Defenseless: Command Failure at Pearl Harbor

by Jack Lambert, Norman Polmar, Jack W. Lambert

Book Overview

When these two [authors] combine their considerable experience, the reader has to pay attention. Naval Aviation NewsIn 1999, by a vote of 52 to 47, the U.S. Senate cleared the names of Admiral Husband... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0760317399
• ISBN13: 9780760317396
• Release Date: January 2003
• Publisher: Motorbooks International
• Length: 253 Pages
• Weight: 1.20 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.9" x 6.3" x 9.3"

Customer Reviews

The 1941 attack on Pearl didn't have to be a Disaster

This concise read has only 156 pages plus and an extensive Appendix. The authors confine their study to the culpability of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. This is the obvious place to start an investigation but the investigation shouldn't be limited to it and for that reason a rating of three stars was almost given to the book. Another reason for the potential three star rating is the automatic exclusion of FDR from the investigation. Obviously FDR didn't want the death and destruction of December 7th but if he thought our defenses were ready and could handle an attack who knows how far the President would go to get the US in the war. There are incidents, like the oil embargo or the war drills, that make FDR look manipulative and eager to find a way to enter the war that would be acceptable to the American people. The introduction was well laid out by the authors. The rise of nationalism and then imperialism of Japan is described well, the burgeoning role of the US in the Pacific after the turn of the century is also covered. The recognition of a potential war with Japan was noted decades before with the planning of Orange and Rainbow. A brief history of the new US commanders to Pearl is then delivered. I find the choosing of Adm Kimmel and Gen Short to their new posts extremely curious. Kimmel, a friend of FDR and a former employee of his while FDR was in the Navy, was junior to many other candidates. Gen Short was nearing retirement and presented a disinterest in the position. Though both had good prior records, both were not the best choice with a war close at hand. The authors do a nice job of giving the reader an understanding of the conditions leading up to war before delivering their reasons why Kimmel and Short were derelict of duty and why Marshall and Roosevelt were under the misunderstanding that the Pacific Fleet was ready for war. Both officers had been in service for many years, the fragile relationship of Japan and the US was known to both men; they should have taken that relationship more seriously. Though not receiving as many planes and weapons as desired, they did receive planes, weapons and the new radar in sufficient quantities as to be able to defend themselves against an attack by air or sea. The authors list a litany of offenses and errors of omission by the two commanders to prove their thesis that they were derelict. I know for decades the commanders, their friends and family and other advocates, claim their innocence and the Senate finally exonerated them but the authors prove, at least to me, that Kimmel and Short must shoulder the bulk of the responsibility for the disaster. If military standards, like patrols and alertness levels were being followed, if the two commanders took the Washington communications seriously, if the two communicated with each other and more honestly with Washington, if the radar was faithfully used, and many other problems that escaed their attention, December 7th would have turned out mu

Short, But to The Point -- Turf Wars & Failures Of Kimmel & Short

This is a short, crisp book that can be read in a single sitting outlining the failures in the Hawaiian command structure of the Army and Navy immediately before and during the attack on Pearl Harbor. It does not address the issues of failures in intelligence, communications, and command in Washington. For those see Clausen, "Pearl Harbor Final Judgement" and Victor, "The Pearl Harbor Myth." I do not recommend Prange, "Pearl Harbor, The Final Judgment" due to its many errors in fact and analysis. Over time the Pearl Harbor debate has divided authors into two general camps; those seeking to blame Roosevelt and the service commanders in Washington while absolving Kimmel and Short, and those attempting to present the situation with blame passed around to everyone. The charges against Roosevelt usually center around the idea that he pushed Japan to attack the US, knew when it would occur, and failed to notify Hawaii so the effect of the attack would galvanize the American people into entering the war (against both Japan and Germany.) The corollary to this is that Kimmel and Short were sacrificed as scapegoats to keep scrutiny away from the truly guilty parties. Books such as Kimmel's "Admiral Kimmel's Story" and Theobald's "The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor" take this point of view. Leyton's postumous book "And I Was There" adds to the literature but contains inaccuracies designed to deflect blame from his intelligence and cooperation failures. This book simply focuses on Kimmel's and Short's command failures and treats all other exogenous failures as of little consequence. There is much merit to this approach in that it shows what the Hawaiian command did and did not do to prepare for war and to defend itself without getting bogged down in other issues. A military commander is charged to do the best possible job with the resources he has, including intelligence, and this book, in a very cut and dried manner, rates Kimmel and Short (Short primarily) on this single responsibility. The conclusion is that both commanders were woefully derelict in their duties. There was little (or none) cooperation between the Army and Navy commands even though Kimmel and Short enjoyed a very friendly relationship. The right hand did not know what the left hand was doing, and critical functions fell through the crack as both thought the other was taking responsibility for those functions. Yes, the lack of an overall commander was a deficiency that can be attributed to inter-service rivalry and a command failure in Washington, but the two commanders on the ground could have done much more to alleviate the problems. Unfortunately they didn't. Turf wars also raised their ugly heads among subordinates as discussed in this book, and were not addressed by the commanders. This book shows that the Hawaiian command was given a healthy number of first line aircraft for defense and reconnaissance, but failed to put them into service and use the

