At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress

by George C. Edwards III

Book Overview

In this book George Edwards explores how and under what conditions presidents lead Congress, what we can reasonably expect of them, and how we should evaluate their performance. Integrating quantitative analysis with documentary and historical research, Edwards argues that the most effective chief executive is a facilitator, who works at the margins-rather than at the core-of coalition building. Presidents are not by themselves going to bring about...

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0300044046
• ISBN13: 9780300044041
• Release Date: May 1989
• Publisher: Yale University Press
• Length: 233 Pages
• Weight: 1.10 lbs.

Customer Reviews

Limitations of Presidential Leadership

Edwards examines the ways a president attempts to "lead" congress, that is, how a president persuades Congress to support presidential initiatives. Edwards contends that there are three sources of presidential influence; (1) the president's position as party leader, (2) the president's approval in the eyes of the public, and (3) the president's personal legislative skills. However, we must keep in mind that the influence garnered from these sources is not tremendously powerful, or capable of commanding legislative subservience. Rather, the influence has marginal effects, but these small, marginal effects can, at times, and given the right circumstances, gain support for presidential initiatives. The first variable influencing presidential influence is the strategic position of the president as party leader. Party members in congress may have a personal or emotional loyalty to the party, and subsequently the party's leader, the president. Furthermore, party members may have incentives to make the president look good as it improves the approval of the party. Party members may also distrust the opposition, or they may have similar policy preferences as the president. As such, party members may be receptive to presidential influence. However, party support for the president is not guaranteed. First, partisan support for the president slips over time. Members may begin to disagree with the president on particulars. Second, party members may have constituent interests that are different from the president (Kingdon 1992, Jones 1994). Third, party members may defect if presidential policy diverges too much from the traditional party platform. Fourth, there are different factions within the party. Here we could think of "Blue Dog" Democrats. Fifth, party members may not want to associate with an unpopular president. Nevertheless, the president has some sources of power which allow him to influence party members "at the margins." These include making personal appeals to party members, working with congressional leadership, and selective incentives (both positive and negative). First, the president may make personal appeals to partisan congressmen to garner support. Still, the president must be conscious that this must be rare in order for such a technique to remain effective. This illustrates the fact that the president doesn't have the power to give orders. He must rely on the "soft sell" (73). Second, the president can appeal to floor and committee leaders. These actors could have significant sway with the party rank-and-filed. However, the president has to work hard to court the support of the party leaders. The separation of powers grants them a good deal of autonomy. Additionally, due to the decentralization of parties, power has become much more dispersed and the leadership may not have the sway it once did. In this environment, the president has limited incentives at his disposal to shape/pursue support of party members.