Nuclear energy is faced with major challenges ranging from public perception
and acceptance to nonproliferation and continued operation
and enhanced safety of existing fleet with lessons learned from recent
Fukushima Daiichi accidents. The industry itself recognizes the ultimate
importance of ensuring overall safety, where research and development
play an important role in supporting safe operation of nuclear
power plants. Understanding the mechanisms and underlying physics
and developing measures to prevent and/or mitigate decay of plant performances
are still challenging tasks for utilities and technical support
organizations. Because of the global nature of these nuclear technology
issues, it is imperative that professional forums, such as professional
societies, international journals and technical professional meetings,
provide a global communication channel to foster the exchange of ideas
and critical information and to enhance cross-fertilization of research
and development activities through our professional community.
Nuclear forensics (NF) is an important tool in the control and
prevention of the malevolent use of radioactive and nuclear (RN)
material out of regulatory control. It has been recognized as fundamental
to nuclear security. Aiding the ability of law enforcement to
quickly and rapidly identify the perpetrators, discover out-of-control
and to safely remove and take control of RN material goes a long
way in deterring criminal and terrorist activities.Canada has invested
significant effort in the development of NF capability, as a part of
overall public safety and security, which is still in progress. Canada's
approach to nuclear forensics is determined by its highly developed
and complex nuclear fuel cycle as well as the support for the peaceful
use of nuclear energy through International Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The Canadian nuclear non-proliferation program, monitored by the
International Agency for Atomic Energy (IAEA) and regulated by
the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, has strict controls of use
of material, equipment and information related to the nuclear fuel
cycle. Among other controls, it requires accurate accounting of the
movement of the nuclear material and reporting of such movements to the IAEA by the CNSC. To facilitate control and reporting, the CNSC developed various tools, including the nuclear material accountancy database. In line with the IAEA Code of Conduct, the movement of high activity radioactive sources is monitored by the Canadian Sealed Source Tracking system, the first to be established in the world. These regulatory tools in addition to the installed radiation detection capabilities at the border crossings are instrumental in prevention of the loss of control over RN material.
It is a great pleasure to welcome our readers to this new monograph, specifically designed to provide highlights of Canadian experience and resulting best practices. We would like to thank Dr. Patrick Saull of the National Research Council of Canada for his thorough review of the manuscript. His helpful remarks and suggestions led to important improvements of the monograph.