Arabs at War

by Kenneth M. Pollack

Book Overview

Kenneth M. Pollack, formerly a Persian Gulf military analyst at the CIA and Director for Persian Gulf Affairs at the National Security Council, describes and analyzes the military history of the six... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0803237332
• ISBN13: 9780803237339
• Release Date: October 2002
• Publisher: University of Nebraska Press
• Length: 699 Pages
• Weight: 2.65 lbs.
• Dimensions: 2.3" x 6.0" x 9.0"

Customer Reviews

Excellent, but perhaps better for afficionados

The Middle East has been, regrettably, one of the most active "laboratories" of war-fighting since WWII. The lessons learned from the numerous conflicts there have had tremendous influence on the development of the concepts of maneuver warfare which are so central to current Western military doctrine. The success of that developmental process has been manifestly evident in the Coalition (essentially U.S.)-Iraqi conflicts of 1991 and 2003. Pollack's book, which is well-summarized by the other reviewers, is a fairly technical survey of the course of each of the individual Middle-East conflicts, with an eye towards elucidating the causes for the defeats of the Arab militaries in each of those wars. His analytic style will be familiar to those who have read his other, more politically charged, book, The Threatening Storm. He proposes hypotheses for Arab military ineffectiveness in his introduction, and then proceeds to evaluate the degree to which performance of each country in each conflict supports or refutes each of those hypotheses. It is a very logical, detailed method of argument which has an aura of inevitability in its conclusions. However, some in the general readership may find it a bit dry. There are few anecdotes of small unit action to liven up the narrative, which reads more like a War College document than a popular history.The conclusions have also been summarized by the other reviewers. As I see it, Pollack proposes that Arab military ineffectiveness stems mainly from an inability of smaller units, either on land or in the air, to engage in the free-flowing maneuver and combined-arms co-ordination required for tactical success on the modern battlefield. He proposes that problems reliably using and maintaining sophisticated modern weapons systems are also significant, but the root cause is the inflexibility of the small unit. Pollack attributes this mainly to failings of the junior officer corps, but I would like to have seen a discussion of the role of the non-commissioned officers in Arab armies, since the ability of Western NCOs is a major factor in the strength of Western militaries. Pollack does not propose an explanation for the limitations he identified. It would be fascinating to read an evaluation of his conclusions in light of the Arab Development Report, to assess the degree to which the military deficiencies are indirect manifestations of aspects of Arab culture. My own hypothesis (although I am certainly no expert) is the observed limitations arise from an absence of a technological, machine-oriented, society that emphasizes individual empowerment and action, an inherent conservatism that values the collective (umma) at the expense of personal initiative, and an system of personal worth and honor that limits the ability to recognize and convey negative information. In other words, many of the factors that are at the heart of criticisms of Western (and especially U.S.) society by the Arab world are those that are associate

Excellent book, well-summarized by other reviews

After reading "The Threatening Storm", I bought this for further background and to continue to assess the quality of Pollack's research. This seems a detailed and objective analysis. Pollack analyzes each of the Arab armies, and finds, as noted in other reviews, that Arab soldiers have often been incredibly brave, but with tactical leadership uneven at best, and often truly awful. I take away from this that at least part of the problem is not just that lower-ranking officers are not good, but that the common problem has been *architectural*. That is, the structures and motivations of these governments have almost never allowed for independence and initiative at the lower levels. In some cases, it is clear that various rulers never wanted the military to be too independent, and this resulted in a rigid centralized-control approach.Hence, perhaps it is possible this is a military problem, i.e., train better tactical leadership, but the consistency of the problem makes me think that it is more of a government/society issue, where the existing structures simply don't encourage the long-term existence of flexible troops.In any case, fine analysis with comprehensive military history of the era.

