A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War

by Melvyn P. Leffler

Book Overview

In the United States the Cold War shaped our political culture, our institutions, and our national priorities. Abroad, it influenced the destinies of people everywhere. It divided Europe, split Germany, and engulfed the Third World. It led to a feverish arms race and massive sales of military equipment to poor nations. For at least four decades it left the world in a chronic state of tension where a miscalculation could trigger nuclear holocaust...

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0804722188
• ISBN13: 9780804722186
• Release Date: July 1993
• Publisher: Stanford University Press
• Length: 712 Pages
• Weight: 0.35 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.7" x 6.1" x 9.2"

Customer Reviews

Excellent

This excellent book is a very scholarly and well written analysis of the opening of the Cold War. Based on several years work in American archives and careful reading of the large secondary literature, this is the standard account of the development of American policy under the Truman administration. The major limitation, which Leffler acknowledges forthrightly at the beginning of the book, is that access to Soviet archives is limited and much of what Leffler writes about Soviet intentions and policy is based on American analyses. Leffler's comparisons of American and Soviet intentions, consequently, may be subject to revision. His analysis of American policy, however, is likely to be the standard account for the foreseeable future. Leffler sees American policy as driven by a broad, consensual, sophisticated, and specific vision of American security needs. For the policy makers who dominated the Truman administration, the crucial experiences were the failure of Wilsonian internationalism after WWI, the failure of America to exert decisive leadership after WWI, the emergence of autarchic dictatorships in Europe and Japan, and the need for the massive American effort in WWII to defeat the most dangerous of those dictatorships. The American policy making elite, a coalition of internationalist Democrats and former Republicans, concluded that American security required friendly, prosperous democratic regimes in the industrialized sections of Eurasia - Western Europe and Japan, an open international economic order, and multilateral institutions to guarantee international economic and political security. This vision of American security was not one of narrow safety. A Eurasia in the grip of hostile dictatorships would result not only in an unhospitable political environment but also in a world of internatinal trade restricted by autarchic governments and narrow, bilateral trade agreements. American security in this world would have required the transformation of America into a garrison state with marked changes in the liberal capitalism and democratic institutions of America. Avoiding this grim future required an aggressive and far-reaching American foreign policy. Leffler is careful to point out that this vision of American security was not driven by fears of Soviet predominance per se. American policy makers perceived the Soviet State as militarily powerful on the ground but markedly limited by the weak industrial base of the Soviet Union, the ravages of WWII, absence of strategic weapons, and its brutal political system. Its wasn't so much the power of the Soviet Union as much as poverty and political chaos leading to the peoples of Europe and Japan succumbing to the false promises of Communism that was feared by American policy makers. The primary instrument to avoid this grim vision of the future was a very active, indeed sometimes aggressive, international policy. This policy was based on and required a preponderance of America

A Fantastic Book

One of the most important works on the Cold War. Though I do not agree with every point made by the author, his overall thesis is incredibly insightful. Particularly helpful to understanding the era is the scheme he depicts of American grand-strategic thought, dividing the world according on a power basis, with Central Europe and Japan as the hubs and the importance vis-a-vis these hubs of adjacent areas such as the Middle East and Southeast Asia. I would not recommend it for students beginning their study of the Cold War (try John Lewis Gaddis first), but otherwise, it is a must read.

Rankean. Magisterial. Faith-Restoring

Melvyn Leffler labored for more than ten years in official U.S. archives from the 1940s and early 1950s to research and write this book. He read diplomatic cables, parsed decision papers, and studied war plans -- in short, he marinated himself in the decision-making of the Truman Administration. The outcome of his labor was this long and beautiful history of U.S. national security strategy in the early Cold War. Anyone reading it will be gripped by the thought, "This makes sense. This is how things happened." Leffler's book is a triumph of the historian's art. After World War II, U.S. policymakers were determined keep the industrial and human resources of Europe and Japan out of Soviet control, lest the global balance of power tilt against the U.S. No one thought that Stalin wanted to start another war. However, Washington was alarmed that instability and economic crisis could bring Communist parties to power in Italy, France, Greece and elswhere, eventually drawing them into the Soviet orbit. The U.S. took on the task of rebuilding war-smashed economies in Europe and Japan, reviving German military power in the context of a European defense system, and stabilizing "peripheral" areas such as the Middle East and South East Asia that were seen as crucial to economic recovery in the "core." Huge mistakes were made in the process -- but the strategy, as we now know, was successful. It was the most creative era in the history of U.S. diplomacy. Leffler ties this story together with lucid prose, copious documentation, and a minimum of editorial comments. He recreates the deliberations of decisionmakers like Acheson, Kennan, and Marshall, knowing that statesmen are driven by realpolitik -- but knowing also that realpolitik can be quite unrealistic if its assumptions are wrong (Washington wrongly assumed, for example, that Communist parties everywhere were controlled by the Kremlin). Some readers of the book will hail the U.S. for rescuing Europe from totalitarianism. Others will damn the U.S. for amassing atomic weapons, propping up upopular governments in places like Vietnam, and succumbing to indisriminate anti-Communism. But all will come away enlightened about a turning point in twentieth century history. They will also have their faith restored in the possibility of grand political history. My only complaint is that Leffler's analysis is relentlessly centered on Washington. European leaders appear only on the margins of the story, and Japanese and Soviet leaders are almost invisible. Unfortunately, Soviet archives were still mostly closed when Leffler did his research. Moscow's view of the origins of the Cold War will have to be found elsewhere. No matter: Leffler has done enough for one scholar! Six stars.

A Captivating, intersesting, and thought provoking book.

I found this book to be very interesting and thought provoking. It captured and held my interest from the beginning. To fully understand this book it is essential to have some background about the cold war, its origin and the key players in both the Soviet Union and the Truman Administration. Marvin Leffler does an outstanding job explaining the origin of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) one the most successful alliances that have endured while other have formed and dissolved. In A Preponderance of Power you will understand how the Marshall Plan or as some know it, The European Recovery Plan, rescued Europe from the twin specters of starvation and Communism. In the book you will learn about key players such as George C. Marshall, a five-star Army general who became the Secretary of State in some of the most critical days of the Cold War and Secretary of Defense in the Korean War. There is also Dean Rusk, a former Rhodes Scholar who possessed a substantial interest in the interlocking nature of political-military affairs. Yes, this book is a monumental achievement. I intend to purchase Leffler's latest book, For the Soul of Mankind, The Soviet Union, the United States and the Cold War

"A Preponderance of Power" Reviewed

Melvyn P. Leffler's work is a monumental achievement in the study of the Cold War. The book is the result of over twelve years of research. The author's access to the newly available archived materials makes the volume invaluable to students of the Cold War. The book is lengthy and sometimes difficult to read, however, it will remain, for some time as a cornerstone for the understanding of U.S.-Soviet relations during this period.