Command in War

by Martin van Creveld

Book Overview

Many books have been written about strategy, tactics, and great commanders. This is the first book to deal exclusively with the nature of command itself, and to trace its development over two thousand... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0674144406
• ISBN13: 9780674144408
• Release Date: January 1985
• Publisher: Harvard University Press
• Length: 339 Pages
• Weight: 1.60 lbs.

Customer Reviews

The future does not work.

The Ideal Command System should monitor close but not choke initiative nor undermine authority. The system should gather information accurately, continuously, comprehensively, selectively, and fast. Decision-makers should reliably tell truth from error in the data. The Display of information should be displayed clearly, in detail, and provide comprehensive vision. The system information should accurately translate into a real world reference. Design and defining of system objectives must be both desirable and feasible. The systems results should produce orders that are clear and unambiguous Command should act as a force multiplier. Command identifies opportunities to multiple resources, attention, and tactics as a multiplier effect in that region. Command structures do not win battles. Victories are won in spite of command structure. Men engaged in war need both motivation and information. Command must have councils of war, well-defined and understandable procedures, and technical means. 90% of good command management never allow certain "events too happen". For example, vigilant effort removes maintenance breakdown, careless waste of life, procedures and practices that are inherently hazardous, and correctly of serious defect. As is, commanders must fight with information on hand. Commander's location relative to the troopers differs in proximity. The commander's place is dictated by function. Strategic intelligence in the 1800 was found in books of strategy and maps of friendly and enemy territory. Communication was by mounted couriers that moved between rely-stations transmitting messages. The commander would sit in his tent and contemplate his situation. The speed of the communication was limited to the horse. The troop formations were limited by the ability of the commander to see visual clues. Today, troop formations have a 10-fold increase in defense capability to defend perimeter territory against enemy movement because of communication improvements. A bigger army creates bigger problems. Complexity, specialization, and organizational instability have created an inordinate increase in the amount of information. Excess specialization has worked against stability. In 1963, four services had 2,225,000 enlisted men representing 1,559 Military Occupation Specialties. Significant increases in radio usage resulted between 1943 and 1971. In 1943, the radio usage was 1 for every 38.6 men. However, by 1971, usage increased to 1 for every 4.5 men, a 859% increase. Usage feasibility corresponded with technology innovations. The radio created thousands of little cogs - all interconnected in the hands of supreme management. The result was backfire! The information was to abstract and diffuse to use. Pressure from the top to produce more quantitative information ended up producing inaccuracy and uncertainty. Bigger armies meant larger interconnected systems. McNamara created a new military resource call

Best book (I've read) on Command and Control

Much has happened (e.g. Boyd's OODA methodology, etc) since this book was written, but I still think it's the best single book I'ved read on Command and Control. Much of what van Creveld talks about historically is supported by Boyd's OODA theory and similar models of decision-making. Highly recommended, and one of those books I've bought and given to others... dave

A Commanding Read!

I first heard about this book during lectures on military leadership. When I finally got around to buying it and started reading it, I could not put this book down. It thoroughly engrossed me in the subject of command under wartime conditions. Although the book uses examples from purely the land warfare aspect, it is easy to see how the concept of command can and ultimately does encompass all three services. The author has researched this subject extremely well (the endnotes are endless)and the bibliography exhaustive. I highly recommend this book to all military enthusiasts as well as the military professional.

Wonderful and Lucid Book on Command

This is the first book by Martin Van Crevold I have read, but it is a fine one. In this wonderful tome, Van Crevold analyzes the problem of military command in detail, looking at the evolution of Command systems, paying close attention to Napoleon, Van Moltke, Israel during 1967 and 1973, and the United States in Vietnam. A must buy for any military history buff.

Command in War

This is the best non-fiction book I have ever read. Van Creveld traces the history of command systems in organized warfare. His conclusion is that successful command systems did not employ breathrough technology but, rather, so organized themselves that they could function with less information flow. They did this by either compressing the organization so less communication was needed (e.g., the phalanx) or decentralizing decision making so that information did not have to flow as far up or down the organization. Added to this informational efficiency was a "directed telescope" that permitted commanders to focus on essential points in the system in detail, which had the secondary purpose of keeping lower level commanders honest through fear of intense scrutiny from on high. Finally, informal channels of communication existed to grease the wheels of the formal system, as well as to permit temporary but essential circumvention of the formal system in emergencies.Van Creveld's scholarship is broad and impressive; he researched in, and translated from, several languages. His sense of irony and good story telling make for a can't-put-down read.This book is great for military buffs, and is equally useful for business managers who recognize that the hot new management buzzwords being hawked by the consultant industry cannot compare to thoughtful analysis.By the way, for those who believe the Internet will easily and immediately change how we do business, check out van Creveld's Technology and War.