The aim of my dissertation is to articulate a philosophical interpretation of the writings of Pierre Bayle, an early modern Huguenot skeptic, that provides a coherent account of his conception of the relationship between reason and religious belief. My work arises as a response to the inadequacies of the interpretations of Bayle that have been proposed in the secondary literature. Unlike recent scholars such as Gianluca Mori, who maintains that Bayle's arguments imply a philosophical atheism, I argue that Bayle's conception of the nature and function of reason is in fact consistent with the sincerity of his affirmation of revealed theology and religious belief. Since my interpretation focuses on Bayle's conception of reason and its proper function within philosophy and theology, I am concerned both with Bayle's explicit statements about the nature of reason, and with Bayle's own use of reason in philosophical and theological arguments. My thesis is motivated by the assumption that understanding these two elements of Bayle's thought is the key to developing a coherent reading of the Baylean corpus.