Beyond Experimentalism and the Rationalist Renaissance
In recent years philosophers have become increasingly concerned with the question whether philosophical intuitions are reliable sources of evidence. So-called ―experimental philosophers‖ have begun to make an impact on the way mainstream philosophers think about the role of intuitions in philosophy. They argue that it is possible for good empirical work to reveal the truth about the nature and reliability of the intuitions that philosophy has relied on so heavily.2 For example, the positive experimentalist program has it that intuitions may be useful and epistemically justified as long as they can be properly calibrated by empirical science. The negative program has it that intuitions are generally unreliable, and that empirical science will show us how and why. There has also been staunch criticism of the empirical method, and even staunch support for a philosophical methodology which prizes the use of purportedly robust and reliable philosophical intuitions. The former approach is broadly empiricist in nature, and the latter approach is broadly rationalistic. My project is to demonstrate that neither of these approaches is entirely satisfactory
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