Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War

by David E. Murphy

Book Overview

This book is the definitive insiders' account of the espionage warfare in Berlin from 1945 to the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. In an unprecedented collaboration, CIA and KGB intelligence... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0300072333
• ISBN13: 9780300072334
• Release Date: August 1997
• Publisher: Yale University Press
• Length: 530 Pages
• Weight: 2.00 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.7" x 6.5" x 9.6"

Customer Reviews

Spies Like Them

If one were to pick the "ideal author" to narrate a history of the CIA or KGB, the choices usually end with a decision between a former operative in one of the agencies, a historian, or a journalist. In Battleground Berlin, Murphy, Kondrashev, and Bailey have managed to find the merging of two of the three. The first two are former operatives - one in the CIA and one in the KGB. The latter, is a reporter. It is an important distinction to make from the beginning, because the tone and language used in their book is often that of the first-person, and it is always narrated with a vested interest, first-hand accounts, and material that may seem overzealous. Luckily for the three, the Cold War remains a fertile topic of examination for historians. In terms of uniqueness, Battleground Berlin represents one of the first times in the post-Cold War era that former CIA and KGB officers have come together to write about the history of American and Soviet intelligence operations. The work is not simply the memoirs of David Murphy, former chief of the CIA's Berlin Operations Base, and Sergei Kondrashev, former head of the KGB's German department and active measures department, but relies to a considerable extent on a vast array of sources from both Soviet and American archives. To be sure, much of the story is based on the recollections of the co-authors, but these are tempered by supporting evidence. In this work, the reader is treated to a sober and balanced account of major Cold War events in Germany as interpreted by the American and Soviet intelligence services. The authors' smooth narrative touches on the primary events that will be familiar to most historians of post-war Europe: the Berlin Blockade, the Korean War (and its effect on Germany), the June 1953 uprising in East Germany, the Otto John case, the Berlin Tunnel, and the Berlin crisis of 1958-1961 which culminated in the building of the Berlin Wall. The authors portray in an interesting manner the intelligence organizations in Germany in the initial postwar years. The view put forth is not necessarily a unique one, but it is put forth in a dynamic manor: The fledgling CIA was naive and unprepared compared to the seasoned opponent in the KGB. The authors point out, for example, that the CIA did not receive its first Russian speaker until 1947 (p. 23). In contrast, the Soviets in Germany were preparing for intelligence operations in the West "as the fronts advanced into Germany (p. 33)." The authors attribute this contrast in preparation to the deep-seated paranoia which characterized Soviet Russia (p. 26), as personified in Joseph Stalin. Battleground Berlin sets out to describe in detail the major Cold War events in Germany, and specifically Berlin, as they related to intelligence. The account of the Berlin Blockade makes clear that the Soviets had reliable information on the position of the Western governments, but that this information was not translated into useful knowl

Authoritative and detailed

This is the first time a thorough review of post war Berlin intelligence activities has been published. For the professional this is a good compilation of operations (collection, defection, analysis, etc.). For the novice the book is a difficult read - chock full of details but not written in captivating language. Students of history need to add this to their collection of books to keep and use as reference.

Worthwhile Read

The most interesting aspect of the book may be the insight it gives on the interworkings of the Soviet State. While some passages go into detail much beyond what the general reader will want to know, it is worth trudging through the slow passages.

Setting the Record Straight

This is a historic book, which anyone interested in the history and practice of espionage will appreciate. LeCarre it is not; while there is some bit of cloak and dagger (Murphy relates the story of the KGB attempting to capture him in a Vienna) for the most part the book is a set of essays addressing the questions of what each side did and knew. The strength of the book comes from the first hand of Murphy and Kondrashev as station chiefs in Berlin of the CIA and KGB respectively, and from the fact that Murphy and Kondrashev had unprecedented access to CIA and KGB files to document their conclusions. These essays are loosely organized and the chronology is often repetitive: in the chronology of events, and in the apparent structure of Murphy and Kondrashev writing contrasting points of view sounds good in theory but repetitive in practice: the book does not have the clear argumentative flow that a book by a single author would have, and it lacks clear headings identifying section author. Last week, Murphy and Kondrashev were in New York at a panel discussion sponsored by the Harriman Institute and the Yale University Press, held at the Yale Club. The questions from the audience were appalling, but there were two points made on the panel that might be of interest here. The first concerns a claim made by the book that in looking into the effects of intelligence on the leaders consuming it, there was a pattern: the CIA had limited resources and limited penetration of the east; this meant that information was sketchy; however, analysis was thorough and objective and well-considered by the Western leaders. In contrast, the KGB had spectacular assets: high level penetration of French and British intelligence that produced immediate and insight into the Western positions. However, as the Soviet intelligence moved up the chain toward Stalin, fear and organizational dynamics led the analysts to spin the data to suit Stalin preconceptions and socialist ideology. The KGB intelligence, in other words, was ideologically pure but as a consequence it was misleading. This led Stalin, for example, to believe that the Western countries could be budged from Berlin by the blockade, even when Western leaders had agreed among themselves that they would not be budged. At the Press panel, this book assertion was challenged: the Historian on the panel claimed that there was evidence in the book that the CIA intelligence was just as ideologically driven. Little evidence was given to support this challenge, but as you read the book, you might keep your eyes open for it. The second point raised at the panel was to highlight one of the book's most novel claims: that 1) the KGB knew about the Berlin tunnel even before it had been built and 2) even so, they considered the source of their knowledge -- George Blake, a mole in british intelligence -- so precious an asset that they couldn't risk his discovery by putting

More fascinating than Le Carre or Ludlum

Only the collapse of the Soviet Union could have opened a "window" in history which would allow two men, adversaries in the most arctic period of the Cold War, to tell the full story of what really went on in the epicenter of intelligence warfare, divided Berlin. Even more extraordinary is that David Murphy and Sergei Kondraschev were able, thirty years after they served leading roles in this clash of armies of the night, to break down residual barriers of this conflict and collaborate on this book. They supplement first-hand accounts with documents and interviews that complete an unparalleled picture of the real world on which novels like THE SPY WHO CAME IN FROM THE COLD andFUNERAL IN BERLIN were based. This brilliant account is not merely more compelling than any novel; it is more compelling than any novel CAN be