Clausewitz and Modern Strategy

by Michael I. Handel

Book Overview

Published in 1996, Clausewitz and Modern Strategy is a valuable contribution to the field of Military & Strategic Studies.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0714640530
• ISBN13: 9780714640532
• Release Date: November 2004
• Publisher: Routledge
• Length: 342 Pages
• Weight: 1.15 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.0" x 5.9" x 9.0"

Customer Reviews

An Excellent Addition to Your Strategic Theory Library

This book is a compilation of essays that were presented at a Clausewitz conference in 1986. Given the nature of strategic theory and Clausewitz, twenty years doesn't necessary make something outmoded. In the case of strategic theory, we seem to be living through a particularly dark period in the US, where our sense of strategy, or even the existence of a "strategic culture" is in question. Political and even military leaders mix up "strategy" with "objectives", failing hopelessly to see that the former allows for the achievement of the latter through the use of the military instrument, not the two terms being one in the same. That Clausewitz is still basic to strategic thought should be obvious to even the most narrow-minded of technocrats at this point since the fiasco in Iraq has been shown to be very much a "political" struggle by nature, regardless of the range of military "grammar" applied. The essays include the subjects or Guerrilla warfare, intelligence, "time and space", chance and uncertainty, and various ways that Clausewitz had been misperceived in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Of particular interest is the essay by Martin van Creveld entitled "The Eternal Clausewitz". In it van Creveld argues convincingly that Clausewitz's approach of dealing with war not as an object of scientific study (as in attempting to develop a positivist theory or "cook book" as vC puts it), but as a complexity of social interaction, and using scientific methodology - looking at war from a social science perspective - while at the same time considering war also from a philosophical perspective, ensures his lasting relevance. One has to asked, "what happened?" concerning van Creveld, who has since dismissed Clausewitz through an obvious misreading of the Clausewitzian "trinity". . . In my opinion this change of heart has more to do with van Creveld's political views, than with strategic thought, since misunderstanding Clausewitz's meanings is hardly the case. This book is more for the advanced student of strategic theory, not so much the beginner, although Michael I. Handel's essay on "Clausewitz in the Age of Technology" does provide an excellent primer on applying Clausewitz to modern warfare.