own worst enemy...I had the privilege of serving as one of these men. PRELUDE TO TRAGEDY provides a unique insider look at how dedicated --and desperate--young Americans tried to head off the final outcome...Not a book for casual readers looking for combat stories, but a "must read" for any serious student of the Vietnam conflict.

The Greater Tragedy

'Prelude to Tragedy: Vietnam' looks beyond the curtain of lies concocted by Johnson & McNamara in 1964. A simple truth remains too devastating for mainstream publication. Johnson pulled the trigger on the American War in Vietnam by ordering retaliatory strikes three months prior to the election of 1964. No mere coincidence. Johnson did so to win the election. No other factor accounts for Johnson's arrogant insistance on immediate retaliation to an event which never occurred. A 24 hour delay would have revealed there was no Tonkin Gulf attack as claimed. Johnson adamantly demanded an immediate attack for he feared any delay would deny him the use of his trump card as CinC. Air strikes were used to defeat Goldwater. Johnson won the election then defeated himself by his arrogant miss use of military power. Johnson's effort to intimidate Ho Chi Minh failed miserably. Ho recognized retaliatory strikes as the superficial show of force it was. Without a commitment to win Johnson's efforts were doomed to failure from the start. Certain defeat was recognized, long before Johnson stepped aside in '68. 'Prelude' provides evidence of the impending tragedy as it unfolded. However the most damming evidence was left out. The purpose of the air strike was to win the election. Johnson's fear, greed & grasp for power must be recognized if we are to avoid future acts of arrogance leading to war by a renegade president. Our constitution did not grant dictatorial power to a ruthless tyrant. How then, did Johnson acquire sufficient power to over ride congressional restraint & military dissent? He did so by lies, deceit & intimidation for all who stood in his way including his Vice President. Humphrey was denied access to LBJ's inner circle of advisors on Vietnam. JCS members were blocked from attending crucial strategy sessions. Johnson reduced JCS members to pawns, merely carrying out miss guided 'strategies' concocted by McNamara & his 'War Room' of civilian 'experts'. Military officers were intimidated, insulted, humiliated & ignored by Johnson. Military strategies were dictated by Johnson's political agenda. Without a compelling national security threat, military logic or justification for acts of war in Vietnam, Johnson created the ruse of a Tonkin Gulf attack to over ride congressional & military reluctance to war. He then launched unprovoked acts of war to enhance his political image. Johnson's arrogance in resorting to war to win the '64 election is supported by evidence presented in 'Prelude to Tragedy'. The authors failure to state this self evident fact is understandable. Doing so would have invited disbelief, criticism and ostracism. Lies perpetrated by Johnson & McNamara have been assimilated into the very fiber of American perceptions of defeat in Vietnam. The dregs remain today. American foreign policy remains a threat to many, including our allies. Claims of justification for American effort

Unique contribution to Viet-Nam war history

Prelude to Tragedy is one of the very few books ever published that focuses on the anti-poverty and civilian development roles of the United States in Viet-Nam. It does so with information and perspectives that have been almost universally ignored in all the writing that's appeared on this sad period of history. As such, and because it is written by key leaders at a crucial early stage of the American war in that country, it makes a unique contribution to our understanding of why the American effort failed on the political plane and therefore also on the military plane. The writers are extraordinarily committed Americans and Vietnamese who proved to have a far better understanding of Vietnamese civilian realities than the higher-ranking policy-makers who refused to pay them heed. In fact, their observations and conclusions inform and reinforce from additional perspectives those reached by Don Luce and me in our own book, Viet-Nam -- The Unheard Voices. The fact that those of us with expertise that came from living and working among the Vietnamese people themselves, from hearing the concerns they raised and the causes they espoused, were not taken sufficiently seriously -- indeed, that Robert McNamara had the gall to deny the existence of anyone who understood Viet-Nam and could have informed the highest American policy-makers -- is enough to make one angry all over again. But anger is not the correct response; the point is to learn for the future. And in this sense, and even after such a lapse of time, a wide readership for Prelude to Tragedy may hopefully help prevent similar tragedies in the future.

Counterinsurgency Warfare: The Road Less Travelled

America's strategy in the conduct of the war in Vietnam largely followed the model of attrition warfare. However, underneath the search and destroy tactics existed a sporadic application of maneuver warfare principles which were successfully manifested through counterinsurgency methods. As Marines, we should be familiar with the maneuver mindset behind III MAF's combined action program (Warfighting MCDP 1, p.39). Nonetheless, long before the Marines' adopted unconventional methods in Vietnam, government civilians effectively utilized principles of maneuver warfare. Prelude to Tragedy: Vietnam 1960-1965 is their story as told by five American and three Vietnamese field operatives who loyally attempted, but failed to inject unconventional warfare into our mainstream national strategy. The book also provides profound insights on the importance of cultural education and morality during wartime and operation other than war. Central to the authors' efforts were maneuver concepts such as: knowing the enemy, identifying his center of gravity, targeting critical vulnerabilities, and using innovative techniques in support of a properly selected main effort (Warfighting MCDP-1, Chapter 4). All eight contributing authors identify incomplete knowledge of the enemy as the foundation beneath America's strategy in Vietnam. Five of the authors specifically refer to a passage in former Defense Secretary McNamara's book In Retrospect which blames our poor understanding of the Vietnamese situation to a "lack of experts." However, the divergence between McNamara's book and Prelude to Tragedy is that the latter is an autobiographical tribute by these very "experts" about their attempts to inform the American political and military establishment of the true nature of the conflict.. Having fought with Ho Chi Minh's forces in the conflict against the French, contributing authors Lu Lan and Tran Ngoc Chau understood that the center of gravity for both sides was the rural population. A population which provided concealment, intelligence, logistics, and manpower was the only fuel which could run the communist machine. To deny Ho Chi Minh popular political support would have driven him into an unwinnable conventional war. Therefore, the communists' critical vulnerability, their rear area, and their logistical infrastructure, so to speak, was the allegiance of the people. All eight authors of Prelude to Tragedy describe creative, unconventional methods that successfully attacked enemy vulnerabilities. These weaknesses were the communist incompatibilities with the social traditions of Vietnam and inability to bring about economic progress in the countryside. The great irony is that these methods were the least employed weapons within our arsenal. The last part of Prelude's thesis regards the South Vietnamese Army. The authors contend that it should have been trained as a decentralized, counter-guerilla force. In support of this main effort would have been a United St

Vietnam War descriptive literature and analysis

Prelude To Tragedy: Vietnam 1960-1965 comprises eight key essays covering the Vietnam war from a variety of personal and historical perspectives. The contributions include Before We Lost in South Vietnam (Rufe Phillips); Counterinsurgency in South Vietnam: The Real Story (Ben Fraleigh); The People's War or War on the People? (Lu Lan); Defeating Insurgency in South Vietnam: My Early Efforts (George K. Tanham); My War Story: From Ho Chi Minh to Ngo Dinh Diem (Tran Ngoc Chau); Life and Times of a USOM Prov Rep (John O'Donnell); Destination South Vietnam, 1959 (Harvey Neese). These articles are followed by the editors' "Conclusion" and an appendix (America's Involvement in Vietnam); a selected bibliography; and an index. Prelude To Tragedy is an impressive and very welcome addition to the growing library of Vietnam War descriptive literature and analysis.