Anarchy, State, and Utopia

I disagree with the substantive claims of political philosophy that this book makes, but it would be churlish of me not to give this 5 stars. Giving intellectual credibility to a superior predecessor to libertarianism, Nozick devotes half of this book to defending the minimal state and the other half to presenting him notion of patterned distribution against Rawls contractualism. Sharp and insightful, ASU is also unusually readable for modern political philosophy.

Rawls and Nozick were responsible for reinvigorating rights-based liberalism in the 20th century, saving political philosophy from mere in-fighting among utilitarians, and the superstitions of Marxism. Political philosophy since is largely a response to Rawls and Nozick.

This is a work of genius, though it is frequently misunderstood, perhaps on purpose. Most readers, including important philosophers like Thomas Nagel, simply misunderstand the argumentative structure, with the result that many famous criticisms of the book are irrelevant.

Nozick's thesis is that a minimal state can be justified, but a more than minimal state cannot, except under unusual situations.

Part I of the book is addressed to other libertarians, specifically market anarchists (also called anarcho-capitalists). As such, Nozick assumes libertarian rights of self-ownership (or self-governance). Basically, Nozick wants to show market anarchists that a minimal state can arise without violating anybody's rights, where the rights in question are things that all parties to the debate agree that we have. To do so, he describes a scenario in which security companies come inevitably to have natural monopolies over geographic areas. After providing a highly original analysis of the nature of risk and its moral implications, plus a hugely important discussion of side constraints and moral prohibitions, Nozick establishes that such a monopoly would legitimately prohibit other security firms and independent enforcers from operating in its area, provided it compensates everyone involved. The most natural form of compensation is free security. Nozick then argues that an equilibrium will occur in which the security of all can be provided for with an analogue of coercive taxation.

At the end of this section, Nozick, provided the argument is successful (and there are good reasons to think it is not) has established that an agency provided court, military, and police services in a geographic area will arise without violating rights and without the explicit intention of creating a state.

A very common misreading of Nozick occurs here. Many philosophers think Nozick believes that only a state that does arise in this manner and has this form (of a security company with private shareholders) can be legitimate. Nozick didn't think this and isn't committed to it. Instead, what he believes he has shown is both that a minimal state is desirable (it would arise unintentionally as a result of spontaneous order because it is superior to market anarchy) and legitimate. Nozick can then say that this leaves open whether the state will be democratic and in what way.

The second part of the book is meant to challenge arguments for the more than minimal state. It is also misunderstood, even by very smart people. Nozick does not assume libertarian rights in part II, though he refers to them at times. Instead, his argument consists of three factors. First, he primarily addresses egalitarian liberals (hereafter e-liberals). E-liberals believe that rights to personal freedoms (sexual activity, etc.) are justified, but hold that economic activity can be controlled by government decree. Nozick examines e-liberals reasons for wanting a more-than-minimal state (such as a welfare state or social democracy), and debunks them by drawing analogies between the economic activity the e-liberal would regulate and personal freedoms the e-liberal desires to leave free. If the e-liberal cannot identify a morally salient difference, she is forced to either deny the personal freedom, thus becoming an authoritarian, or admit that the economic activity should remain free, thus conceding Nozick's point.

Another style of argument used in part II is what I will call "the liberal presumption" argument. The liberal presumption is that any human activity ought to remain unregulated by laws unless some strong reason can be shown to regulate the activity. (This can be contrasted against the authoritarian presumption, which Mussolini and Stalin held, namely that any activity ought to be governed unless strong reason can be shown to let it be free.) Nozick addresses e-liberals, who hold the liberal presumption, and then attacks the reasons they offer in support of regulating various activities. He shows that the reasons are based on misunderstandings and bad arguments, thus restoring the liberal presumption.

The last type of argument does not rely on this presumption. Nozick addresses Marxists, for instance, who are not liberals. His arguments against them consists mostly of just showing what's wrong with their position. For instance, Marxist exploitation theory crucially depends upon bad economic theory, such as the labor theory of value, something which was shown false back in the early 1870s. (Almost all contemporary economists would agree with Nozick on this. Marxism is to smart people what creationism is to dumb people, a pseudo-science.)

The result of these arguments is to show that the more than minimal state cannot be justified.

Along the way, in part II, Nozick provides us with some gems. He gives the first major critique of Rawls. The critique is devastating, as Nozick points out mistakes in Rawls reasoning (simple logical errors, etc.) that leave Rawls' project ungrounded. Rawls, for some reason, never responded to this critique. Nozick also analyzes envy, and provides hypothetical histories to arrive at the more than minimal state that uncover its nature (it is logically equivalent to system in which we all own parts of each other). He also sketches a theory of justice in holdings to contrast with Rawls, Dworkin, and others. This theory, the entitlement theory, is very rough, but it provides a welcome alternative to simplistic theories maintaining that all there is to justice is establishing patterns of ownership.