a superb military history of the Middle East

The main thesis of Pollack's book is that the Arab armies lose wars because of the low quality of the junior officer corps. The first army that Pollack evaluates is the Egyptian army from 1948-1991. Pollack states the main reason for the severe defeat suffered by the Egyptians in 1967 was due to the poor quality of lower ranking officers. These Egyptian lieutenants, majors, and colonels failed to react to Israeli manuevers or look for routes of escape. However Pollack praises the Egyptian high command's decision to move forces closer to the Israeli border because if they waited behind defensive works, the Egyptian army would have been outmaneuvered by the Israelis. When planning for the 1973 war the Egyptian high command planned every detail of the lower officers moves for the upcoming offensive. The end result was that the Egyptian army was suuccesful in the opening phases of the offensive but faced defeat in the unplanned later phases of the conflict.Pollack thinks that the Egyptian high command made the right move in staying in the Northern Sinai and not retreating because the Egyptian army lacked the maneuver skills to implement the later option. The second that Pollack details is the Iraqi army that faced problems similiar to the Egyptian army. In the opening phases of the Iran-Iraq the Iraqi army was outmaneuvered by Iranin forces because of the medicore qaulity of the Iraqi forces. The Iraqi high command compensated for this weakness by carefully planning every operation in minute detail. This soon led to the later Iraqi victories against the Iranians although the Iraqi junior officers still suffered from poor intiative. Because of the above mentioned weaknesses the Iraqi army was swiftly defeated by the United States during the Gulf War, but Pollack states that the Iraqi high command saved the Iraqi army from complete destruction by sacrificing some units of the elite Republican Guard against the American armored forces so that a great percentage of the Iraqi army could escape. The the third army that Pollack details is the Jordainin army from 1948-1991. The Jordanian army was able to defeat the Israelis in the 1948 war because it was officered by British officers thereby escaping the previously mentioned weaknesses of the Iraqi and Egyptian armies. But once the British officers were replaced by Arabs in 1956, this led to the poor showing of Jordanian forces in 1967. The forth army mentioned is the Libyans that had similiar problems with their junior officers and this caused the Libyan defeat in Chad during the late eighties. The Saudi Arabian army which had exactly the same problems as the above mentioned armies was more ineffective since the Saudis never bothered to learn the technical skills to run a mechanized army. The final army that Pollack describes in the book is the Syrian army and how the poor quality of Syrian lower officers led to defeat in it's wars against Israel. The inefffectiveness of the Syrian officer corps allowed the

a superb military history of the Middle East

Kenneth Pollack's main thesis is that the low quality of junior officers in the Arab armies leds them to defeat. The first army that Pollack analyzes is the Egyptian army from 1948-1991. The low quality of Egyptian lower officers to innovate led to Egyptian defeat during the Six Days War. Pollack praises the Egyptian high command's decision to move closer to the Israeli border prior to the war, because if they stayed behind the original fortifications the Egyptians would have been outmaneuvered. Before the Yom Kippur War the Egyptian high command planned the operation to cross the Suez canal in minute detail since they did not trust their junior officers to display any personal intiative. Once the Egyptian army advance beyond the planned goals the Egyptians were defeated because their lower officers did not know to improvise in combat. Pollack states the Egytian high command made the right decsion in holding the Northern Sinai instead of retreating because if the later option was followed the Egyptian army officers could not have reacted to this fluid situation and the Egyptian army would have faced total defeat.The next army that Pollack evaluates is the Iraqi army with an emphasis on it's war with Iran. In the opening phases of the Iran-Iraq War the Iraqis were constantly out maneuvered by the Iranians because of the low quality of Iraqi offices. To compensate for this low quality, the Iraqi high command developed highly complex plans to be followed to the letter by junior officers. This allow Iraq to gain some victories in the closing stages of the Iran-Iraq War. The Iraqi army was totally unprepared to fight the Americans during the Gulf-War due to the above mentioned problems with it's officer corps. However Pollack believes that the Iraqi high command made the right decision in sacrificing units of the elite Republican Guard against American armored forces so that a large percentage of the Iraqi army could escape from the Coalition forces. The third army is the Jordanian army that was originally officered by British officers in the 1948 war against Israel. Due to the it's British officers the Jordanian army was able to repel Israeli attacks in the 1948 war. However once the army was commandered by Arab officers it faced the same problems as those mentioned in the Iraqi and Egyptian armies and this led to the medicore showing of the Jordanian army during the Six Days War. The Libyan army face similiar problems with it's officers and this led to defeat against the Chadians in the eighites. Pollack states the Saudi Army is perhaps the least effective of the arab armies because the Saudis refuse to learn technical skills to operate hig tech machinery. The final arab country that Pollack evaluates is the Syrian Army. The dismal performance of the Syrian officer corps during the 1967 War, led to a lack of a Syrian response to the Israeli flank attack on the Northern Golan heights. During the 1973 war the Syrians planned a Soviet style attack with