Denial and Deception: An Insider's View of the CIA from Iran-Contra to 9/11

by Melissa Boyle Mahle

Book Overview

The reality for a woman agent working in the secret world of intelligence often leads to extraordinary obstacles and sacrifices. Melissa Boyle Mahle, a sixteen-year covert operative for the CIA in the... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 1560256494
• ISBN13: 9781560256496
• Release Date: November 2004
• Publisher: Nation Books
• Length: 403 Pages
• Weight: 0.40 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.3" x 6.3" x 9.1"

Customer Reviews

A Must Read

The Margin Melissa Boyle Mahle gives readers a birds eye view of the CIA. It isn't in depth because the CIA would not permit it. It isn't an expose or a tell-all book because Mahle could be jailed for revealing information she took a sworn oath to protect. However, the author explains in a way that satisfied her former bosses how leadership during the `80's and `90's lead to downsizing of all agencies responsible for intelligence gathering. And how that downsizing may have likely opened the door to the 9/11 architects and to terrorism on US soil. She names names but not in a personal assault manner. No one would've intentionally neglected intelligence gathering that resulted in the largest loss of human life on American soil since the Civil War. The book is about paying attention to prospects of potential harm to the US. Marvin Wiebener, author of THE MARGIN and THE MORIAH RUSE [...]

True and honest account of CIA

Unlike alot of books, this author doesn't seem to be writing to grind an ax. Well written and provides great insight on some of the most recent terrorist events.

Denial and Deception

Denial and Deception is the story of the CIA from 1987 to 2004 as seen through the eyes of a former CIA spy. Although she was eventually forced out due to some admitted error on her part (now classified), she was generally supportive of the agency though often very critical of its leadership. The book is divided by the various CIA directors, Webster, Gates, Woolsey, Deutch, and Tenet, and provides a fascinating account of the unintended dismantling of our intelligence capabilities and the demoralizing of our intelligence personnel at the hands of Congress, numerous bureaucrats, various reformers and a few directors. Although reform was badly needed because the agency had gotten out of control, the endless reforms had the effect of paralyzing the agency, making CIA leaders and officers afraid of taking risks for fear of political repercussions. Rigid CIA leaders made matters worse by failing to come to grips with the new dangers of a post-Soviet Union world. Although the author acknowledges supporting Bill Clinton for president she admits that most of this took place on his watch and that between his distrust of the CIA, his preoccupation with the Lewinski scandal, and his focus on domestic issues (It's the economy stupid)--he greatly compounded the problem. Just before 911, the CIA was apparently so dysfunctional and afraid to take risks (for fear of political repercussions) that it is no wonder they were unable to predict 911 and messed up on the WMD call in Iraq. It's hard to know how accurate the author's version of this history is, but I found the book fascinating and hard to put down.

Not a real memoir, but a very insightful book

Mahle writes only sparsely about her own career with the CIA clandestine service in this book, most likely because her former employer wouldn't let her, as she herself says a few times. This well-written book is full of insights, especially, on the sorry state of the clandestine service of the CIA (also known as the Directorate of Operations, DO) during the last fifteen years or so. The author writes about general developments within the DO and its position within successive US administrations. Partly due to Iran-Contra, the DO from the second half of the 1980s had to work under all kinds of ethical and political restrictions that made operations very difficult if not impossible in many cases. Operations would be cancelled if there was only the slightest chance of them resulting in bad publicity. Agents could only be recruited if they would lead the life of saints and go to church and confession at least once a week. Whereby the author makes abundantly clear that saints do not usually make good agents. Support from headquarters for clandestine officers in the field was weak at the best of times, if Mahle is to be believed. This was the time I think when a CIA officer in the field, before going off on an important but risky mission inquired first if the headquarters at Langley was still in friendly hands. It could always be that the enemy had taken over by the time he came back from his mission, of course. I seriously wonder if there was ever a great power in the last century whose clandestine service had to labor under such restrictions and under such a fear of risk-taking. After 9/11, of course, the pendulum swung completely in the other direction again, witness the program of 'extraordinary rendition', for example, about which much has been written lately. Apparently, in American political culture it is very difficult to find a kind of balanced middle road for the clandestine service that is a necessary tool for every great power in this imperfect and evil-ridden world. For an intelligence service in a democracy, there have to be some restrictions, of course, in the means used, but not excessively so. I found Mahle's analysis sharp but at the same time objective and balanced. She doesn't seem to bear a grudge towards her former employer but as an American citizen and a patriot, she naturally regrets the sorry state of an important part of the CIA during the time she worked there. I should also mention that her book is well-written and a good read.

Excellent Useful Single-Person Account Focused on CIA

Edit of 20 Dec 07 to add links. This is a very personal story by a female case officer who served overseas, did some very hard time over the course of at least fifteen years with the Directorate of Operations, and has produced a very rare book, one that provides some useful documentation of the ups and downs of clandestine operations under five Directors of Central Intelligence (this would be even more impressive if the five had not all been appointed in the space of six years). This is, without question, one of the best books available on the intimate subject of the clandestine culture, and it offers some lovely gems and personality assessments that intelligence professionals will appreciate more than the general public. I have taken one star off for lack of detail and context, but strongly recommend the book to anyone who has served in the clandestine service and wishes to be reminded of the dark years, and to anyone who has not served in the clandestine service, and wishes to have a small glimmering of the down side of it all. Although the book does a good job of weaving a somewhat superficial (that is to say, the highlights, not the irrelevant) history of counter-terrorism with a history of bureaucratic mis-steps by a series of DCIs, and the book does a superb job of shredding both CIA lawyers and CIA security officers and CIA's complete lack of counterintelligence, this is primarily a book about the failure of the Directorate of Operations as a tribe, not about the failure of the US Government in the global war on terrorism. In retrospect, 1983-1985 are the years when the USG and the IC should have gone to "General Quarters," and 1992 was the year when Congress should have risen to its role and passed the Boren-McCurdy National Security Act of 1992. No one comes out of this book looking better than Senator Dave Boren (today the President of the University of Oklahoma) and Congressman Dave McCurdy, both from Oklahoma, both in charge of the respective committees on intelligence, and both bright men with good hearts who were unable to prevail against their less enlightened colleagues. The author does an excellent job of capturing some of the really low moments in CIA's clandestine history (such as in the 1990's when case officers were advised to take out legal liability insurance, both to protect themselves from CIA witch-hunts and to protect themselves from witch hunts mounted by others against which CIA would not be helpful to them). The author, who got into trouble over some Palestinian relations that led to her being fired, has *not* written a bitter or a revenge book. This is an excellent and useful book, and for those who wish to study the CIA's clandestine service and its ups and downs in the 1980-2005 timeframe, this is destined to be a core reference. It captures nuances and insights that are not available to outsiders in any other source. I do, however, want to highlight the author's brief discussion of CIA Security and th