War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945

by Edward S. Miller

Book Overview

Based on twenty years of research in formerly secret archives, this book reveals for the first time the full significance of War Plan Orange-the U.S. Navy's strategy to defeat Japan, formulated over... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0870217593
• ISBN13: 9780870217593
• Release Date: January 1991
• Publisher: US Naval Institute Press
• Length: 509 Pages
• Weight: 1.25 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.5" x 6.3" x 9.2"

Customer Reviews

A Must Read

Author Miller has justly received many honors for this book which present the US planning for response to any Japanese aggression against the United States during the period between World War I and World War II. Miller also wrote another book, "Bankrupting The Enemy" about the US economic actions concerning Japan leading up to the war that is equally high quality and required reading for World War II historians. Outside of the plans themselves representing various schools of thought among Naval strategists, thrusters, defensivists, cautionaries, etc., the political situations in the United States with respect to limitations on military capabilities are covered thoroughly. Often the planning foundered on the reality of inadequate resources, rendering official strategy rather feckless in hindsight. Politicials were simply not up to the task of providing military preparedness, and it was not until Roosevelt was able to obtain a major naval expansion through Congress in 1937 that sufficient force would be available for a strategy for victory starting as early as 1943. Although the author makes the case that the Rainbow-5, the last pre-war Plan Orange, was followed in the main to victory, the most disturbing element was the sacrifice of the Philippines inherent in the planning but not communicated to MacArthur or the officers or men in the Philippines. Troops were sent to the Philippines to sacrifice themselves, unbeknownst to them. Plans to relieve the Philippines were simply not realistic given the resources of the Navy, even if there had been no losses at Pearl Harbor. This is clear from Miller's book, and an indictment of the American arm-chair admirals, generals and politicians involved. This lesson went unlearned for the future, as the Army's Berlin Brigade was defenseless throughout the Cold War, and truthfully its only purpose was to die so that American public opinion could be mobilized against the Soviets. One is ultimately led to the conclusion that War Plan Orange was successful more due to the limited options available to the planners than to any inherent brilliance in planning. The adjustments during the War such as invading the Marianas to supply a long-range bombing base tended to be more decisive than the pre-war plans. Nonetheless, Rainbow-5 provided an effective starting point and should not be underestimated. A side point is that the author apparently does not believe that Truman would have invaded Japan if there had been no atomic bomb. As he writes, "... it is questionable that after 292,000 American deaths in all theaters of World War II, any president would have accepted carnage on that scale (of the invasion) as the only option for ending the war." Interesting point. I guess the belief the the American public can't sacrifice or has limited staying power in a conflict is alive and well. Maybe even true.

Research at its best.

War Plan Orange dispels many of the myths surrounding a supposed plan for an Armageddon type clash between the Navies of the USA and Japan before WW2 actually broke out. The Author is a little confusing at first. He has a tendency to leap from this year to that, then back to here and over to there, with a side reference to some other period. There were sections of the first few chapters where I was not sure if I was in the right time continuum. However he eventually settles down about half way through, after which things proceed in a far more orderly cronological order. That is not to say valuable information in the first half, is not able to be gleaned from this excellent work. It can be. You just might need to keep reminding yourself which year he is currently addressing. Over all the author tells a story of contingency planning. All nations engage in it just in case something happens. It also enables naval planners to determine the sort of ships required in the event of a future naval conflict. While the contingencies are often battered about by different lines of thought from a whole range of naval people as the years progress, one thing is clear. The US Navy worked out what their likely requirements were if Government sent them to war. This came in the form of permanent bases, advanced base equipment, ships and stores. But these issues then also required a means by which to deploy those things and where. The author has done some incredible research and unearthed volumes of reports that must have been gathering dust for decades. In doing so he shows how a navy goes about planning for what might be required of it. Even when peace reigns, these things have to be allowed for, but the longer it reigns, the more people get to effect the plan. Yet over all, the things they forsee, and the plans they make, do in many cases, turn WW2 in the Pacific into an emulation of what these men had thought out during previous decades. Cleverly, the author concentrates on the US Navy. There are no side distractions into what the Japanese thought. Even when it turns into plan Rainbow to reflect more countries involved, plus allies, he remains true to his course. Therefore, although armed with 'hindsight', the reader finds himself in the position of the planners as they must have wondered, what the other side were wondering. We know what eventually happened. We do not know from this book, how the Japanese side of it was planned. So the reader is as in the dark as the planners were, which I felt produced a good element into the study of this particular part of history. The book is strongly recommended for any naval historian, or indeed any historian looking at the land side of the Pacific war. For those who like a bit of lighter reading, it may prove a bit too heavy. But I would still advise those with an interest in WW2 in the Pacific, to give it a try. You will find it incredibly informative.

Who said we weren't prepared!

Edward Miller's "War Plan Orange" is a well researched and effectively written book on the United states Navy's plan of action against a naval threat from the Empire of Japan. He covers the plan from it's initial design, through it's many changes, and through the point where it was "taken off the self" and executed.While the sneak attack by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor might have destroyed a large portion of the physical fleet. One thing they could not touch was this plan and through it's use as the foundation for the US response, the defeat of Japan was assured. Let's hope that we still make plans that prove this effective.

Excellent analysis of military and geopolitical factors.

Author Edward Stanley Miller has expertly distilled the political and military conditions of each era of war planning for the Pacific Theater. Using a plethora of original references to illustrate contemporary reasons for each era of stratagy, Mr. Miller has done a yeoman's job. The text is logical (a difficult task to identify all of the ebbs and flows of the various planning bodies of the time)and informative. The supporting tables, charts and maps are helpful but could have been expanded. Additional maps of Midway, Corregidor and various other key locations would have enhanced the text. Considering the main thrust of this scholarly work however , any lack of illustrative aids is not a major handicap. This book serves as a benchmark for U.S. military and geopolitical stratagy in the greater Pacific area for the first half of the twentieth century.

A revelatory vindication of interwar military plans.

Too often these days both fictional and "factual" scholarly and media representations of military personnel falls into two categories: buffoons or renegades. Edward S. Miller explodes the myth that the interwar military planners were a bunch of buffoons and the actual combatants who won the war against Japan a bunch of brilliant innovators. War Plan Orange reveals the careful, thoughtful debate and study that went into Pacific War Planning for 48 years. In the final analysis, about the only mistake the interwar planners actually made was to underestimate time and resources required (something that happens with every campaign). As to basic strategy, their work was sound. The campaigners of WW2--some of whom helped with interwar planning--did nothing innovative, they simply executed a good plan proven through much wargaming and study.