Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness

by Daniel C. Dennett

Book Overview

In the years since Daniel Dennett's influential Consciousness Explained was published in 1991, scientific research on consciousness has been a hotly contested battleground of rival theories--"so... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0262042258
• ISBN13: 9780262042253
• Release Date: January 2005
• Publisher: Bradford Book
• Length: 216 Pages
• Weight: 0.85 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.7" x 6.2" x 8.0"

Customer Reviews

Dennett and His Career

I feel like this work is a summation and a review of Dennett's work. It's not readily available to those who are not already familiar with common problems in the philosophy of consciousness--problems like zombies and qualia. But if you are familiar with these problems, the book reads like a definitive statement. Here is Daniel Dennett, perhaps nearing the end of a career, putting his foot down. And thank goodness (not God--this is Dennett after all) for that. As Dennett has always been one of my favorite philosophers, one of the men whose intuitions I have been always willing to follow, sometimes without the necessary evidence, it is good to see him come down firmly on one or another side of these issues. Without question, in this work, he is at his lightest (I've laughed out loud several times reading it). But he still asks the hard questions of Searle, Tye and Chalmers. Gut instincts and feelings of "Surely" and what is "obvious" tell us nothing about consciousness since common cognitive science has taught us that so much of what we "know" is often an illusion. There is more to functionalism than people are willing to admit yet, and this book is clearly ahead of the curve. Thank goodness for Daniel Dennett. We may yet come to understand ourselves. (As an aside, you can get an interesting taste for this book by watching Dennett's lecture on TED:[...]

A bit disappointing

I read this book after reading Consciousness Explained and The Mind's I. I'm giving the book 4 stars because it's still a good book, but compared to Consciousness Explained it's just a little small and has way less information in it. You can see they had problems filling this book, there is much line spacing and some passages appear twice. The advantage of this is that it's easier to read. If you want to spend months reading a book and learning very very much, read Consciousness Explained. If you want to spend weeks reading a book and get a general (and more actual) impression of Dennett's viewpoints, read Sweet Dreams. And of course, if you're a Dennett fan like me, read both :). (Although i don't agree with him on some points... e.g. i don't like he says consciousness is no mystery, he seems to think that he has almost solved the problem, i still see many problems)

The Mystery of the Zombie Hunch

As the concept of the modular structure of the brain emerged, objections to the idea took the form of "Well, if my brain's made up of computers, somebody in there has to be in charge. It had better be me!" This comment, paraphrased from philosopher Jerry Fodor, typifies what Daniel Dennett has been contending with for many years. Although the "Cartesian theatre" notion, that the body was one aspect of our being and the mind another - "dualism" - has supposedly been supplanted, it has not lost its hold on our view of consciousness. We continue to insist, in some form or other, that "somebody, and it better be me" is inside our minds looking out at the world. Although we can't find that "self" in there, we have a hunch it's there. When Dennett wrote "Consciousness Explained" in 1991, it seemed the "homunculus" representing our "self" had been laid to rest. This excellent collection of essays and lectures, is an update on that earlier work. As lectures, they have a conversational tone, yet impart many deep insights. Addressing consciousness through four major themes, Dennett shows us the project of eradicating "dualism" remains incomplete. Until that view of "self" is discarded, our understanding of consciousness will remain misleading. The first theme he addresses is the "zombie". Philosophers have posed the idea that a duplicate person, identical to you in every way but one, is logically possible. The person would act as you act, talk as you do, have the same preferences and distastes. But it would not be conscious. This proposal presumes that something in you could be identified that is lacking in the zombie. For most of us, who still feel our "self" remains somehow separate within us, the logic seems reasonable. Dennett carefully examines the implications of the proposal, and dismisses it as modernised dualism. If a region of the brain holds the key to "self" it remains out of sight and undetectable. Perhaps the most challenging segment of the book deals with "heterophenomonology". This tongue-twisting phrase refers to the methods used in cognitive science. Because consciousness is "often celebrated as a mystery beyond science" Dennett challenges researchers to take a step back from commonly accepted techniques. Become a "Martian" cognitive scientist to broaden the scope of the work. One facet of this approach relies on understanding what "folk psychology" is, then building from there. We prefer to believe that what we believe is entirely private and unaccessible. Heterophenomonolgy, he contends, will expose aspects of our consciousness we view as a "mystery". One of those "mysteries" has been wrapped in the idea of "qualia". Probably one of the poorest concepts in philosophy, "qualia" are things said to possess "intrinsic qualities". When you carefully examine those "intrinsic" properties, they begin to fade and vanish. If "qualia" is in an object we see, such as colour, how can it change without our noticing?

Consciousness Explained stands up to scrutiny

This book is essentially a follow-up to the author's previous work Consciousness Explained. Dennett revises and builds upon the ideas he put forward in that book, and addresses some of the criticism that has been leveled against his theory of consciousness in the intervening years. He also reviews some of the development (or lack thereof!) in the study of and debate over the question of consciousness over the past few years. As always, Daniel Dennett presents his ideas with great precision and eloquence. No other writer I have read does a better job of shedding light on the question of consciousness. As the author repeatedly cautions, much work remains to be done before we have a full understanding of how human consciousness works. But Dennett rejects the "Mysterian" view that consciousness is something special which by its very nature we can never obtain an understanding of using the scientific method. He puts forward a methodology for the systematic study of consciousness, and shows persuasively that it is a phenomenon just as open to scientific inquiry as any other biological function. One of the major themes in both Consciousness Explained and in this postscript to it is idea of "zombies", the subject of an old philosophical thought-experiment. The zombie is a creature indistinguishable from normal people but which has no internal mental life, no consciousness. As Dennett says he addresses the question of zombies reluctantly since it has been the source of so much confusion. He shows very clearly how the concept has little use in clarifying the question of consciousness. He also addresses the inevitable question of artificial intelligence and whether it is possible for "mere machines" to be consciousness. The answer turns out to be yes, since those conscious machines are us! It would be best to read the author's previous book Consciousness Explained before reading this one.

Brilliant follow up to Consciousness Explained

In these incredibly readable and lucid essays and lectures, Dennett follows up on the ideas he put forth in his seminal work "Consciousness Explained" The intervening years have allowed Dennett to hone his thoughts to laser-precision and it is simply a joy to watch him walk the reader through the logic of his arguments.