Defeat in the West (Cassell Military Paperbacks)

By Milton Shulman

Book Overview

"The best and most vivid account of the German collapse." Hugh Trevor-Roper, The Sunday Times "Ambitiously enough this volume was begun with a threefold object -- to tell the story of the defeat of... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 030436603X
• ISBN13: 9780304366033
• Release Date: January 2004
• Publisher: UNKNO
• Length: 400 Pages
• Weight: 1.49 lbs.
• Dimensions: 8.0" x 1.0" x 5.0"

Customer Reviews

A book that stands out among good books!

As a big military history reader I have to say this book was excellent. I don't recommend very many books but this was great especially for people already familiar with WWII. It takes you inside the dfeat of the German Army. Very great observations from high ranking German officer mixed with views from the foot soldier. Gives a great perspective on the German Army and the internal divisions it had.

Interesting, if imperfect, analysis

Defeat in the West is a curious classic history of World War II. Shulman, immediately after the war ended, set out to interview German generals to find out why the Allies won. One might conclude that this source of information would be hopelessly biased. Shulman, however, seems to be fairly immune from the German generals' excuses and scapegoating. Instead, Shulman argues that the Germans were defeated because of three problems with their military. First, Shulman identifies Hitler's disastrous in military affairs. As the war continued, Hitler became progressively involved in military minutia, to the point of issuing tactical orders. I always feel that care must be taken with this argument. Too many authors slip into the mode of "it was all Hitler's fault", which is most certainly incorrect. Hitler by himself did not lose the war for Germany. Shulman occasionally loses sight of this fact, although corrects himself at the end of the book by placing much of the blame on the German field generals and general staff. Further, it can be argued that it was not Hitler per se that was the problem, but rather that tactical orders emanated from a politician, who was hundreds of miles from the front, and who constantly had information that was badly out of date. Anyone occupying such a position would have performed as badly as Hitler. So, I think it is more appropriate to blame a highly inefficient and ineffectual chain of command. Shulman essentially makes this argument, although he frequently writes as if Hitler the man was the source of the problem. Second, Shulman identifies "discipline" as a factor for Germany's defeat. This is interesting, as militaries typically stress discipline as a factor for victory. However, Shulman uses the term to describe the German army's willingness to follow Hitler all the way to the destruction of their country. This perhaps was a curious hold-over from the traditions of the German general staff, that held that the army should be strictly apolitical; the head of state would make the strategic decisions and it was up to the military to carry out its orders without question. As an institution it was not to interfere or offer opinions in the realm of politics, nor to question military orders. Shulman demonstrates how this played out in the war. German generals were too "disciplined" (too reflexive in their need to obey orders) to ignore stupid commands emanating from Hitler's headquarters. Additionally, resistance to Hitler's plans almost never was offered on political or moral grounds. Any debate about strategy was purely military (e.g. delaying the attack on France not because it would be wrong, but because the army was not ready). Political resistance, most visibly in the July 20, 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler, only occurred when the generals realized the war was lost and that some political settlement was needed. Shulman notes that even this logic was basically military and not moral. He do