The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb

by John Ray Skates

Book Overview

Examines the U.S. plan to end the Second World War by invading JapanFor more than a half century scholars and nonscholars alike have debated the ethics of dropping the atomic bomb, but rarely have... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0872499723
• ISBN13: 9780872499720
• Release Date: January 1994
• Publisher: University of South Carolina Press
• Length: 276 Pages
• Weight: 1.50 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.1" x 6.3" x 9.3"

Customer Reviews

A careful reconstruction of war strategy and the plans for the invasion of Japan

This excellent book was written based on a study the author made to answer the following questions: What was the role of the Soviets in the war against Japan? Why did the JCS choose a strategy of invasion?. What would have been the costs in casualties? Would Japanese homeland defenses have proved as formidable as those on Iwo Jima and Okinawa? What was the connection, if any, between the plans to invade and the decision to use the bomb? To what extent did the invasion plans depend on redeployment of forces from Europe? What were the invasion plans, and had they been carried out, what would have been the likely results. This book is not some revisionist theory or an imaginative alternate history. This book is a careful reconstruction of history based on primary documents and some secondary sources. The events described in this book actually took place throughout the course of the war or were discussed, debated or argued in the planning stage for Operation Downfall. The author does convey his opinions throughout the book but he's not heavy handed about it. There is little criticism by the author. He tries to recreate the story as true as possible without shading it with excessive personal comments. Mr Skates uses the statements and actions of the key people to describe key events or circumstances of the war. For example in regards to the use of the bomb within the invasion plan or as a replacement to the invasion, the author doesn't state his opinions on the topic but just describes what the key people wanted or expected. The key players that really "write" this book by their deeds, influence and statements are MacArthur, Marshall, King, Nimitz, FDR, Stimson, Arnold and Truman. Their profiles play a large part to this book. Marshall wanted to use the bomb as a tactical weapon, figuring nine would be needed for Operation Olympic. MacArthur also wanted to use it with the invasion. Truman thought of it as a strategic weapon. Stimson wanted to use it to shock the Japanese to surrender so an invasion wouldn't be necessary. There were a few who didn't want to use the bomb. In addition to the controversy of the bomb, there were several other main themes in the book. One of these themes is involving the Russians with the invasion. It was thought by just about everybody in the US that we would need the Russians to attack Manchuria in order to prevent the Kwantnug Army from leaving the mainland and redeploying on the home islands. FDR was a big proponent of this idea and Truman followed along in his footsteps. This attitude changed a little after the successful testing of the Trinity bomb. Another main topic was FDR's demand for unconditional surrender which was the main cause for the Japanese resistance and the reason why we almost had to invade the country which was estimated would cost the Allies up to a million casualties. Another hot button topic of mine that was discussed is FDR's wish to arbitrarily end the Japanese War within twelve months of VE d

Fascinating

This book is quite fascinating. What Skates has done is write a history of the planning for the invasion of Japan. The invasion never happened; the planning did. What he is doing is exploring the alternatives to the use of the atomic bomb that U.S. leaders thought they had before them in 1945. Skates explores all sorts of plans including airpower, deception, the possibility of employing special weapons (everything ranging from missiles to chemical weapons) and the planned inclusion of British, Australian, and Canadian troops. What he finds is that the invasion never was considered an alternative. It was going to happen. American policy makers always intended to use BOTH atomic weapons against Japan and then invade. In explaining his decision to use the atomic bomb rather than invade, President Harry S. Truman was making things up. It never an either/or choice for the United States. This book was published in 1994 and became hugely controversial in 1995 as part of the crisis over the "Enola Gay" display at the Smithsonian Institute. He found that planners never expected the one million dead that Truman used to explain his decision. There were a number of figures floating around, but at worst it was 124,935 casualties (both dead and wounded). "While there is little evidence except assertion and repetition to support the huge numbers used by Truman and Stimson after the war, the U.S. leaders, both civilian and military, were extremely conscious of the costs of Okinawa and reluctant to repeat those loses" (p. 82). Many revisionists have attempted to use Skates's study to argue against the use of the atomic bomb because of the low numbers. In interviews, Skates has said that he does not believe the general revisionist claims that Japan was trying to surrender, believing that the evidence argues to the contrary.

Excellent addition to World War 2 historiography

John Ray Skates breaks new ground with his excellent study on the projected plans to invade Japan during the Second World War. Comparing rival American and Japanese forces, resources and plans, he makes a convincing and scholarly case against conventional wisdom on the use of the atomic bombs. At the same time Skates provided a refreshing and welcome change from the typical propaganda and (usually) ideologically laced revisionism. Perhaps the most illuminating (although controversial) part of the book was the author's contention that projected Allied casualty estimates for Operation Downfall will be on a scale similar to the Normandy campaign. Moreover, Skates argues that the use of the atomic bombs should be seen within the context of the Allies' unconditional surrender policy in World War Two. His views of course will find many dissenters, especially those who believe that these weapons prevented a mutual bloodbath between the Americans and Japanese. What they cannot question however is Skate's high level of scholarship in supporting his views and positions. Every way superior to Thomas Allen's and Norman Polmar'swork on the same subject, "The Invasion of Japan" is one of the few revisionist historical works worth reading.

The best anaylsis of what was about to happen in 1945.

This is the best analysis of Operation DOWNFALL, the two-part plan to invade Japan in November of 1945 that is in print. Skates details Allied preparations, deployments, strategy and tactics along with Japanese plans to defend their home islands in a detailed and scholarly manner. If you ever had doubts about the use of the atomic bombs, they will leave you when you read this book and realize the carnage that was awaiting both the Allies and the Japanese in 1945.

What would the invasion have cost?

The atomic bomb is such a sore subject that the folks on both sides of the argument tell the wildest story about its alternative: the invasion of Kyushu scheduled for November 1945 and of Honshu in the spring of 1946. Skates looks at the invasion plans, the Japanese preparations to repel the invasion, and gives a reasonable accounting of what it might have cost both sides. Excellent.