The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness

by António R. Damásio

Book Overview

In The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness, neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, director of UCLA's Brain and Creativity Institute, presents "the first truly compelling neurobiological account of the self...a remarkable work of intellectual daring" (Nature).

A New York Times Book Review Editors' Choice

Widley praised for his innovative scientific thinking and elegant writing, Antonio Damasio, the international...

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0156010755
• ISBN13: 9780156010757
• Release Date: October 2000
• Publisher: Mariner Books
• Length: 400 Pages
• Weight: 0.92 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.1" x 6.0" x 9.0"

Customer Reviews

Neurobiology of consciousness

According to Damasio any convincing account of consciousness must address two, inter-related problems: (1) the problem of how the brain is able to generate images of objects - how the `movie-in-the-brain' is concocted and (2) how the brain simultaneously represents a sense of self in the act of knowing those images. The latter problem has to do with the inherently subjective quality of consciousness, one of its essential attributes. It is unfortunate that this second problem is often overlooked - the old `Cartesian theatre' concept is woefully out-dated. Damasio links the origin of consciousness to the organism's homeostatic mechanisms. It is a well known fact derived from neuropathology that damage to a circumscribed region of the brain stem can completely obliterate consciousness. However, surprisingly little has been written about the reasons for why consciousness should be so closely associated with the brain's devices of representing and regulating its own body. By his own ingenious use of the clinico-anatomical method Damasio puts forth a fascinating and compelling neurobiological theory of consciousness. In a nutshell, Damasio's hierarchical theory proposes that the foundation of all consciousness is grounded in a medium of the organism's awareness of its own fluctuating internal `milieu' (the proto-self). The sensory input into the proto-self is both neural and humoral. The integrating centers for this source input are various brainstem, midbrain and telencephalic structures which constantly map the internal state of the organism (as a form of homeostatic regulation). The proto-self is not conscious (or ever capable of being verbally accessible); instead, core consciousness is the basic unit of consciousness and it is generated in `pulses' which integrate the current internal state of the proto-self, the objects being processed and the changes induced in the proto-self either by (a) objects in the external world which are processed in the relevant cortical areas or (b) internal representations of external objects, such as memories, thoughts and so on, which are mediated by the cortical association areas. Thus, there must be a link between the proto-self (the background medium of awareness or what Damasio calls `that to which knowing is attributed') and the object to be represented (what Damasio calls `something-to-be-known' or the specific qualia of a global conscious state). The `something to be known' is referenced to a primitive `self'. The next step above core consciousness is extended consciousness, which is closely associated with working memory capacity among other things. With extended consciousness, the organism is not only conscious of the here and now, a kind of `Humean' being; instead, each `now' contains a kernel of the past and one is able to anticipate the near (and distant) future. Continuity is established and continuity enables the construction of a personal identity. For Damasio, the value of consciousness for an or

Excellent Attempt by Damasio to Explain Us to Ourselves

Damasio breaks down into minute, qualitative descriptive detail how the boby/brain functions in humans, and ergo, de facto, many mammals. This book's strength is that Damasio backs up his claims regarding neural anatomy, physiology, and function with specific examples from comparative neuropathology. The book's weakness is that he goes on at length with qualitative descriptions for non-intuitive notions like how the body and brain function as a singular unit, and how emotions and feelings are integral along with body/brain physiology. I say this is the book's weakness because Damasio often bogs down and even tries to describe phenomena that are possibly ineffable, but these attempts at qualitative description are also one of the strengths of this book. This may seem contradictory, but possibly the book would have read differently if the author had stuck to purely quantitative case studies. However he did not, so we get through Damasio's several qualitative, alternate descriptions of singular phenomena an attempt to flesh out and make organic the dry clinical data. On the one hand the book could have been more concise without the extended descriptive sections, on the other hand the book possibly becomes richer and more meaningful because of them; this is up to the reader to decide.Having said this, the book itself endeavors to demonstrate how consciousness emerges from gross neuroanatomy and physiology. In this Damasio is successful in using neuropathology to define terms such as: homeostasis, consciousness, language, mental images, neuronal maps, cathexis, and hedonic tone (although he does not use these two latter terms explicitly). In all honesty Damasio is very strict about defining his terms. Even though the author writes to a popular audience some knowledge of neuroanatomy and physiology is helpful in reading this book for maximum effect; although this book would be a good beginning for those interested in neurology. In General, the appendix, `Notes on Mind and Brain,' should probably be read prior to reading the main body of text, especially if the reader is weak in basic neurology. In any event, Damasio is big on forming neologisms although he spends adequate time defining and explaining them. As a neurologist, he always couches his arguments in materialist, Darwinistic terms.A good way to describe the structure of this often rambling, inchoate book, is to briefly compare it to Dr. Paul McLean's triune brain model. The triune brain posits the reptilian brain (brain stem) as primary, the mammal brain (thalamus, limbic, etc.) as secondary, and the primate brain (cortex) emerging evolutionarily later as tertiary. Damasio uses a similar foundation in positing the proto-self, the core self, and the autobiographical self (I told you there were a lot of neologisms), but he does so in a way that has them all hang together as a synchronous, functioning unit. The proto-self is rather the sense of homeostatic organism state, where the core self is th