Part III is the least often read and least understood part of the book. Partly, it provides a contractarian argument for libertarianism (see Loren Lomasky's article in David Schmidtz' book, Robert Nozick, contemporary philosophy in focus). It thus contains some of the foundations that Nagel claims Nozick lacks (though this criticism is based on Nagel's mistaken reading.) In part III, Nozick asks us to try to construct a system that allows for experimentation and in which everyone, despite their differences, can find a society that allows them to live out their conceptions of the good. The system that best approaches this is a libertarian framework, inside of which non-libertarian communities may be established provided they respect other, different communities. Part III is sketchy, but contains seeds of brilliant things, and it is too bad it hasn't been explored more.

Overall, I would say that the argument of part I is the weakest, part II is the strongest, and part III the most interesting and ripe with philosophical potential.

If you care about political philosophy, you owe it to yourself to read this book. You also owe it to yourself to understand it. If you find yourself thinking Nozick is making a dumb mistake or begging the question, you've misunderstood. But you'll be in good company.

An observation and common criticism of the book, both in this little Amazon fishbowl and elsewhere, is that Nozick takes givens, starts the arguments, and proceeds without initial justification of his givens.

The charge is accurate. So throughout the logic of the case he builds one finds comments like, "This does not take seriously the person as an individual" with no support or clarification. What are these statements? Are they broad appeals to what everyone has already recognized through some moral sensory apparatus, a moral fact? Are they simply what Nozick has taken as true beyond dispute, or at least, beyond fruitful argument?

Some times they are. Some times, as with property rights, Nozick has simply accepted the work of previous thinkers, there John Locke. Are there flaws with Locke's property rights base? Yes, indeed there are flaws with any theory, and one must accept the least flawed if he ever wants to advance to a higher subject. This is especially true of ethics. But Locke is certainly no insignificant thinker, but rather a reliable starting point of an analysis. And what the author perceives as commonly accepted (but not necessarily unanimously accepted) principles are fair game when one is presenting an argument--without such data, we have nothing but skepticism unbounded.

And yet many seem intent on criticizing Nozick for not reinventing the wheel--for simply filling in gaps in other theories, weaving certain ones together in new ways without going through the substrata of the entire philosophy of Western civilization, doublechecking each vein.

I find that criticism unfair. Each writer, each theoretician, must accept certain truths to begin with, accept some axioms and from thence go forward. It simply won't do to demand an entire universe in every book. Some times the premisses a writer starts with will be bizarre to the reader, and so he will not accept the conclusions. Those skeptical of "rights" in general will find trouble accepting where we are led--and if the premisses started with are so absurd perhaps we can rebuke the author for his warped view on reality. But nothing presumed here can be dismissed so easily. You may charge, accurately, that Nozick has yet to prove the existence of external reality, and ergo, this political argument is unsupported. But you're a silly person to do so.

And some of you take the idea that a progressive tax could be immoral to be simply insane, and thus you find the book's conclusion contrary to reality as such. But I tell you the quality of the book is not merely its truth (though I do believe Nozick has presented here a powerful moral truth), but also the case Nozick builds from the (often widely-held) premisses he selects, and the mastery and beauty of that case. I don't think anyone can fairly deny the grandness of what he has done here. (I am not arguing that truth is insignificant--I am arguing it is one of many components of quality).

To be honest, I loved this book. I loved the honesty, I loved the politics he justified, I loved the vibrancy of Nozick's arguments, the freshness of his methods, the power of the Rawlsian critique, the dangling tantalizing questions. I loved the parts I agreed with and those I didn't agree with.

I loved the setup--the journey through economic theory to bring us a just minimal state from the anarchist's state of nature. I loved the detours along the way--the discussion of animal rights, utilitarianism, punishment and deterrence. I loved the minimal state, and the crisp arguments that ruled any increase in it immoral. I loved the discussion of utopia, born like dessert after a full meal, a whole new set of fun arguments, providing us with more rich analytic devices, and exploding possibilities.

I loved Nozick's style--never, not for a second, patronizing. Smart, quick, concise and dense, poignant with its thoughts, and yet neighborly, polite, forthright and friendly. Were I not already a libertarian I'd be one now. Were I not already interested in philosophy, I would be now. Were I not already an ardent Nozick groupie, I would be now.

There is a passage where Nozick gives a short paean to Rawls, the beauty of his theory, the mastery of his technique. Surely Rawls deserves it, but there can be no doubt that after this work, Nozick deserves no less glowing praise. It is hard to stress sufficiently the warmth and artistry of what the author accomplishes: the birth of a political philosophy, and a journey there with every step amazing. No cliches, no tricks, just light.

With this book, the libertarians have carved a slice of truth from the world. We can be defeated--but now we must at least be faced.

