The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008

by Bob Woodward and Woodward Bob

Book Overview

As violence in Iraq reaches unnerving levels in 2006, a second front in the war rages at the highest levels of the Bush administration. In his fourth book on President George W. Bush, Bob Woodward... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 1416558977
• Release Date: September 2008
• Publisher: Simon & Schuster
• Length: 512 Pages
• Weight: 1.70 lbs.
• Dimensions: 9.5" x 1.5" x 6.5"

Customer Reviews

Important inside view of the change in the President's Iraq policy

When I read a new book by Bob Woodward, two questions normally come to my mind: (1) Why in the world would people let him interview them on the record or on background, knowing that he will report their statements in some publication? (2) Once these statements end up in print, why do so few attack him as distorting what they said or of making up quotations? Each question is fascinating in itself. And the answers may well tie together. If one wants his or her views on the record, it will happen with Woodward. And my sense is that he is normally very accurate (why else would there be so few complaints, relatively speaking?). Anyhow, here we go again--"The War Within." This is a book about the Bush Administration's change of policy with respect to Iraq. It begins before the elections of 2006, when things were falling apart in Iraq. Even stalwart Republican Senators began to question the war and the Administration's policy regarding it. Even while the President was telling the country that progress was being made, several evaluations of policy were occurring simultaneously (and not always informing one another): the military evaluation, centered on a platoon of colonels assessing matters; Stephen Hadley's examination (he was National Security Advisor); the Iraq Study Group, led by James Baker and Lee Hamilton; a group headed by Meghan O'Sullivan. One thing that is clear from all the groups' examination of the status of the Iraq war--things were not working. Generals and Administration figures were speaking positively of the war, and these various groups were telling a far different story. In fact, the President, saying one thing in public, had come to embrace the perspective of Hadley and others. Things began to happen--Donald Rumsfeld was replaced by Robert Gates at Defense; the concept of the "surge" began to gain some degree of support. Some of the high points: discussions of the President's own thinking (based on interviews with Woodward), inside accounts of meetings among military leaders and war critics, within the Iraq Study Group, and so on. At the end of the book, Woodward notes how this book builds on his third in a series on the Bush presidency, "State of Denial." He notes how, in that work, how the President was not openly acknowledging problems in Iraq and the deterioration of conditions on the ground. As Woodward said in the final passages in that book (Page 433 in "The War Within"): "With all Bush's upbeat talk and optimism. . .he had not told the American public the truth about what Iraq had become." He goes on to say "My reporting for this book showed that to be even more the case than I could have imagined." His final evaluation (Page 437): "There was no deadline, no hurry [in the President's leadership on Iraq]. The president was engaged in the war rhetorically but maintained an odd detachment from its management. He never got a handle on it, and over these years of war, too often he failed to lead." Fairly bracing languag

Lifts the veil from the inner discussions of the Bush administration

From "The War Within": "In Baghdad, [General] Casey appreciated the president's repeated public votes of confidence. But he kept asking himself: What do civilian leaders bring to such a war? After all, neither the full capacity of the U.S. government nor the American people were ever mobilized. No one ever articulated a grand strategy about what the heck the United States was doing. Nearly everything fell to the military." Actually, the U.S. did have a strategy in 2006 as articulated repeatedly by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. That strategy was 1) train up Iraqi security forces so they could take over the mission and 2) disengage the U.S. military so it would provide additional impetus to the Iraqis to help themselves. The problem was, this strategy wasn't working and had not been working for the previous three years. General Casey was frustrated and he was right about one thing--there was no "grand strategy" that had been formulated and that was being executed by the Bush Administration to bring both political and military resources to bear to strive towards a successful outcome in Iraq. That would come later. I have always been amazed at the access that Bob Woodward has to high level sources who share with him the inner discussions, challenges and decisions that are made at the highest civilian and military leadership levels. Even President Bush gave extensive interviews to Mr. Woodward who was able to weave the various point of views together to produce a coherent and fresh look at a complex and vexing situation which has cost an enormous amount of human lives and national treasure. History is still being written. The jury is still out. But "The War Within" will be reviewed and studied for decades to come as the assessment continues on what went wrong (and perhaps right) with the Iraq War. One note on the Kindle edition of this book. I was really happy to pick up this book and read it on my Kindle. This really validates why I have a Kindle because I saved at least $10 on purchasing the book plus saved shelf space -- and probably some backpack space too!

A Best Book of 2008!

