East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950 (Volume 2) (Williams-Ford Texas A&M University Military History Series)

by Roy Edgar Appleman

Book Overview

In November, 1950, with the highly successful Inchon Landing behind him, Gen. Douglas MacArthur planned the last major offensive of what was to be a brief conflict: the drive that would push the North... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0890964653
• Release Date: September 1990
• Publisher: Texas A&M University Press
• Length: 416 Pages
• Weight: 1.54 lbs.
• Dimensions: 9.0" x 1.3" x 6.0"

Customer Reviews

Honest, In Depth and Heartbreaking.

I've long been very familiar with the 1st Marine Division's history at the Chosin, but until I read Roy Appleman's book I didn't realize just how much I didn't know about the Army's side of the conflict. This tale of desperation and bravery should be required reading amongst all American service personnel and perhaps even in High Schools. Excellently written, this book holds your attention despite the huge amount of very detailed geographic and unit data presented.

A reader from St.John's, Newfoundland

A very engrossing account. Despite the level of detail on the geography, personnel and their units it holds your attention. Also provides comment on areas of uncertainty over what actually happened. One of the most successful books on warfare in putting you there - to the point where it was difficult to read ( in this case an indication of the author's success ). One really sensed the isolation of the units and the desperate situation in which they found themselves. Recommended.

The definitive tale of the 31st RCT

Appleman's book is meticulously researched and wonderfully detailed. (Though you will find yourself wishing you had a set of really detailed topo maps to follow the action.) The one weakness of Appleman's research has to do with the 31st Tank. Appleman seems to have relied heavily on the recollections of Col. Drake, who commanded the 31st Tank. Drake's recollections are generally correct but more details could have been obtained from the other survivors of 31Tank. Despite this small personal quibble, Appleman's book is superb. John F. Close

Casting light into a little understood part of history

This book makes it possible to understand how the tragedy of Task Force Faith could occur. In part, it does this by showing how false assumptions made at critical moments led to weaknesses which the Chinese exploited. In part, it does this by showing how the 32nd RCT could have been saved. The most telling historical insights, to me, are the resources and energy used by the Chinese which might otherwise have been brought to bear on the Marines at Hagaru-ri, and which might have been just enough to have captured that road junction, and entrapped the 7th and 5th Marines. One of the proudest moments in Marine Corps history may honorably offer humble gratitude to the forgotten army men who's relics still lie unmarked, east of Chosin.

Appleman's book brings home agony of Task Force Faith

This is a book for Korean War hardcores, focusing exclusively on the command, tactical and other decisions which led directly to the disaster of Task Force Faith east of the Chosin reservoir in early December 1950. As such it is extremely detailed in its discussion of terrain, platoon layout and attacks by forces on boths sides, communication blunders, and so on. (Keep in mind the whole tragedy unfolded over just 4 days.) There are many maps in the book; even so, I was tempted at times to lay out a topographic map of my own and stick pins in it to represent crucial encounters the author refers to. Unless you can follow and appreciate this level of detail (and have a morbid need to understand the tragedy of the 31st RCT at its fullest) this book is probably going to bore you to death or you will just sail along with the text and not really get a FEEL for the battle. Problems with Army troop training and command are discussed by many authors and occurred in numerous spots during the first part of the war, until Ridgway whipped the forces into shape and back into fighting mood. Appleman mentions them here, since there were a lot of problems with troop discipline as the breakout proceeded. But he does not make it a big issue, for two reasons. One, its easy to look back and second guess decisions made under such extreme conditions. Second he feels its largely unproductive; we should concentrate on learning from mistakes, not thrashing ourselves because of them. The first error was moving troops up to the forward positions at Pyongnuri-gang inlet [henceforth, for obvious reasons, the 'inlet'] immediately after the Marines left the position. The 31st RCT mission was to protect the Marines flank on the east side of the reservoir, and army units were rushed to Hagaru-ri pell-mell. Forces in the area must have known plenty of enemy were around-- the Marines had just finished a 5 day battle with the Chinese as they climbed Funchilin Pass. A reconnaisance platoon sent up the Inlet simply disappeared. Given this it was foolish to send troops to the Inlet and beyond until they reached regimental strength. Not only were Army battalions smaller than Marine ones, but the Army personnel were, on balance, less experienced fighters and rifleman than the Marines were. In defense of the much-maligned soldiers Appleman points out that KATUSA's were a much larger portion of the Army's field strength; whereas the Marines used very few and chiefly as interpreters. Still, it would require a lot of smoke and mirrors to hide all the army's deficiencies which brought on its Chosin disaster. Poor discipline, platoon placement and snoozing soldiers made the confrontation with the Chinese on the night of the 27th worse than it should have been. Even when Faith ordered a consolidation of positions at the Inlet the next day, he still must have been under the impression tank support from his 2nd battalion was on the way, as he merely ordered abandoned vehicles to be disabled...