Belief about the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content

by Neil Feit

Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions-things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from time to time, place to place, or person to person. Neil Feit argues that this view breaks down in the face
of beliefs about the self. These are beliefs that we express by means of a first-person pronoun. Feit maintains-following David Lewis, Roderick Chisholm,...

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0195341368
• ISBN13: 9780195341362
• Release Date: July 2008
• Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
• Length: 216 Pages
• Weight: 0.76 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.9" x 5.7" x 8.3"