Accountability Through Logic

By Matthew Heeney

Are we morally responsible for what we believe and intend? If so, what is the nature of this

responsibility, and how does it differ from our moral responsibility for our outward bodily deeds?

How is our moral responsibility for belief and intention grounded in mental action? I argue that

we do bear a species of moral responsibility for our beliefs and intentions. But our beliefs and

intentions are nonvoluntary-we neither believe nor intend 'at will.' ����is raises a pressing

question about how we can be legitimately held accountable for the attitudes. Given that we do

not choose our attitudes in the same way we choose to perform ordinary intentional actions, how

do we exercise agency in belief and intention? My answer is that responsibility for the attitudes

is grounded in a fully intentional yet nonvoluntary form of mental action. ����is is a thinker's

reasoning to a conclusion in thought (or inferring). Drawing on the work of G.E.M. Anscombe, I

argue that reasoning is active because it is constituted by the very species of self-conscious

practical knowledge as intentional bodily action. ����is practical knowledge positions a thinker to

answer the justificatory demands that mark our responsibility for the attitudes.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 1835207782
• ISBN13: 9781835207789
• Release Date: September 2023
• Publisher: Hbnisha
• Length: 292 Pages
• Weight: 0.87 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.6" x 6.0" x 9.0"