To refute the propoganda that was written about Nozick by reveiwer Roger Albin, that Nozick is no longer a Libertarian, here is a an interview with Nozick in an article that appeared originally on the Liberator Online September 11, 2001:

Robert Nozick (1939-2002) is one of the most respected and honored philosophers in the world.
In 1974, Nozick -- then a largely unknown thirty-five-year-old professor of philosophy at Harvard -- published Anarchy, State, and Utopia. The book startled and amazed reviewers, reached a huge audience, and immediately established Nozick's reputation as a major new figure in philosophy -- in fact, as an international intellectual celebrity.
Anarchy, State, and Utopia was a rigorous examination and defense of libertarianism. It was controversial, exciting, and -- most shockingly for a serious philosophical work -- a pleasure to read. And it is hard to overstate the book's importance to libertarianism.
As Laissez Faire Books editor Roy Childs wrote in 1989:
"Nozick's 'Anarchy, State, and Utopia' single-handedly established the legitimacy of libertarianism as a political theory in the world of academia. Indeed, it is not too much to say that without Nozick's book, there might not be a vital and growing academic libertarian movement today, making its way from university to university, from discipline to discipline, from nation to nation."
So it was all the more shocking (and tragic for libertarianism) when, in his 1989 book "The Examined Life," Nozick hinted he had rejected the libertarian philosophy he presented so brilliantly in "Anarchy, State and Utopia." Rumors begin flying that Nozick had abandoned libertarianism. Some even said he had embraced socialism!
In a fascinating and far-ranging new interview with Laissez Faire Books Associate Editor Julian Sanchez, Nozick said he'd been a libertarian all along.

An excerpt:

Sanchez: "In 'The Examined Life' (1989), you reported that you had come to see the libertarian position that you'd advanced in 'Anarchy, State and Utopia' (1974) as 'seriously inadequate.'
But there are several places in 'Invariances' where you seem to suggest that you consider the view advanced there, broadly speaking, at least, a libertarian one. Would you now, again, self-apply the L-word?"

Robert Nozick: "Yes. But I never stopped self-applying it. What I was really saying in 'The Examined Life' was that I was no longer as hardcore a libertarian as I had been before. But the rumors of my deviation (or apostasy!) from libertarianism were much exaggerated. I think this book makes clear the extent to which I still am within the general framework of libertarianism, especially the ethics chapter and its section on the 'Core Principle of Ethics.'"

NOTE: Nozick's scholarly work is not casual reading. Yet it is well worth the effort for the serious student of ideas. We never recommend Anarchy, State and Utopia without also passing along Roy Child's wisdom on how to read this marvelous book: "Two final things to remember: This is a book of many parts, and you can usually skip a section without harm, returning to it later. Finally, Nozick sometimes retreats into math and other modes of argument that are beyond me. I always skip this stuff and I've never had a single sleepless night over it."

This book is one of the most unusual in the history of political philosophy, and perhaps one of most brilliant. The author's ideas are thought-provoking and highly original, and he asks the reader to consider arguments, rather than engaging in a "diatribe to convince" (my words here). The author creates a reading atmosphere of intellectual honesty, and this helps to soften the possible uneasiness that some readers might feel in encountering these kinds of arguments for the first time. Some may seem radical and unpalatable for readers of other political persuasions, but any reader who is open to new ideas should find the reading highly interesting. The political philosophy of libertarianism finds its best apology here, but the contents of the book, and the method of presentation will and has found application to other political philosophies, and to legal philosophy.

In the first chapter, the author asks the reader to consider what he calls the "state-of-nature theory". This (Lockean) notion, although archaic in the author's view, allows one to answer whether a state would have to be invented if it did not exist, this being a classical question in liberal political philosophy. The chapter is a detailed justification for pursuing the state-of-nature theory. He holds to the premise that one can only understand the political realm by explaining it in terms of the nonpolitical. He thus begins with the Lockean state of nature concept and uses it to build a justification for the state in the rest of the book.

Most of the discussion in part 1 of the book revolves around the "dominant protective association" in a given geographical area. The author then builds on this in an attempt to justify from a moral perspective "the minimal state". Along the way, one reads about the "ultraminimal state", which has a monopoly over the use of force except that necessary for immediate self-defense, but will not provide protection to those who do not purchase it. The author discusses the tension that arises between the ultraminimal state and those who decide not to participate in it. The game-theoretic, optimization-theoretic approach that the author takes, although not advanced and rigorous from a mathematical standpoint, is very straightforward to follow for those not familiar with the more analytical and formal aspects of many modern treatments of political science.

In part 2 the author attempts to deal with alternatives to the minimal state, such as those proposed by the political philosopher John Rawls, and incorporating the doctrine of "distributive justice". The entitlement-welfare state dialog has not abated in modern political debate, and those who desire an in-depth analysis of these debates will find it in this book. And again, game-theoretic analysis comes into play, although not from a rigorous mathematical standpoint. One of the more interesting discussions in this part concerns the right of individuals to leave a state that they find too compulsory. If a compulsory distribution scheme is the most important, why would a state permit this emigration? Would such an overidding principle of compulsory distribution also permit forced immigration? These are the kinds of questions that the author addresses in the book, and some are left solely for consideration by the reader.

Reader who desire a list of platitudes and endless arguments supporting libertarianism will not find them in this book. Readers though who are not concerned with their political and cognitive equilibrium disturbed will enjoy immensely this book. If it can assist in more careful individual consideration of accepted political doctrine and moral cliches, it has done its job.

...and indeed it has.