"The War Within" begins portraying the Iraq chaos in 2006 - violence and American casualties are increasing, while Bush portrays a rosy picture and his staff realize our strategy needs to be reviewed. Bush agrees, but the "really bad news" is that this strategy review had no deadline and the emphasis was on it being conducted "under the radar" to avoid causing consternation during an election year. General Casey, head of U.S. forces in Iraq, is trying to convince Bush to reduce troops in Iraq - we were making the Iraqis dependent on us and our large pressure was a sign of disrespect for them. He and General Abizaid had seen how the ethnic groups in the Balkans didn't reconcile until the violence got totally out of hand. Nonetheless, Bush seemed plugged into an attrition strategy (keep killing them until they run out of bodies), but Vietnam had proved that didn't work. Rumsfeld supported Casey - in fact, this was in line with his "new, light" Army vision. Bush's decision-making style was "gut driven" - thus, his decisions lacked a process to examine consequences, alternatives, and motives. Further, he refused to allow talks with Iran and Syria - even though wanted by his area chief, Admiral Fallon. Finally, lacking deadlines, strategy reviews were underway, but with no seeming movement to fruition. Retired General Jack Keane emerges as the hero in all this internal chaos, warfare, and delay. Being a member of the Defense Policy Board, he had access to up-to-date information on Iraq, and was encouraged by fellow member Newt Gingrich to take his thoughts to Rumsfeld. Keane's one-man, self-initiated effort outperformed those of all the other groups (eg. NSC, WH consultants, the Iraq Study Group, the Pentagon) and he is the father of the surge and other key ideas. Keane's ideas included getting troops out 24/7 within the people, away from their air-conditioned based with movie theaters, swimming pools, etc., to protect the people from insurgents, stopping Casey's "ramp-down" (undermined motivation for the troops to risk their lives), doubling the size of the Iraqi security force to 600,000, extending tours to support the surge, strengthening the advisory program (often staffed by National Guard troops who had less experience than the Iraqis they were coaching), moving away from vehicle to foot patrols (less subject to IED damage, better able to obtain intelligence), learn form Col. McMaster's achievements in Tall Afar, increase the number of CIA analysts focusing on Iraq (had only 38 - fewer than those working on China) and bring the DIA intelligence staffing on Iraq (then 61) up to authorized (156), and focus on winning the war in Baghdad. Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Pace then asked Keane for feedback on his own performance. Keane told Pace that he was failing - not spending enough time on Iraq, and being satisfied with superficial reports. At the same time, American generals in Iraq were working too hard (eg. Gen. MacArthur took time t

You Didn't See or Hear This On the News Programs

"The War Within" is Woodward's 15th book, and his fourth about the Bush administration. I received an advance copy. Woodward interviewed President George W. Bush twice, and he interviewed Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates. I've noticed that in all of Woodward's books about Bush, he seemed to be full of praise for Bush when Bush was flying high in the ratings. But when Bush was low in approval ratings, so was Woodward's opinion. So I've got to question if Woodward has gone from the great investigative reporter he once was to an establishment me-too type. After reading this, one can only be grateful that the Bush presidency is close to an end. Trouble is, it leaves a mess behind. According to Woodward, the surge has worked but Bush failed to lead and made numerous blunders that were very costly. The White House's National Security Adviser, Stephen Hadley, put out a statement Friday, Sept. 5, prior to release of the book, disputing some of the assertions made by Woodward. Woodward says that Bush has not told the American public the truth about Iraq and the war in general. But I found it of interest that Bush allowed Woodward to interview him and give him access. He said that Bush seems to have aged considerably during his long tenure in office --- he has a "paunch" and slumps when sitting. Of Bush Woodward says, "He did not seek sacrifice from most of the country when he had the chance. He did not even mobilize his own party. Republicans often voiced as much suspicion and distrust as Democrats. The president was rarely the voice of realism on the Iraq war." Woodward does, however, admit the success of Bush's surge of additional troops into Iraq in 2007. "Violence was down so much in a few places that some U.S. soldiers were not receiving combat action badges because there was no fighting in their area," he wrote. Woodward says in the book that deputy national security adviser Meghan O'Sullivan sent President Bush a daily top secret report that cataloged the escalating bloodshed and chaos in Iraq. He quotes one memo as follows: "Violence has acquired a momentum of its own and is now self-sustaining." She wrote this on July 20. Woodward says, "Her dire evaluation contradicted the upbeat assurances that President Bush was hearing from Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the U.S. commander in Iraq. Casey and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld were pushing to draw down American forces and speed the transfer of responsibility to the Iraqis. Despite months of skyrocketing violence, Casey insisted that within a year, Iraq would be mostly stable, with the bulk of American combat troops headed home. " "Publicly, the president claimed the United States was winning the war, and he expressed unwavering faith in Casey, saying, 'It's his judgment that I rely upon.' But Woodward continues, "privately, he was losing confidence in the drawdown strategy. He questioned O'Sullivan that summer with