Perception, Theory, and Commitment: The New Philosophy of Science

By Harold I. Brown

Book Overview

With originality and clarity, Harold Brown outlines first the logical
empiricist tradition and then the more historical and process-oriented
approach he calls the "new philosophy of science." Examining the two
together, he describes the very transition between them as an example
of the kind of change in historical tradition with which the new
philosophy of science concerns itself.

"I would recommend it to every historian of science and to every
philosopher of science. . . . I found it clear, readable, accurate,
cogent, insightful, perceptive, judicious, and full of original
ideas."
--Maurice A. Finocchiaro, Isis

"The best and most original aspect of the book is its overall
conception."
--Thomas S. Kuhn

Harold I. Brown is professor of philosophy at Northern Illinois
University.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0226076180
• ISBN13: 9780226076188
• Release Date: September 1993
• Publisher: University of Chicago Press
• Length: 204 Pages
• Weight: 0.70 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.5" x 6.1" x 9.0"

Customer Reviews

Still One of the Best Introductions to Philosophy of Science

Brown espouses what he calls "the new philosophy of science," contrasting this with logical empiricism. He contends that the logical empiricists maintained a general belief that science could provide an unbiased and presuppositionless approach to `objective' facts. They were concerned with the elaboration of formal logical approaches to `meaning,' explanation, verification and falsification of claims, etc. The new philosophy of science, in contrast, goes beyond formalism and doesn't exclude psychological, historical, and sociological approaches in order to formulate what and how scientists do what they do. According to Brown, "It is...the meaning of the observed situation that becomes a part of our knowledge and the objects of significant perceptions are thus meanings" (87). "Science consists of a sequence of research projects structured by accepted presuppositions which determine what observations are to be made, how they are to be interpreted, what phenomena are problematic, and how these problems are to be dealt with" (166). Brown asserts that "...the best that science can hope to attain is tentative rational consensus on the basis of available evidence..." (152). Korzybski's evaluational approach to science surely pushes in the direction of Brown's "new philosophy."

I have not seen better on the subject

This book provides a superb critique of the philosophies of logical positivism and empiricism, which, arising from the solid logical structure exemplified by Whitehead's and Russell's "Principia Mathematica" attempted to put the philosophy of science on a firm footing in the sense of absolute knowledge and truth. Whether this belief in absolute concepts derives from a deep need inherent in the social structure of human beings is not debated but it is nevertheless shown to be alien to the practise of science itself. Proceeding through the history of science and presenting many examples demonstrating his ideas Brown gives a very clear indication of the "new philosophy of science" as it is understood today through its history, its dialectical development (not in the Hegelian sense) and epistomological presuppositions. Science is a continuous process of research which attempts to form a coherent structure based on conceptual theories which are studied through observations made on the concepts inherent in the theories themselves. The rationality, objectivity and legitimacy are approached through the examples of Aristotle's rational man or "man of practical wisdom" and a reality independent of theories about it is retained. The fallibility of this new approach is countered by the fact that theories are based on presuppositions and that any philosophy based on absolute ideas are themselves based on a presupposition, in other words it is impossible to avoid a presuppositionless view in the current understanding of the interaction between man and reality. This new philosophy retains the basic idea that theories are conceptual models of reality and that there exists a basic divide between man and nature, this is to some degree diluted by the involvement of the scientist him/herself in the creation of science thereby avoiding the attempt to replace the participation of the scientist by an algorithm. Brown avoids the objections of Hume, Kant and Popper and in the last chapter brings together his thoughts on the new philosohpy of science.One feels that this last chapter is merely a starting point for the further elucidation of this philosophy. Brown also acknowledges rather intuitively the possible need for a new epistimology and looks at the strongly unscientific dictatorship of Lysenko and the vicious ignorant attacks on the ideas of Veilkovsky thereby bringing out the very human traits of scientists and so reminding us of the need for vigilance.Brown's book is an academic treatise and not designed for the reader simply reading for pleasure, his arguments are well thought out and his insights well developed. He has studied the archetypal texts on the matter such as Hanson's, Popper's and Kuhn's deeply and one feels that this book is about as clear and as good an exposition one could get for the new philosophy of science. In many ways this book could be interpreted as a launching pad for a totally new epistomology of