Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone

By Larry Devlin

Book Overview

Larry Devlin arrived as the new chief of station for the CIA in the Congo five days after the country had declared its independence, the army had mutinied, and governmental authority had collapsed. As... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 1586484052
• ISBN13: 9781586484057
• Release Date: March 2007
• Publisher: PublicAffairs
• Length: 312 Pages
• Weight: 1.31 lbs.
• Dimensions: 9.5" x 1.0" x 6.5"

Customer Reviews

The Way It Was -- Honest & Unvarnished

This is a great book of how one man can could make a difference in the Cold War. Author Devlin chose to concentrate on his time as the CIA Station Chief in the Congo (now Zaire) in the early and mid 1960s but one suspects that his earlier time as a case officer (in an unstated country) and later as station chief in Laos might be equally enlightening. Devlin did his job to the best of his ability, acting always in the interest of the United States, and sometimes taking enormous risks with his career in the Agency and even his and his family's personal safety. Unfortunately this is an example of a bygone era, probably never to be repeated since the Agency has become increasingly bureaucratic and bureaupathic over the years. Devlin enjoyed a great deal of latitude and authority, much more than is allowed today, recommending to Langley what should be done (and doing it either before or after approval) rather than to sit and wait on directives. Such behavior is unthinkable today, and as a result the CIA's HUMINT is currently almost non-existent. Having read the other reviews I was struck by several who criticized Devlin on political grounds, but it was Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson and other various people above him who made policy rather than Devlin himself. He was simply extremely effective in carrying out their policies, and for that he should be commended rather than criticized. In addition, the times were much different in the 60s, and the Cold War was threatening to become hot in many locations. The UN was its usual ineffective self, and this book clearly points up the problems of attempting to depend on a toothless tiger to maintain order. Even worse, the UN frequently acts in opposition to American wishes as it did in this book. American politicians, such as G. Mennon Williams, unknowledgable and dabbling in foreign affairs come off less than effective in Devlin's work, as do many State Department officials. Devlin's main effort was to forestall Soviet expansion into Africa and the Congo rather than create a democracy in Zaire, and that must be kept in mind. He dealt with the Congolese as they were, not as how he would like them to be (ala Jimmy Carter.) His depictions of personalities, both favorable and unfavorable may offend many, but inconvenient truths are still truths. Devlin recounts the problems with Patrice Lumumba and the various successor governments until the Mobutu coup and the civil war in the mid 1960s. The CIA was in the thick of it, advising but not controlling the Congolese politicians, and always attempting to keep the Sov Bloc nations out. How Devlin did this, and his successes and failures, make fascinating reading. His motivation (as he states it) was to keep the cold war from becoming hot by frustrating communist expansionism and influence in non-communist countries. This is a period piece illuminating the operational CIA at its best working to further American

History Lessons

This book rewards its readers with good deal of information on a variety of subjects. It undoubtedly provides a very accurate account of the struggle of the former Belgium Congo to become a variable nation state. In the course of doing this, its author provides a plausible description of the chaotic condition of an imploding nation state and its leading political players of the period, including the controversial Patrice Lumumba and the man who turned out to be his chief rival Sese Seko Mobutu. Finally the book opens a window on how the U.S -Soviet Union Clod War rivalry played out in an newly independent African state like the Congo. On a rather different level, Larry Devlin provides a good explanation of what a pro-active CIA Station Chief (COS) of 1960 did to earn his keep. One can carry away a good deal of information about good `tradecraft', the use of non-official cover (NOC) agents, and the vital need for a close relationship between the COS and the U.S. Ambassador. For a long period Devlin was not only COS Kinshasa (Leopoldville), but also the only CIA representative in the Congo. As a result, he discloses quite a bit about the art and craft of recruiting and maintaining `agents' in the field. Although virtually all memoirs written by former intelligence folks tend to be somewhat self-serving, from this book it is clear that Devlin really was good at his job and did his best to protect the national security interests of U.S. and equally important to help the Congolese build a viable and independent nation state. That in the end the Congo continues to be a near failed state was due to factors well beyond Devlin's control. The problem then as now of course is that a really good CIA operative like Devlin and a really poor operatives are treated pretty much the same way by CIA. The system is really designed to homogenize everyone into the same bland blend. Also it is clear that CIA of 2007 would never allow a COS the kind of freedom of action that Devlin had in 1960. Anyone with an interest in Africa or the CIA or both ought to find this well written and informative book fascinating.

rare honest account of events in Congo in the 1960s

This is a remarkably honest and accurate book about events in the Congo in the 1960s. The author tells his story, good and bad, and attempts to explain his motivations. Most attempts to tell the story of these events are exercises in conspiracy theory and mythology. The false story is always of how Patrice Lumumba was the greatest leader in African history who was murdered by a colonial/CIA conspiracy and replaced by the same people with Mobutu. The real story was never that simple. Lumumba was a bad leader. Within a month of independence, Lumumba caused the army to mutiny by giving all government workers except the army a pay raise. The soldiers ran wild leaderless throughout the country and Lumumba could do nothing to address the situation. He actually responded to the mutiny by going about the country whipping up crowds against europeans leading to riots and beatings in the streets. When Belgian troops in the country intervened to protect civilians from the army, Lumumba accused them of attacking the Congo and then Lumumba asked for UN intervention. What happened next was that the various tribal factions in the country lined up behind outside sponsors (commerical and government). Lumumba aligned himself with the Soviet Union which of course meant that some of his opponents lined themselves up with the author as representative of the Americans. But also playing the game were the Belgians, various Belgian commerical interests, the French, the British and even the Chinese. Devlin is very blunt about the things he did to assist Lumumba's rivals in removing him from power and makes no apologies for what he did. He also talks about receiving orders that he should arrange the assassination of Lumumba. Orders which he never carried out because he considered it a horrible idea in any number of ways. The UN comes off very badly in the book. The local official in the Congo, an Indian Political Crony of Nehru, comes across as more interested in formenting a civil war than in solving the conflict. When the government desposes Lumumba as Prime Minister, the UN rejects the decision and then sends in troops to act as a bodyguard for Lumumba. The worst story about the UN is a personal one. When the daughter of an american official suffers a broken leg and hip, the UN doctor she is brought to not only refuses to treat her, he attempts to stop the men from using a strecher (UN Property) to move the girl on foot to another hospital. On the actual death of Lumumba, the author has remarkably little to say other than to make convincing statements that whatever happened he had nothing to do with it. The problem is that the number of groups that wanted him dead was so large, that its almost impossible to assign blame or to figure out who was actually responsible. The author then afterward traces the downward spiral of Congo into first civil war and then a political showndown between the president and prime minister which ended with Mobutu overthrowing both in a

Fantastic

This is an absolutly fantastic account of a Chief of Station's duties during the Cold War. Devlin's experiences and accounts show just how important Africa was to the Soviets and the West beginning in the 1960s. While certainly not excusing Mobutu's atrocities, Devlin provides the reader with a portrait of the man during his early years, when the Great Leopard was not quite as ruthless or dishonest. All in all, a great read and a great addition to the growing genre of Cold War texts.

What Does A CIA Station Chief Do?

Have you ever wondered exactly how a CIA covert agent actually spends his days? Who does he talk to, who does he recruit and how? What does he have to worry about? If you're interested in these questions, read Larry Devlin's book. You'll learn a lot. You'll also learn a lot about the way much of African politics actually work. Even if you're not too interested in Africa or the workings of the CIA, you'll enjoy this very well-written, page-turner adventure story.