System Failure!

This book is an excellent examination of a system failure that prevented the U.S. military from mounting an effective defense against the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. It is concerned exclusively with failure of the U.S. Air Defense System which had been carefully designed to defend against such an attack. The air defense system designed for Hawaii was an integrated and modern (at the time). It incorporated such newfangled sub-systems as air warning radars (five sites) and a centralized control center serving as filter and ground control intercept (GCI) center staffed by both army and navy personal with direct communications to the radar sites, army air pursuit (fighter) squadrons, army anti-aircraft regiments, and the U.S. Navy warships anchored in Pearl Harbor (fire direction for their ship borne anti-aircraft guns. In addition there was an air reconnaissance sub-system that would utilize both army and navy long range patrol planes to reconnoiter probable Japanese attack routes. All in all a very effective system that would have probably done a good job of defending Oahu. In the months prior to December 1941 all the hardware for the system was in place and the control center was up and running. Unfortunately, like intelligence systems, this air defense system was only as good as the command structures it served. Neither the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel nor the commander of the Army's Hawaiian Department demonstrated any interest in the establishment or operating procedures of the system. Since they did not understand it they made little effort in the months before Pearl Harbor to ensure that their senior subordinates cooperated with and supported the system. Not only did the navy opt out of an active role supporting the system, but so did the army. Neither service was wiling to supply either the long range reconnaissance patrols essential to the system nor the personnel needed to adequately man the control center. In the absence of any senior direction intra- and inter- service rivalries and parochial interests hamstrung the air defense system. As is often the case with system failures of any type there is plenty of blame to go around. The authors of this book are especially hard on Admiral Kimmel, General Short and their senior commanders and staffs. It is certainly true that the senior army and navy commands displayed a remarkable lack of interest in or curiosity about what was after all the first line of defense for Hawaii. It is also true both commands appeared to lack strategic sense in their blindness to the possibility that the Japanese might attack the American fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbor. On the other hand, the normally brilliant Chief of Staff, General Marshall, does not appear to have made any effort to correct their strategic misperceptions. Further, the brilliant young officers who were really responsible for creating the air defense system appear to have made no effort to expla

Fills an important niche about Pearl Harbor

There are countless books about Pearl Harbor, and even a few good ones. Whether this counts as one of the good ones really depends on what you are looking for. If you are looking for tales of dauntless daring, look elsewhere. If you are looking for dark conspiracies, look elsewhere. Above all, if you are looking to absolve General Short and Admiral Kimmel of responsibility for having failed to defend their commands, certainly look elsewhere. "Defenseless" really has only one strength, but it's a very important one. The key to effective defense of Pearl Harbor would have been a modern air defense system (modern by 1940-41 standards, that is). Lambert and Polmar show clearly that Short was given the materials and personnel to build a good system, and adequate time, but failed to get it in operation by 7 December, basically because he didn't place much emphasis on it. In this he was abetted by Kimmel, who didn't hold up his relatively minor responsiblities for the system. The book also lays out lesser but still crucial failings regarding reconnaissance, fighter readiness, and AAA readiness. By the letter of existing regulations both officers should have been court-marshalled for all this, rather than being given the slap on the wrist that they got. (Of course MacArthur in the Philippines should have been given a good old fashioned American tarring and feathering rather than a Medal of Honor, but that's another story.) Whether Kimmel and Short were given adequate and specific warning really has nothing to do with it. They failed to properly prepare their commands for defense and put them in a defense posture appropriate to what they fully knew the general situation to be. This book does a good job of showing that.

Dereliction of Duty

Of all the books on the subject, this one presents the most reasoned case yet as to why Kimmel and Short were rightly accused of derelection of duty. If there wasn't already the Clinton book by the same name, that would have been the appropriate title. It is hard to disagree with the facts presented by Lambert and Polmar.