An objective study of subjectivity

I much appreciated reading Damasio's book. First and for most because Damasio's study logically combines objective neurologic facts with rigorous introspective analysis. At last, «hard» science can be profitably put to work to tackle global subjective problems. Damasio seems to be at the forefront of this relatively new trend. And his book is a good reference point to help any serious reader to think about the way consciousness works.Brain injuries mentioned in the book show that, contrary to widespread belief, consciousness does not originate in the cortex, or in a «higher» human faculty; it originates in the more primitive areas of the brain. Damasio stresses that it is a fact, not an hypothesis, independantly of what we may think of his thesis exposed in the book. The core of his thesis is that consciousness originates from the internal representation of perceived modifications to the body (to the «proto-self» ) caused by perceived external objects interacting with the body during that time. We become conscious of ourselves, of the external objects and of the interaction between the two at the same time.Even if most of the time, the language used is very easy to understand, I had difficulties grasping his multi-levels concepts about the self and about consciousness. At first they seemed to me badly defined and arbitrary. But further attentive reading, further exposure to the neurological facts put forward by Damasio and further thinking made me see the reasons behind those concepts.However, I still think that Damasio's notion of the self is a too passive one. He doesn't emphasize the essential role of the «inner drive» of the body (instincts, impulses, basic desires, etc.) in the making of consciousness. It seems to me that the concrete feeling of that basic inner drive is a unifying whole in front of the external world and objects. It is much more concrete and real than any other internal representation of our own body. It is that drive that made us (as babies) interact in the first place with external objects, experience with them and distinguish them from us. So, it surely must have a central role to play in the process of consciousness, maybe taking the place of Damasio's more general «proto-self».Anyway, Damasio's book is a great one that made me think a lot and put order in my own thoughts. He is a courageous scientist trying to explain objectively what is going on subjectively. He is upgrading with the newest science what great thinkers like Hegel and Piaget had been doing (in other fields of knowledge).

Truly a "must read," albeit a first attempt

I'm a clinical neurologist myself, and familiar with Damasio's work...there's no doubt he's a first rate behavioral neurologist, who's made many original contributions on both theoretical and clinical levels to neuroscience and neurology. I believe his particular breakdown of consciousness into several levels..."proto" "core" "autobiographical" and "extended"...to be both novel and supported by clinical evidence and intuition. It is inaccurate to say that Damasio equates consciousness with the reticular activating system. In fact, he conceives "core consciousness", the unadorned feeling of self, to be a network function including not only the RAS, but the intralaminar thalamic nuclei and cingulate and primary somatosensory cortex. I also disagree strongly with the reviewer who felt the ideas were largely redundant with previous philosophical attempts at explanations of consciousness. Though I agree the book is at times wordy and could use more detailed scientific backup in places, it is clearly aimed at a popular audience. I look forward to seeing his paradigm used in further neuroscientific research on consciousness, and I'm convinced it will be. This book is definitely on the right track, and one shouldn't hesitate to read it. I'd also note that the book is strongly endorsed by leading scientists and philosophers, such as Eric Kandel, David Hubel, and the Churchlands.

An exceptional synthesis, with many original ideas

This is a landmark book, almost irrespective of how accurate all of Antonio Damasio's extensive theoretical formulations turn out to be. He is the first to admit (in the book itself) that things are changing so fast in this area of neuroscience that virtually nothing on the table at this point can be considered doctrinal, or not subject to potentially major modifications. That being said, I suspect that much of Damasio's more original terminology, terms such as "proto-self," "core-self," "autobiographical self," "core consciousness," and "extended consciousness" will quickly become part of the basic lexicon in consciousness neuroscience in many quarters, due to the shear force of his ideas and the volume of original thought in this work. At the heart of this enterprise is Antonio Damasio's supposition (generally not informing much theorizing about consciousness) that the brain can't be conscious unless it represents not just objects, but a primitive self, and also represents the basic manner in which the self is being altered by interaction with the object(s). In other words, consciousness requires that the brain must represent not just the object, not just a basic self structure, but the interaction of the two. This is still an atypical foundation for a theory of consciousness, given that until recently, it was implicitly assumed that the self could be safely left out of the equation. There has been a recent sea change on this crucial point, parallel with the cogent formulations in Damasio's book. The book will challenge and delight the most sophisticated readers, while rarely leaving the less sophisticated lost or overwhelmed. Damasio makes great use of the rich empirical database provided by the neurology of diseases of consciousness that some theorists of consciousness seem to know almost nothing about, and pay little attention to. The book also addresses in a most thoughtful and sophisticated fashion the problem(s) of self, and carefully unbundles the mostly conflated hierarchical nature of self and consciousness into separate but intimately related systems. It is tightly and carefully reasoned and empirically grounded. It integrates emotion and the body in the story of consciousness. Damasio deals skillfully with conceptual pitfalls in our commonplace terminology of "maps," "neural (neurodynamic) patterns," and "representations" (don't miss it stashed in the appendix!!) The book integrates classical RAS theory and neo-classical ERTAS (extended reticular thalamic activating system) theory into a broader theory about the ventral brain, that of "proto-self mappings and structures." Damasio admits readily this formulation is without the differential functional specificity for the proto-self structures (as perhaps the earliest functionally concerted, distributed system?) that he deeply hopes to see further developed. Further understanding of the functionally concerted and re-entrant operation